Chapter 15
Why Do Financial Institutions Exist?
◼ Multiple Choice Questions
1. Of the following sources of external finance for American nonfinancial businesses, the least
important is
(a) loans from banks.
(b) stocks.
(c) bonds and commercial paper.
(d) nonbank loans.
2. Of the following sources of external finance for American nonfinancial businesses, the most
important is
(a) loans from banks.
(b) stocks.
(c) bonds and commercial paper.
(d) nonbank loans.
3. Of the sources of external funds for nonfinancial businesses in the United States, bonds account for
approximately _________ of the total.
(a) 10 percent
(b) 20 percent
(c) 30 percent
(d) 50 percent
4. Of the sources of external funds for nonfinancial businesses in the United States, stocks account for
approximately _________ of the total.
(a) 10 percent
(b) 20 percent
(c) 30 percent
(d) 40 percent
186 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
5. With regard to external sources of financing for nonfinancial businesses in the United States, which
of the following are accurate statements?
(a) Marketable securities account for a larger share of external business financing in the United
States than in most other countries.
(b) Since 1970, less than 5 percent of newly issued corporate bonds and commercial paper have
been sold directly to American households.
(c) The stock market accounted for the largest share of the financing of American businesses in the
1970–2000 period.
(d) All of the above.
(e) Only (a) and (b) of the above.
6. With regard to external sources of financing for nonfinancial businesses in the United States, which
of the following are accurate statements?
(a) Direct finance is used in less than 5 percent of the external financing of American businesses.
(b) Only large, well-established corporations have access to securities markets to finance their
activities.
(c) Loans from banks and other financial intermediaries in the United States provide five times
more financing of corporate activities than do stock markets.
(d) All of the above.
(e) Only (a) and (b) of the above.
7. (I) In the United States nonbank loans are the most important source of external funds for
nonfinancial businesses. (II) In Germany and Japan, issuing stocks and bonds is the most important
source of external for nonfinancial businesses.
(a) (I) is true, (II) false.
(b) (I) is false, (II) true.
(c) Both are true.
(d) Both are false.
8. Which of the following is not one of the eight basic facts about financial structure?
(a) Debt contracts are typically extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial
restrictions on the behavior of the borrower.
(b) Indirect finance, which involves the activities of financial intermediaries, is many times more
important than direct finance, in which businesses raise funds directly from lenders in financial
markets.
(c) Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts for both households and business.
(d) New security issues are the most important source of external funds to finance businesses.
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 187
9. Which of the following is not one of the eight basic facts about financial structure?
(a) The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy.
(b) Issuing marketable securities is the primary way businesses finance their operations.
(c) Indirect finance, which involves the activities of financial intermediaries, is many times more
important than direct finance, in which businesses raise funds directly from lenders in financial
markets.
(d) Financial intermediaries are the most important source of external funds to finance businesses.
10. Because information is scarce,
(a) equity contracts are used much more frequently to raise capital than are debt contracts.
(b) monitoring managers gives rise to costly state verification.
(c) government regulations, such as standard accounting principles, can help reduce moral hazard.
(d) all of the above are true.
(e) only (b) and (c) of the above are true.
11. Which of the following best explains the recent decline in the role of financial intermediaries?
(a) Private production and sale of information
(b) Government regulation to increase information
(c) Improvements in information technology
(d) None of the above can explain the recent decline
12. (I) The total cost of carrying out a transaction in financial markets increases proportionally with the
size of the transaction. (II) Financial intermediaries facilitate diversification when an investor has
only a small sum to invest.
(a) (I) is true; (II) is false
(b) (I) is false; (II) is true
(c) Both (I) and (II) are true
(d) Both (I) and (II) are false
13. If bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek loans and, therefore, receive them from
financial intermediaries, then financial intermediaries face the problem of
(a) moral hazard.
(b) adverse selection.
(c) free-riding.
(d) costly state verification.
14. If borrowers take on big risks after obtaining a loan, then lenders face the problem of
(a) free-riding.
(b) adverse selection.
(c) moral hazard.
(d) costly state verification.
188 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
15. Because of the lemons problem in the used car market, the average quality of the used cars offered
for sale will be _________, which gives rise to the problem of _________.
(a) low; moral hazard
(b) low; adverse selection
(c) high; moral hazard
(d) high; adverse selection
16. In the used car market, asymmetric information leads to the lemons problem because the price that
buyers are willing to pay will
(a) reflect the highest quality of used cars in the market.
