Financial Markets and Institutions, 6e (Mishkin/Eakins)
Chapter 7 Structure of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System
7.1 Multiple Choice
1) Americans’ fear of centralized power and their distrust of moneyed interests explains why
the U.S. did not have a central bank until the
A) 17th century.
B) 18th century.
C) 19th century.
D) 20th century.
2) Bank panics in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907 convinced many that
A) the Federal Reserve needed greater control over the banking system.
B) the Federal Reserve needed greater authority to deal with problem banks.
C) a central bank was needed to prevent future financial panics.
D) both A and B of the above.
3) The unusual structure of the Federal Reserve System is perhaps best explained by
A) Americans’ fear of centralized power.
B) the traditional American distrust of moneyed interests.
C) Americans’ desire to remove control of the money supply from the U.S. Treasury.
D) all of the above.
E) only A and B of the above.
4) The traditional American distrust of moneyed interests and the fear of centralized power
help to explain
A) the failures of the first two experiments in central banking in the United States.
B) the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System.
C) why the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is not located in New York.
D) all of the above.
E) only A and B of the above.
5) The financial panic of 1907 resulted in such widespread bank failures and substantial losses
to depositors that the American public finally became convinced that
A) the First Bank of the United States had failed to serve as a lender of last resort.
B) the Second Bank of the United States had failed to serve as a lender of last resort.
C) the Federal Reserve System had failed to serve as a lender of last resort.
D) a central bank was needed to prevent future panics.
6) Nationwide financial panics in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907 might have been avoided had
A) the First Bank of the United States served its intended role of lender of last resort.
B) the Second Bank of the United States not been abolished in 1836 by President Andrew
Jackson.
C) the Second Bank of the United States served its intended role of lender of last resort.
D) the Federal Reserve served its intended role of lender of last resort.
7) The many regional Federal Reserve banks resulted from a compromise between parties
favoring
A) establishment of a central bank and those opposed to its establishment.
B) a private central bank and those favoring a government institution.
C) establishment of the board of governors in Washington, D.C. and those preferring its
establishment in New York City.
D) none of the above.
8) Which of the following is an element of the Federal Reserve System?
A) The Federal Reserve banks
B) The board of governors
C) The FDIC
D) All of the above
E) Only A and B of the above
9) Which of the following is an element of the Federal Reserve System?
A) The Federal Reserve banks
B) The board of governors
C) The FOMC
D) All of the above
10) Which of the following is not an entity of the Federal Reserve System?
A) Federal Reserve banks
B) The FDIC
C) The board of governors
D) The Federal Advisory Council
E) Member commercial banks
11) Which of the following functions are not performed by any of the twelve regional Federal
Reserve banks?
A) Check clearing
B) Conducting economic research
C) Setting interest rates payable on time deposits
D) Issuing new currency
12) Which Federal Reserve Bank president always has a vote in the Federal Open Market
Committee?
A) Philadelphia
B) New York
C) Boston
D) San Francisco
13) Each Fed bank president attends FOMC meetings; although only _________ Fed bank
presidents vote on policy, all _________ provide input.
A) three; ten
B) five; ten
C) three; twelve
D) five; twelve
14) The _________ Fed bank, with about 25 percent of the system’s assets, is the most important
of the Federal Reserve banks.
A) Chicago
B) Los Angeles
C) Miami
D) New York
E) Washington, D.C.
15) Member commercial banks have purchased stock in their district Fed banks; the dividend
paid by that stock is limited to
A) four percent annually.
B) five percent annually.
C) six percent annually.
D) eight percent annually.
16) All _________ are required to be members of the Fed.
A) state chartered banks
B) nationally chartered banks
C) banks with more than $100 million in assets
D) banks with more than $500 million in assets
17) Which of the following banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve System?
A) state chartered banks
B) insured banks
C) banks having over $500 million in assets
D) none of the above
18) Of all commercial banks, about _________ percent belong to the Federal Reserve System.
A) 15
B) 20
C) 30
D) 50
19) Banks subject to reserve requirements set by the Federal Reserve System include
A) only state chartered banks.
B) only nationally chartered banks.
C) only banks with less than $100 million in assets.
D) only banks with less than $500 million in assets.
E) all banks whether or not they are members of the Federal Reserve System.
20) The Fed’s support of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 stemmed in part from its
A) concern over declining Fed membership.
B) belief that all banking regulations should be eliminated.
C) belief that interest rate ceilings were too low.
D) belief that depositors had to become more knowledgeable about banking operations.
