24) Suppose that in a market for used cars, there are good used cars and bad used cars (lemons).
Consumers are willing to pay as much as $6,000 for a good used car but only $1,000 for a lemon.
Sellers of good used cars value their cars at $5,000 each and sellers of lemons value their cars at
$800 each. Buyers cannot tell if a used car is reliable or is a lemon. Based on this information,
what is the likely outcome in the market for used cars?
A) Both good used cars and lemons will sell for $4,500 each.
B) Only lemons will sell, for $800 each.
C) Both good used cars and lemons will sell for $1,000 each.
D) Most used cars offered for sale will be lemons.
25) Health insurance markets have a problem with insuring people who are “poor health risks”
while many people who are “good health risks” do not buy insurance. This problem is an
example of
A) moral hazard.
B) adverse selection.
C) market signaling.
D) asymmetric information.
26) All of the following are ways in which health insurance companies can potentially reduce
adverse selection except
A) by insuring only large groups of people.
B) by lowering the co-payments and deductibles on the policies they issue.
C) by refusing to insure some applicants, for example based on prior health conditions.
D) by finding out as much information about a person applying for insurance, for example
requiring a medical examination.