(b) reflect the lowest quality of used cars in the market.
(c) reflect the average quality of used cars in the market.
(d) none of the above.
17. The problem created by asymmetric information before the transaction occurs is called _________,
while the problem created after the transaction occurs is called _________
(a) adverse selection; moral hazard.
(b) moral hazard; adverse selection.
(c) costly state verification; free-riding.
(d) free-riding; costly state verification.
18. A borrower who takes out a loan usually has better information about the potential returns and risk
of the investment projects he plans to undertake than does the lender. This inequality of information
is called
(a) moral hazard.
(b) asymmetric information.
(c) noncollateralized risk.
(d) adverse selection.
19. Adverse selection is a problem associated with equity and debt contracts arising from
(a) the lender’s relative lack of information about the borrower’s potential returns and risks of his
investment activities.
(b) the lender’s inability to legally require sufficient collateral to cover a 100 percent loss if the
borrower defaults.
(c) the borrower’s lack of incentive to seek a loan for highly risky investments.
(d) none of the above.
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 189
20. Moral hazard is a problem associated with debt and equity contracts arising from
(a) the borrower’s incentive to undertake highly risky investments.
(b) the owners’ inability to ensure that managers will act in the owners’ interest.
(c) the difficulty lenders have in sorting out good credit risks from bad credit risks.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
21. Because of the adverse selection problem,
(a) lenders may make a disproportionate amount of loans to bad credit risks.
(b) lenders may refuse loans to individuals with low net worth.
(c) lenders are reluctant to make loans that are not secured by collateral.
(d) all of the above.
22. Because of the adverse selection problem,
(a) good credit risks are more likely to seek loans, causing lenders to make a disproportionate
amount of loans to good credit risks.
(b) lenders may refuse loans to individuals with high net worth, because of their greater proclivity
to “skip town.”
(c) lenders are reluctant to make loans that are not secured by collateral.
(d) all of the above.
23. The problem of adverse selection helps to explain
(a) why banks prefer to make loans secured by collateral.
(b) why banks have a comparative advantage in raising funds for American businesses.
(c) why borrowers are willing to offer collateral to secure their promises to repay loans.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
24. The problem of adverse selection helps to explain
(a) which firms are more likely to obtain funds from banks and other financial intermediaries, rather
than from securities markets.
(b) why collateral is an important feature of consumer, but not business, debt contracts.
(c) why direct finance is more important than indirect finance as a source of business finance.
(d) only (a) and (b) of the above.
25. The concept of adverse selection helps to explain
(a) why collateral is not a common feature of many debt contracts.
(b) why large, well-established corporations find it so difficult to borrow funds in securities
markets.
(c) why financial markets are among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy.
(d) all of the above.
190 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
26. That most used cars are sold by intermediaries (i.e., used car dealers) provides evidence that these
intermediaries
(a) have been afforded special government treatment, since used car dealers do not provide
information that is valued by consumers of used cars.
(b) are able to prevent potential competitors from free-riding off the information that they provide.
(c) have failed to solve adverse selection problems in this market because “lemons” continue to be
traded.
(d) do all of the above.
27. That most used cars are sold by intermediaries (i.e., used car dealers) provides evidence that these
intermediaries
(a) provide information that is valued by consumers of used cars.
(b) are able to prevent others from free-riding off the information that they provide.
(c) can profit by becoming experts in determining whether an automobile is a good car or a lemon.
(d) do all of the above.
28. A key finding of the economic analysis of financial structure is that
(a) the existence of the free-rider problem for traded securities helps to explain why banks play a
predominant role in financing the activities of businesses.
(b) while free-rider problems limit the extent to which securities markets finance some business
activities, nevertheless the majority of funds going to businesses are channeled through
securities markets.
(c) given the great extent to which securities markets are regulated, free-rider problems are not of
significant economic consequence in these markets.
(d) economists do not have a very good explanation for why securities markets are so heavily
regulated.
29. In the United States, the government agency requiring that firms, which sell securities in public
markets, adhere to standard accounting principles and disclose information about their sales, assets,
and earnings is the
(a) Federal Corporate Securities Commission.
(b) Federal Trade Commission.
(c) Securities and Exchange Commission.
(d) U.S. Treasury Department.