21) Which of the following are duties of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System?
A) Setting margin requirements, the fraction of the purchase price of securities that has to
be paid for with cash.
B) Setting the maximum interest rates payable on certain types of time deposits under
Regulation Q.
C) Regulating credit with the approval of the President under the Credit Control Act of
1969.
D) None of the above has been a duty of the board since the mid–1980s.
22) Which of the following are not duties of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System?
A) Setting margin requirements, the fraction of the purchase price of securities that has to
be paid for with cash.
B) Setting the maximum interest rates payable on certain types of time deposits under
Regulation Q.
C) Approving the discount rate “established” by the Federal Reserve banks.
D) Representing the United States in negotiations with foreign governments on economic
matters.
23) The chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System exercises a high
degree of control over the board
A) through his ability to set the agenda of the board and the FOMC.
B) through his role as spokesman for the Fed with the President and before Congress.
C) because he can veto decisions made by a majority of the other board members.
D) because of all of the above.
E) because of only A and B of the above.
24) Members of the board of governors are
A) chosen by the Federal Reserve Bank presidents.
B) appointed by the newly elected President of the United States, as are cabinet positions.
C) appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate as
members resign.
D) never allowed to serve more than seven–year terms.
25) Each member of the seven–member board of governors is appointed by the president and
confirmed by the Senate to serve
A) 4–year terms.
B) 6–year terms.
C) 14–year terms.
D) as long as the appointing president remains in office.
26) The board of governors
A) establishes, within limits, reserve requirements.
B) effectively sets the discount rate.
C) sets margin requirements.
D) does all of the above.
E) does only A and B of the above.
27) Although neither _________ nor the _________ is officially set by the Federal Open Market
Committee, decisions concerning these policy tools are effectively made by the committee.
A) margin requirements; discount rate
B) margin requirements; federal funds rate
C) reserve requirements; discount rate
D) reserve requirements; federal funds rate
28) Although the Federal Open Market Committee does not have formal authority to set
_________ and the _________, it does possess the authority in practice.
A) margin requirements; discount rate
B) margin requirements; federal funds rate
C) reserve requirements; discount rate
D) reserve requirements; federal funds rate
29) Which of the following are true statements?
A) The FOMC usually meets every six weeks to set monetary policy.
B) The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the New York Fed.
C) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act did not envision the use of open market
operations as a monetary policy tool.
D) All of the above are true statements.
E) Only A and B of the above are true statements.
30) The Federal Open Market Committee consists of
A) the five senior members of the seven–member board of governors.
B) the seven members of the board of governors and seven presidents of the regional Fed
banks.
C) the seven members of the board of governors and five presidents of the regional Fed
banks.
D) the twelve regional Fed bank presidents and the chairman of the board of governors.
31) The Federal Reserve entity that determines monetary policy strategy is the
A) board of governors.
B) Federal Open Market Committee.
C) Chairman of the board of governors.
D) Shadow Open Market Committee.
32) Which of the following are true statements?
A) The FOMC usually meets every six weeks to set monetary policy.
B) The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the New York Fed.
C) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act did not envision the use of discount lending as a
monetary policy tool.
D) All of the above are true statements.
E) Only A and B of the above are true statements.
33) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 had not intended for the Fed to use
A) open market operations as a monetary policy tool.
B) reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool.
C) the discount rate as a monetary policy tool.
D) either (a) or (b) of the above.
E) either (a) or (c) of the above.
34) The designers of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 intended the Fed to have one primary
monetary tool:
A) open market operations.
B) discounting.
C) setting reserve requirements.
D) setting margin requirements.
35) The designers of the Federal Reserve Act meant to create a central bank characterized by its
A) system of checks and balances and decentralization of power.
B) strong concentration of power in the hands of a few people.
C) inability to function as a lender–of–last–resort.
D) responsiveness to the electorate.
36) Which of the following are true statements?
A) The Banking Act of 1933 set in motion a series of changes that gave the board of
governors more control over Fed operations.
B) The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the New York Fed.
C) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act did not envision the use of discount lending as a
monetary policy tool.
D) All of the above are true statements.
E) Only A and B of the above are true statements.
37) Which of the following are true statements?
A) The Banking Act of 1933 set in motion a series of changes that gave the board of
governors more control over Fed operations.
B) The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the New York Fed.
C) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act did not envision the use of open market
operations as a monetary policy tool.
D) All of the above are true statements.
E) Only A and B of the above are true statements.
