Appendix 13A—Entry Deterrence and Accommodation Games
MULTIPLE CHOICE
1. In deciding whether to invest in excess capacity in order to deter entry, incumbents should consider all
of the following except
the order of play in pricing and capacity choice decisions
the customer sorting pattern
the sunk cost required to achieve excess capacity
the joint-profit-maximizing cartel output
the potential entrant’s projected profitability
2. An inverse intensity customer sorting rule is one in which
customers with high willingness to pay secure the discounted goods
customers are rationed randomly between the discounted and full price goods
no customers purchase below their willingness to pay
customers with the lowest willingness to pay secure the discounted goods
brand loyalty allows the incumbent to retain its regular customers
3. An efficient customer sorting rule is one in which
customers with high willingness to pay secure the discounted goods
customers are rationed randomly between the discounted and full price goods
no customer purchase below her willingness to pay
customers with the lowest willingness to pay secure the discount goods
brand loyalty allows the incumbent to retain its regular customers
4. All of the following are sunk cost investments that precommit an incumbent to aggressively defend
market share and the cash flow prior to threatened entry except
reputational investments in company logos (e.g., Beatrice)
retail displays which hold only L’eggs egg-shaped hosiery packages
neon signage for an independently owned Krispy Kreme store
excess capacity in a declining industry