Hill v. Colorado (2000) CASE IS NO LONGERF FULLY BRIEFED MAY KEEP FOR
INSTRUCTOR
Relevant Case Facts:
Colorado passed a law placing restrictions on protestors within a radius of 100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility. Within this zone the law prohibited anyone from
approaching, within eight feet of another person, without that person’s consent for the purpose of
distributing literature, displaying a sign, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling.
Violation of the law was punishable with a $50-$750 fine and up to six months’ imprisonment.
Hill claims the law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments on their face, and prohibits
constitutionally protected speech in a public forum.
Legal Question: Does a law which prohibits someone from approaching another person for the
purposes of protest, education, or counseling violate the right to free speech in the 1st and 14th
Amendments?
Reasoning:
Concurring (Souter, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer):
Dissenting (Scalia and Thomas):
Dissenting (Kennedy):
McCullen v. Coakley (2014)
Relevant Case Facts: In 2007, Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities
Act. The amended version of the Act made it a crime knowingly to stand on a “public way or
sidewalk” within thirty–five feet of an entrance or driveway to any “reproductive health care
facility,” defined as “a place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where
abortions are offered or performed.” (The original version of the law created six-foot no-
approach zones within the eighteen-foot area.) Exempted from the 2007 act were four classes of
individuals, including “employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their
employment.” Another provision of the Act proscribed the knowing obstruction of access to an
abortion clinic. McCullen, engaged in pro-life sidewalk counseling of those entering abortion
clinics, and other pro-life activists sued the Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley
claiming the law violates the First Amendment and asking that the state be enjoined from
enforcing it.
Legal Question: Is the Massachusetts law content neutral, narrowly tailored, and written so that
it leaves alternative channels of communication?
Reasoning:
Scalia with Kennedy and Thomas concurring in the judgment
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota (1992) CASE IS NO LONGERF FULLY BRIEFED
MAY KEEP FOR INSTRUCTOR
Relevant Case Facts:
The City of St. Paul alleges that RAV and several other teenagers burned a cross inside the
fenced backyard of a black family. Instead of prosecuting RAV with arson, he was charged him
with violation of two laws, including the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance which
prohibited the placement of object or graffiti on public or private property that the person knows
will arouse alarm or anger in others based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Doing so is
considered disorderly conduct and is a misdemeanor.
Legal Question: Is content discrimination reasonably necessary to achieve the compelling
interest of decreasing bias-motivated crime?
Reasoning:
Concurring (White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens):
Snyder v. Phelps
562 U.S. (2011)
Relevant Case Facts:
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder of Westminster, Maryland, died on March 3, 2006,
while serving in Iraq. Frank W. Phelps, Sr., founder of the Westboro Baptist Church, decided to
picket Snyder’s funeral and notified local authorities of his intent to do so. The protesters
complied with all local ordinances and police directions. The picketing took place 1,000 feet
from the church entrance in a fenced-in area on public land. None of protesters approached the
mourners and there was no obstruction of the funeral. Albert Snyder filed a civil lawsuit against
Phelps and the Westboro Church claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, an
unlawful act under Maryland law. Snyder claimed he received severe and lasting emotional
injury, making him often tearful and angry and causing him to vomit. According to his medical
experts, exposure to the protest worsened Snyder’s diabetes and depression. The protesters
argued their words were expressions of opinion on public issues and hyperbole rather than
factual statements, and thus were protected by the First Amendment.
Issue: Do citizens have the right, under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, to
protest at military funerals even if such protests might cause severe emotional distress?
Reasoning:
Alito Dissenting:
U.S. v. Alvarez
567 U.S. (2012)
Relevant Case Facts: In 2007, Xavier Alvarez was elected to the Board of Directors of the
Three Valleys Water District located outside Los Angeles. At his first board meeting Alvarez
introduced himself for the record as follows: “I’m a retired Marine of 25 years. I retired in the
year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded
many times by the same guy. I’m still around.” Other than “I’m still around,” the statement was
false. Alvarez never served in the armed forces. Responding to complaints, the FBI obtained a
recording of the July 2007 water district board meeting. Alvarez was subsequently indicted for
violating the federal Stolen Valor Act. He became the first person prosecuted for violating this
2006 statute. The act provides: “Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed
Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to members of such
forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable
imitation of such item shall be fined under the title, imprisoned not more than six months, or
both.” Alvarez was convicted in federal district court over his objection that the law violated the
First Amendment. The court sentenced him to probation, a $5,000 fine, and community service.
Alvarez appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which, by divided vote, reversed the
conviction and declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional. The United States requested
Supreme Court review.
Issue: Does a federal law that makes it a crime to lie about winning a medal authorized by
Congress or the armed forces violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Reasoning:
Breyer and Kagan concurring in judgment
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas Dissenting
CUT CASE
Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993)
Relevant Case Facts:
Todd Mitchell and several other young black were discussing Mississippi Burning and later saw
a young white boy across the street. Mitchell said, “You want to tuck somebody up? There goes
a white boy; go get him.” The men beat up the boy and left him unconscious. Mitchell was
found guilty of aggravated battery, which carried a maximum of two years in prison. However,
this sentence could reach seven years if the jury found that Mitchell chose his victim because of
his race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry. The jury
found that he had chosen his victim on basis of race and sentenced him to four years in prison.
In short, the state enhanced sentences for hate crimes.
Legal Question: Does a law that enhances penalties for crimes based on hate violate the
constitutional right to free speech?
Reasoning:
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
Relevant Case Facts:
A group of adults and secondary students devised two ways to demonstrate opposition to the
Vietnam War. First, they decided to fast on December 16th and New Years Day. They then
would wear black armbands to school everyday in between these dates to show their opposition
to the War. Principals of the students’ schools agreed to suspend anyone wearing the armbands.
However, a group of students, including the Tinkers, wore the bands anyway, and were
suspended.
Legal Question: Is the wearing of armbands by public school students during the school day a
form of protected speech under the First Amendment?
Reasoning:
Dissent (Black):