(e) Federal Reserve System.
30. An audit certifies that
(a) a firm’s loans will be repaid.
(b) a firm’s securities are safe investments.
(c) a firm abides by standard accounting principles.
(d) the information reported in a firm’s accounting statements is correct.
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 191
31. The authors’ analysis of adverse selection indicates that financial intermediaries in general, and
banks in particular (because they hold a large fraction of non-traded loans),
(a) have advantages in overcoming the free-rider problem, helping to explain why indirect finance
is a more important source of business finance than is direct finance.
(b) play a greater role in moving funds to corporations than do securities markets as a result of their
ability to overcome the free-rider problem.
(c) provide better-known and larger corporations a higher percentage of their external funds than
they do to newer and smaller corporations, which rely to a greater extent on the new issues
market for funds.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
32. The authors’ analysis of adverse selection indicates that financial intermediaries
(a) overcome free-rider problems by holding non-traded loans.
(b) must buy securities from corporations to diversify the risk that results from holding non-tradable
loans.
(c) have not been very successful in dealing with adverse selection problems in financial markets.
(d) do all of the above.
(e) do only (a) and (b) of the above.
33. The pecking order hypothesis predicts that the _________ a corporation is, the more likely it will be
to _________.
(a) smaller and less well known; issue securities
(b) larger and more well known; borrow from financial intermediaries
(c) larger and more well known; issue securities
(d) smaller and less well known; need external financing
34. Financial intermediaries and, particularly, banks have the ability to avoid the free-rider problem as
long as they primarily
(a) make private loans.
(b) acquire a diversified portfolio of stocks.
(c) buy junk bonds.
(d) do a balanced combination of (a) and (b) of the above.
35. Property that is pledged to the lender in the event that a borrower cannot make his or her debt
payment is called
(a) points.
(b) interest.
(c) collateral.
(d) good faith money.
192 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
36. Collateral is
(a) property that is pledged to the lender if a borrower cannot make his or her debt payments.
(b) a prevalent feature of debt contracts for households.
(c) a prevalent feature of debt contracts for business.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (c) of the above.
37. The majority of household debt in the United States consists of
(a) credit card debt.
(b) consumer installment debt.
(c) collateralized loans.
(d) unsecured loans, such as student loans.
38. Commercial and farm mortgages, in which property is pledged as collateral, account for
(a) one-quarter of borrowing by nonfinancial businesses.
(b) one-half of borrowing by nonfinancial businesses.
(c) one-twentieth of borrowing by nonfinancial businesses.
(d) two-thirds of borrowing by nonfinancial businesses.
39. Because of the moral hazard problem,
(a) lenders will write debt contracts that restrict certain activities of borrowers.
(b) lenders will more readily lend to borrowers with high net worth.
(c) debt contracts are used less frequently to raise capital than are equity contracts.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
40. Moral hazard in equity contracts is known as the _________ problem because the manager of the
firm has fewer incentives to maximize profits than the stockholders might ideally prefer.
(a) principal-agent
(b) adverse selection
(c) free-rider
(d) debt deflation
41. Because managers (_________) have less incentive to maximize profits than the stockholders-
owners (_________) do, stockholders find it costly to monitor managers; thus, stockholders are
reluctant to purchase equities.
(a) principals; agents
(b) principals; principals
(c) agents; agents
(d) agents; principals
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 193
42. The principal-agent problem
(a) occurs when managers have more incentive to maximize profits than the stockholders-
owners do.
(b) would not arise if the owners of the firm had complete information about the activities of the
managers.
(c) in financial markets helps to explain why equity is a relatively important source of finance for
American business.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
43. Solutions to the moral hazard problem include
(a) high net worth.
(b) monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants.
(c) greater reliance on equity contracts and less on debt contracts.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
44. One financial intermediary in our financial structure that helps to reduce the moral hazard arising
from the principal-agent problem is the
(a) venture capital firm.
(b) money market mutual fund.
(c) pawn broker.
(d) savings and loan association.
45. A venture capital firm protects its equity investment from moral hazard through which of the
following means?
(a) It places people on the board of directors to better monitor the borrowing firm’s activities.
(b) It writes contracts that prohibit the sale of an equity investment to anyone but the venture
capital firm.
(c) It prohibits the borrowing firm from replacing its management.
(d) It does both (a) and (b) of the above.
(e) It does both (a) and (c) of the above.
46. Debt contracts
(a) are agreements by the borrowers to pay the lenders fixed dollar amounts at periodic intervals.
(b) have an advantage over equity contracts in that they have a lower cost of state verification.
(c) are used much more frequently to raise capital than are equity contracts.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
194 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
47. Equity contracts account for a small fraction of external funds raised by American businesses
because
(a) costly state verification makes the equity contract less desirable than the debt contract.
(b) there is greater scope for moral hazard problems under equity contracts, as compared to debt
contracts.
(c) equity contracts do not permit borrowing firms to raise additional funds by issuing debt.
(d) all of the above.
(e) both (a) and (b) of the above.
48. A debt contract is said to be incentive compatible if
(a) the borrower’s net worth reduces the probability of moral hazard.
(b) restrictive covenants limit the type of activities that can be undertaken by the borrower.
(c) both (a) and (b) of the above occur.
(d) neither (a) nor (b) of the above occur.
49. A debt contract is more likely to be incentive compatible if
(a) the company must follow standard accounting principles.
(b) the funds are provided by a venture capital firm.
(c) owners of the firm have more of their own money in the business.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (b) and (c).
50. A clause in a mortgage loan contract requiring the borrower to purchase homeowner’s insurance is
an example of
(a) a restrictive covenant.
(b) a collusive agreement between mortgage lenders and insurance companies.
(c) both (a) and (b) of the above.
(d) neither (a) and (b) of the above.
51. A debt contract that specifies that the company can only use the funds to finance certain activities
(a) is a private loan.
(b) contains a restrictive covenant.
(c) increases the problem of adverse selection.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b).
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 195
52. Which of the following are accurate statements concerning the role that restrictive covenants play in
reducing moral hazard in financial markets?
(a) Covenants reduce moral hazard by restricting borrowers’ undesirable behavior.
(b) Covenants require that borrowers keep collateral in good condition.
(c) Covenants require periodic accounting statements and income reports.
(d) All of the above.
(e) Only (a) and (b) of the above.
53. Although restrictive covenants can potentially reduce moral hazard, a problem with restrictive
covenants is that
(a) borrowers may find loopholes that make the covenants ineffective.
(b) they are costly to monitor and enforce.
(c) too many resources may be devoted to monitoring and enforcing them, as debtholders duplicate
others’ monitoring and enforcement efforts.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
54. Governments in developing countries sometimes adopt policies that retard the efficient operation of
their financial systems. These actions include policies that
(a) prevent lenders from foreclosing on borrowers with political clout.
(b) nationalize banks and direct credit to politically-favored borrowers.
(c) make it costly to collect payments and collateral from defaulting debtors.
(d) do all of the above.
(e) do only (a) and (b) of the above.
55. Financial crises
(a) are major disruptions in financial markets that are characterized by sharp declines in asset prices
and the failures of many financial and nonfinancial firms.
(b) occur when adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets become more
significant.
(c) frequently lead to sharp contractions in economic activity.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
56. Financial crises
(a) cause failures of financial intermediaries and leave only securities markets to channel funds
from savers to borrowers.
(b) are a recent phenomenon that occurs only in developing countries.
(c) invariably lead to debt deflation.
(d) all of the above.
(e) none of the above.
196 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
57. Factors that lead to worsening conditions in financial markets include
(a) increases in interest rates.
(b) declining stock prices.
(c) increasing uncertainty in financial markets.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
58. Factors that lead to worsening conditions in financial markets include
(a) declining interest rates.
(b) unanticipated increases in the price level.
(c) bank panics.
(d) only (a) and (c) of the above.
(e) only (b) and (c) of the above.
59. If the anatomy of a financial crisis is thought of as a sequence of events, which of the following
events would be least likely to be the initiating cause of the financial crisis?
(a) Increase in interest rates
(b) Bank panic
(c) Stock market decline
(d) Increase in uncertainty
60. An examination of past financial crises in the United States indicates that a bank panic has
typically been
(a) the one key factor that initiates a financial crisis.
(b) a consequence of worsening conditions during a financial crisis.
(c) the result of declining interest rates that raised adverse selection problems.
(d) an event that is unrelated to financial crises.
61. Most financial crises in the United States have begun with
(a) a steep stock market decline.
(b) an increase in uncertainty resulting from the failure of a major firm.
(c) a steep decline in interest rates.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
62. Most financial crises in the United States have begun with
(a) a sharp rise in interest rates.
(b) a steep stock market decline.
(c) an increase in uncertainty resulting from the failure of a major firm.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (b) of the above.
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 197
63. In addition to having a direct effect on increasing adverse selection problems, increases in interest
rates also promote financial crises by _________ firms’ and households’ interest payments, thereby
_________ their cash flow.
(a) increasing; increasing
(b) increasing; decreasing
(c) decreasing; increasing
(d) decreasing; decreasing
64. Deterioration in a firm’s balance sheet and a decline in net worth, which increases adverse selection
and moral hazard problems, can be caused by
(a) a sharp drop in the price level.
(b) a sharp increase in uncertainty.
(c) a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (c).
65. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems increased in magnitude during the early years of the
Great Depression as
(a) stock prices declined to 10 percent of their level in 1929.
(b) banks failed.
(c) the aggregate price level declined.
(d) a result of all of the above.
(e) a result of (a) and (b) of the above.
66. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems increased in magnitude during the early years of the
Great Depression as
(a) stock prices declined to 10 percent of their level in 1929.
(b) banks failed.
(c) the aggregate price level rose.
(d) a result of all of the above.
(e) a result of (a) and (b) of the above.
67. Financial crises in the United States and Mexico
(a) were similar in being precipitated by an increase in interest rates abroad.
(b) were different because in Mexico speculative attacks in the foreign exchange market played a
key role.
(c) were similar in being preceded by stock market declines.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (c).
198 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
68. Stock market declines preceded a full blown financial crisis
(a) in the United States in 1987.
(b) in Thailand in 1997.
(c) in Indonesia in 1997.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (b) and (c).
69. Which of the following factors led up to the Mexican financial crisis of 1994?
(a) Speculative attacks on the peso and a rise in actual and expected inflation.
(b) A rise in domestic interest rates and a deterioration in bank balance sheets.
(c) A rise in foreign interest rates and domestic stock market declines.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (b) and (c).
70. Institutional features of debt markets in Asia that propelled several countries into financial crisis
include
(a) debt contracts with long duration.
(b) firms with debt denominated in U.S. dollars.
(c) governments that could not intervene to protect depositors.
(d) all of the above.
(e) only (a) and (c).
71. Argentina’s 2001–2002 financial crisis was precipitated by
(a) a weak and poorly supervised banking system.
(b) a lending boom that fueled a stock market bubble.
(c) difficulty financing a large budget deficit.
(d) a decline in interest rates.
Chapter 15 Why Do Financial Institutions Exist? 199
◼ True/False
1. American businesses get more funds from direct financing than from indirect financing.
2. American businesses use stock to finance about 10 percent of their external financing.
3. One reason why indirect financing is used is to minimize adverse selection problems.
4. Issuing marketable securities is the primary way businesses finance their operations.
5. Because of the adverse selection problem, lenders may refuse loans to individuals with low net
worth.
6. The concept of adverse selection helps to explain why indirect finance is more important than direct
finance as a source of business finance.
7. The problem of adverse selection helps to explain why direct finance is more important than indirect
finance as a source of business finance.
8. The concept of adverse selection helps explain why collateral is an important feature of many debt
contracts.
9. One way of describing the solution that high net worth provides to the moral hazard problem is to
say that it makes debt contracts incentive compatible.
10. Factors that lead to worsening conditions in financial markets include increasing interest rates and
unanticipated increases in the price level.
11. Economies of scale mean that the percentage return on a financial transaction rises as the size of the
transaction rises.
12. Agency theory focuses on how government agencies regulate financial intermediaries and markets.
13. The principal-agent problem is an example of the adverse selection problem that can result from
asymmetric information.
200 Mishkin/Eakins • Financial Markets and Institutions, Fifth Edition
◼ Essay
1. What are economies of scale in financial transactions? How can financial intermediaries achieve
these economies?
2. Explain how the “lemons” problem could cause financial markets to fail.
3. Distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard.
4. What facts about financial structure can be explained by adverse selection?
5. What facts about financial structure can be explained by moral hazard?
6. What factors usually cause an increase in moral hazard and adverse selection?
7. What is the principal-agent problem?
8. Describe the sequence of events in a financial crisis and explain why they can cause economic
activity to decline.