38) The power within the Federal Reserve was effectively transferred to the board of governors
by
A) the banking legislation of the Great Depression.
B) Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s.
C) the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
D) the Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord of 1951.
39) Factors that provide the Federal Reserve with a high degree of independence include
A) 14–year terms for members of the board of governors.
B) a four–year term for the chairman of the board of governors that is not coincident with
the President’s term of office.
C) constitutional independence from Congress and the President.
D) all of the above.
E) only A and B of the above.
40) Federal Reserve independence is thought to
A) introduce a short–term bias to monetary policymaking.
B) lead to better fiscal and monetary policy coordination.
C) introduce longer–run considerations to monetary policymaking.
D) do both A and B of the above.
41) Members of Congress are able to influence monetary policy, albeit indirectly, through their
ability to
A) withhold appropriations from the board of governors.
B) withhold appropriations from the Federal Open Market Committee.
C) propose legislation that would force the Fed to submit budget requests to Congress, as
must other government agencies.
D) do all of the above.
42) Although it enjoys a high degree of autonomy, the Fed is still subject to the influence of
Congress because
A) Congress can pass legislation that would restrict the Fed’s independence.
B) Congress can withhold the Fed’s budget requests.
C) Congress can remove members of the board of governors whose views on policy differ
from those of key members of Congress.
D) All of the above.
43) According to the textbook authors, the Fed is
A) remarkably free of the political pressures that influence other government agencies.
B) more responsive to the political pressures that influence other government agencies.
C) probably somewhat constrained in its policy making by the congressional threat to
reduce Fed independence.
D) both A and C of the above.
44) According to the textbook authors,
A) the Fed appears to be remarkably free of the political pressures that influence other
government agencies.
B) since the president can protect the Fed from Congress, the Fed may be responsive to
the president’s policy preferences.
C) the Fed appears to be more responsive to the political pressures that influence other
government agencies.
D) both A and B of the above.
E) both B and C of the above.
45) Which of the following have acted to limit the Federal Reserve’s independence?
A) The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978
B) House Concurrent Resolution 133
C) Both of the above
D) Neither of the above
46) The Fed may feel pressure to support the president’s policies since the president can
A) dismiss members of the board of governors appointed by previous presidents.
B) appoint a new chairman of the board of governors immediately after
taking office.
C) veto legislation that might limit the Fed’s discretionary authority and power.
D) do all of the above.
E) do both A and C of the above.
47) The Fed may feel pressure to support the president’s policies since the president
A) can appoint a majority of the board of governors after a few years, as few appointees
serve their full 14–year terms.
B) can veto legislation that might limit the Fed’s discretionary power and authority.
C) can dismiss Board members that have been appointed by previous presidents.
D) can do all of the above.
E) can do only A and B of the above.
48) The oldest central bank, founded in 1694, is the
A) Bank of England.
B) Deutsche Bundesbank.
C) Bank of Japan.
D) Federal Reserve System.
49) The newest central bank, which began operations in January, 1999, is the
A) European Central Bank.
B) Bank of Argentina.
C) Bank of Korea.
D) Bank of New Zealand.
50) Which of the following central banks has the greatest degree of independence?
A) Bank of England
B) European Central Bank
C) Bank of Japan
D) Federal Reserve System
51) Which of the following central banks has the greatest degree of independence?
A) Bank of England
B) Bank of Canada
C) Bank of Japan
D) Swiss National Bank
52) Of the following central banks, the one that enjoys the least degree of independence is the
A) Federal Reserve System.
B) Deutsche Bundesbank.
C) Bank of Italy.
D) Swiss National Bank.
53) A trend in recent years is that more and more governments
A) have been granting greater independence to their central banks.
B) have been reducing the independence of their central banks to make them more
accountable for poor economic performance.
C) have mandated that their central banks give up multiple policy goals to focus strictly
on inflation.
D) have required their central banks to coordinate policies with their ministers of finance.
54) The theory of bureaucratic behavior suggests that the objective of a bureaucracy is to
maximize
A) the public’s welfare.
B) its own welfare.
C) profits.
D) conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government.
55) The theory of bureaucratic behavior suggests that the Federal Reserve will
A) try to avoid a conflict with the President and Congress over increases in interest rates.
B) try to gain regulatory power over more banks.
C) devise clever strategies in an effort to avoid blame for poor economic performance.
D) do all of the above.
56) According to the theory of bureaucratic behavior, the objective of bureaucracy is
A) to maximize its own welfare, meaning that it seeks additional power and prestige.
