CHAPTER 9: COOPERATIVE ALLIANCES
Chapter Summary
We started this chapter by considering the problem of altruism: design features that aid the reproduction
of other individuals, even though the altruist who has this feature incurs a cost. The puzzle is how such
altruism could have evolved, given that it seems to go against Hamilton’s rule. One solution came from
the theory of reciprocal altruism, which states that psychological mechanisms for providing benefits to
nonrelatives can
evolve as long as those benefits are reciprocated in the future. The most important adaptive problem the
reciprocal altruist faces, however, is the threat of cheaters—people who take benefits without
reciprocating at a later time.
One solution to this problem emerged from a computer tournament conducted by Robert Axelrod. He
discovered that tit for tat—a strategy of cooperating on the first move but reciprocating thereafter—was
highly successful. It tended to promote cooperation but also helped to solve the problem of cheating by
punishing defectors immediately.
Examples of reciprocal altruism occur in the animal world. Vampire bats share their blood with “friends”
who were unsuccessful on any given night; at a later point, the friends reciprocate the favor, giving blood
preferentially to those who have recently helped them. Among chimpanzees, reciprocal alliances form
among males, among females, and among males and females.
In addition to kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, two other evolutionary theories have been proposed to
explain altruism: indirect reciprocity and costly signaling. With indirect reciprocity, altruists do not
benefit by gaining a return benefit from the person they helped. Rather, others who witness or hear about
their generosity are more likely to provide aid to the altruists. With costly signaling, acts of great helping
and self-sacrifice provide an honest signal to others about one’s condition and resource-holding potential
because
only those in excellent condition can “afford” to provide the costly signal. Costly signaling increases a
person’s status and reputation, which in turn benefits the costly signaler. In sum, there are at least four
ways in which altruism can evolve: kin selection (altruism toward genetic relatives), reciprocal altruism,
indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling.