B) If all else fails, the shareholders’ last line of defense against expropriation by self–interested managers is
direct action.
C) A shareholder resolution could direct the board to take a specific action, such as discontinue investing
in a particular line of business or country, or remove a poison pill.
D) Any shareholder can submit a resolution that is put to a vote at the annual meeting.
25) Which of the following statements is false?
A) Recently, shareholders have started organizing “no” votes. That is, when they are dissatisfied with a
board, they simply refuse to vote to approve the slate of nominees for the board.
B) One early study of proxy contests found that the announcement of a contest increased firm stock price
by 8% on average, even if the challenge was eventually unsuccessful and the incumbents won
reelection.
C) Shareholders’ only real role in governance is in electing the directors of the company.
D) Perhaps the most extreme form of direct action that disgruntled shareholders can take is to hold a
proxy contest and introduce a rival slate of directors for election to the board.
26) Which of the following statements is false?
A) One study found that firms with fewer restrictions on shareholder power performed worse than firms
with more restrictions during the 1990s.
B) Some large public pension funds, such as CalPERS (the California Public Employees Retirement
System), take an activist role in corporate governance.
C) In 2004 with the Walt Disney Company, major shareholders were dissatisfied with the recent
performance of Disney under long–time CEO and Chairman, Michael Eisner. They began an organized
campaign to convince the majority of Disney shareholders to withhold their approval of the reelection
of Eisner as director and chairman of the board.
D) Given the importance of shareholder action in corporate governance, researchers and large investors
alike have become increasingly interested in measuring the balance of power between shareholders and
managers in a firm.