his income in Philadelphia; the taxpayer did not maintain an office in
Philadelphia, and the taxpayer’s sales territory did not include his residence. The
Tax Court had originally found that Philadelphia was the taxpayer’s “tax home”
for § 161 (a) purposes and the deductibility of his travel, meals, and lodging must
be determined with Philadelphia as the point of departure instead of McLean,
Virginia. This finding was originally reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, but upon a petition to rehear the case, the Fourth Circuit
reheard the appeal and reversed its earlier decision, thus affirming the Tax Court
decision. In a concurring opinion, Judge Murnaghan agreed with the result of the
case, but thought that Congress should deal with the issue in which one spouse’s
situation (e.g., here taxpayer’s wife and her employment situs) plays a significant
role in determining the situs of the other spouse’s “tax home.”
Applying the case law to the facts in the problem, it is noteworthy that M need
only cross a bridge to reach his sales territory; thus, M’s position is arguably
tantamount to living in his territory. Also noteworthy is that M’s wife is employed
in Cincinnati. In light of Judge Murnaghan’s concurring opinion in the Daly case,
supra, this gives M a significant reason for residing there. Finally, M does not
maintain an office in Louisville, although he obviously spends a great deal of time
there in income-producing activities. M’s situation seems to closely follow the
pattern in Daly, except for the taxpayer’s close proximity of his residence to his
sales territory. If M could construct an argument that would distinguish his
situation from Daly based on the close proximity of his residence to his sales
territory, M might find support from Schreiner, supra. M should seek to convince
the court that Cincinnati is as reasonable a place to live to serve his employer’s
business as is Louisville, and thus his “tax home” should be Cincinnati. M would
need to show that he did not live in Cincinnati and travel to Louisville merely for
personal reasons and that his travel to Louisville is necessary and appropriate to
conduct of his employer’s business. However, Bunewith, supra, where the
deduction was denied to a taxpayer who lived outside of his work territory,
coupled with the more recent Daly decision, could pose a threat to M’s ability to
take a travel expense deduction using Cincinnati instead of Louisville as the point
of departure. The Daly decision focused not only on establishing a “tax home” for
the taxpayer where he made most of his income, but also showed that the court
will closely scrutinize the situation to disallow the deduction when the taxpayer’s
travel is motivated by personal reasons which the law deems irrelevant.
Moreover, Judge Murnaghan in his concurring opinion to Daly argued that the
plight of two-earner spouses, where one’s situation has a significant influence on
the other’s tax home, is a matter for Congress to resolve. The cases indicate that
the courts are reluctant to delve into areas properly resolved by legislation. Thus,
in light of the similarity of the facts of the problem to Daly, M will probably not
be allowed travel expense deductions for trips to Louisville, as that city will be
deemed M’s “tax home” for § 162(a)(2) purposes.
8-42 In order for R to claim a deduction for the payments to his employees, the
expenses must first meet the general requirements imposed on all potential
business deductions under § 162. This provision allows a deduction for all the