B) to maximize consumers’ surplus, meaning that it seeks additional regulatory powers.
C) to protect the industry it regulates, meaning that it seeks additional regulatory powers.
D) none of the above.
57) According to the theory of bureaucratic behavior,
A) the objective of a bureaucracy is to maximize its own welfare, meaning that it seeks
additional power and prestige.
B) the bureaucracy will fight vigorously to preserve its autonomy; thus, it will attempt to
avoid conflict with the President and Congress.
C) the bureaucracy will support legislation that gives it additional regulatory power.
D) all of the above describe bureaucratic behavior.
58) The theory of bureaucratic behavior when applied to the Fed helps to explain why the Fed
A) resists so vigorously congressional attempts to limit the central bank’s autonomy.
B) is secretive about the conduct of future monetary policy.
C) sought less control over banks in the 1980s.
D) all of the above.
E) only A and B of the above.
59) The theory of bureaucratic behavior when applied to the Fed helps to explain why the Fed
A) is supportive of congressional attempts to limit the central bank’s autonomy.
B) is secretive about the conduct of future monetary policy.
C) sought less control over banks in the 1980s.
D) is willing to take on powerful groups that may threaten its autonomy.
60) The strongest argument for an independent Federal Reserve rests on the view that subjecting
the Fed to more political pressures would impart
A) an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) a deflationary bias to monetary policy.
C) a disinflationary bias to monetary policy.
D) a counter–cyclical bias to monetary policy.
61) Politicians in a democratic society may be shortsighted because of their desire to win
reelection; thus, the political process can
A) impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) impart a deflationary bias to monetary policy.
C) generate a political business cycle, in which just before an election expansionary
policies are pursued to lower unemployment and interest rates.
D) cause both A and C of the above.
62) The case for Federal Reserve independence includes the idea that
A) political pressure would impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) a politically insulated Fed would be more concerned with long–run objectives and thus
be a defender of a sound dollar and a stable price level.
C) a Federal Reserve under the control of Congress or the President might make the so–
called political business cycle more pronounced.
D) all of the above.
63) The case for Federal Reserve independence includes the idea that
A) a politically insulated Fed would be more concerned with long–run objectives and thus
be a defender of a sound dollar and a stable price level.
B) a Federal Reserve under the control of Congress or the President might make the so–
called political business cycle more pronounced.
C) the principal–agent problem is perhaps worse for the Fed than for congressmen since
the former does not answer to the voters on election day.
D) only A and B of the above.
64) The case for Federal Reserve independence does not include the idea that
A) political pressure would impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) a politically insulated Fed would be more concerned with long–run objectives and thus
be a defender of a sound dollar and a stable price level.
C) policy is always performed better by an elite group such as the Fed.
D) a Federal Reserve under the control of Congress or the President might make the so–
called political business cycle more pronounced.
65) The case for Federal Reserve independence does not include the idea that
A) political pressure would impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) the principal–agent problem is perhaps worse for the Fed than for congressmen since
the former does not answer to the voters on election day.
C) a politically insulated Fed would be more concerned with long–run objectives and thus
be a defender of a sound dollar and a stable price level.
D) a Federal Reserve under the control of Congress or the President might make the so–
called political business cycle more pronounced.
66) Advocates of Fed independence fear that subjecting the Fed to direct presidential or
congressional control would
A) impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) force monetary authorities to sacrifice the long–run objective of price stability.
C) make the so–called political business cycle even more pronounced.
D) do all of the above.
E) do only A and B of the above.
67) Advocates of Fed independence fear that subjecting the Fed to direct presidential or
congressional control would
A) impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
B) force monetary authorities to sacrifice the long–run objective of price stability.
C) make the so–called political business cycle less pronounced.
D) do all of the above.
E) do only A and B of the above.
68) Supporters of the current system of Fed independence believe that a less autonomous Fed
would
A) adopt a long–run bias toward policymaking.
B) pursue overly expansionary monetary policies.
C) be more likely to create a political business cycle.
D) do only B and C of the above.
69) Critics of the current system of Fed independence contend that
A) the current system is undemocratic.
B) voters have too much say about monetary policy.
C) the President has too much control over monetary policy on a day–to–day basis.
D) all of the above are true.
70) Critics of Fed independence argue
A) that it is undemocratic to have monetary policy controlled by an elite group
responsible to no one.
B) that an independent Fed conducts monetary policy with a consistent inflationary bias.
C) that the Fed, since it does not face a binding budget constraint, spends too much of its
earnings.
D) only A and B of the above.
