A threatens to play strategy W. This threat is:
a. credible because the Nash equilibrium occurs where A plays W and B plays Z.
b. credible because the joint optimal solution occurs where A plays W and B plays Z.
c. not credible because A‘s dominant strategy is to play X.
d. credible because A‘s dominant strategy is to play W.
e. not credible because B will never play strategy Z.
Duopolists A and B face the following demand curves: QA = 100 ” 2PA + 5PB and QB =
120 ” 3PB + 4PA. If both firms have zero marginal cost, what are the profit-maximizing
prices and quantities?
a. PA = 300, QA = 600, PB = 220, QB = 660.
b. PA = 200, QA = 400, PB = 200, QB = 400.
c. PA = 200, QA = 700, PB = 200, QB = 320.
d. PA = 300, QA = 750, PB = 250, QB = 570.
e. PA = 300, QA = 1,250, PB = 350, QB = 270.