71) Critics of Fed independence argue
A) that it is undemocratic to have monetary policy controlled by an elite group
responsible to no one.
B) that independence seemingly does little to guarantee good monetary policy.
C) that its independence may encourage the Fed to pursue a course of narrow self–interest
rather than the public interest.
D) all of the above.
72) Instrument independence means the central bank is free from
A) political pressure regarding how it uses the tools of monetary policy.
B) political pressure regarding the goals it pursues.
C) both A and B.
D) neither (a) nor (b).
73) Suppose legislation requiring the Fed to keep the inflation rate between 1.5% and 2.5% per
year is passed by Congress. This law restricts the Fed’s
A) instrument independence.
B) goal independence.
C) both A and B.
D) neither (a) nor (b).
74) Cross–country evidence suggests that an increase is central bank independence results in a
_________ inflation rate and _________ unemployment.
A) lower; higher
B) lower; no worse
C) higher; lower
D) higher; higher
75) The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
A) appoints three directors to each Federal Reserve Bank.
B) elect six members to member commercial banks.
C) both of the above.
D) none of the above.
76) The Federal Advisory Council has ____ member(s) from each district.
A) one
B) two
C) three
D) can have any number of
77) The three largest Federal Reserve banks in terms of assets are those of New York, Chicago,
and
A) Chicago.
B) Los Angeles.
C) Baltimore.
D) San Francisco.
78) The directors of a district bank are classified into three categories: A,B, and C. The three B
directors
A) are professional bankers .
B) are prominent leaders from industry, labor, agriculture, or the consumer sector.
C) are elected by the board of governors to represent the public interest.
D) all of the above.
79) The 12 Federal Reserve banks are involved in monetary policy in several ways:
A) their directors establish the discount rate.
B) they decide which banks can obtain discount loans from the Federal Reserve Bank.
C) their directors select one commercial banker from each bank’s district to serve on the
Federal Advisory Council.
D) all of the above.
80) The _________ of the board of governors is the spokesman for the Fed.
A) chairman
B) president
C) either can be the spokesman
D) neither of the above
81) Currently, there are _________ countries that are members of the European Monetary Union.
A) 10
B) 12
C) 15
D) 20
7.2 True/False
1) The unusual structure of the Federal Reserve System is best explained by Americans’ fear of
centralized power.
2) Rapid money supply growth and uncontrollable inflation were among the factors which
motivated the creation of the Federal Reserve System.
3) The Washington, D.C. Fed bank, with over 30 percent of the system‘s assets, is the most
important Federal Reserve Bank.
4) The FOMC is an element of the Federal Reserve System.
5) All nationally chartered banks are required to be members of the Fed.
6) Designers of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 intended the Fed to use open market operations
as a policy tool.
7) Each member of the seven–member board is appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate to serve 14–year terms.
8) The board of governors sets reserve requirements.
9) Monetary policy is set by the board of governors.
10) Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions must be approved by the Secretary of the
Treasury before they may be implemented.
11) The FOMC issues directives to the trading desk at the New York Fed.
12) Critics of the current system of Fed independence contend that the President has too much
control over monetary policy on a day–to–day basis.
13) Countries with more independent central banks have lower inflation rates, but these have
come at the expense of greater output fluctuations.
14) Announcing the FOMC‘s policy decision immediately after the FOMC meeting is an
example of how Fed policymaking has become more transparent.
15) The Fed has goal independence but not instrument independence.
16) The Federal Reserve banks act as liaisons between the business community and the Federal
Reserve System.
17) The FOMC does not actually carry out securities purchases or sales.
7.3 Essay
1) Former Congressman Jack Kemp reportedly once said that he wanted to become the most
powerful man in Washington, D.C. the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. What does Representative Kemp’s comment imply about the power of the
chairman of the Federal Reserve? Do you think he may have been exaggerating? Explain.
2) Former board of governors chairman Paul Volcker reportedly once said that the Federal
Reserve is free to pursue any policy it desires, as long as it convinces Congress that such a
policy is reasonable. What does Volcker‘s comment suggest about the independence of the
Fed? Explain.
3) What are the factors that promote the independence of the Federal Reserve?
4) What factors limit the independence of the Federal Reserve?
5) What are the arguments for and against an independent Fed?
6) What is the theory of bureaucratic behavior? What types of behavior does it predict the Fed
might undertake?
7) In recent years has Fed policymaking become more or less transparent? Why?
8) Describe the structure and responsibility for policy tools in The Federal Reserve System.