Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985)
Relevant Case Facts: In 1980 Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in the
city of Cleburne, Texas, with the intent of leasing it to the Cleburne Living Center (CLC). CLC,
in turn, planned to operate a group home for thirteen mentally retarded men and women. The
home had four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added. CLC said it planned to
comply with all relevant state and federal regulations; it also said that the house’s occupants
would be under the constant supervision of CLC’s staff. In response to a request by the city,
CLC filed an application for a special permit to operate a group home. The city required special
permits for the construction of “[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholics or drug
addicts, or penal or correctional institutions.” The city had determined that the proposed group
home should be classified as a “hospital for the feeble-minded.”
Legal Question: May the city require the permit for this facility when other care and multiple-
dwelling facilities are freely permitted?
Reasoning:
Loving v. Virginia (1967)
Relevant Case Facts: Mildred Jeter, who was black, and Richard Loving, who was white, were
sentenced to one year in jail for violating Virginia’s miscegenation law. The judge suspended the
sentence on the condition that the couple leave the state for 25 years. The judge justified his
decision by saying that races were placed on different continents by God for a reason. The
Lovings sued, claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia Supreme Court
ruled for the state and upheld the law.
Legal Question: Does Virginia’s miscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
Relevant Case Facts: University of California, Davis Medical School set up a special
admissions program for minorities and for those with educational or economic disadvantages.
Sixteen spots at the school were reserved for applicants to the special admissions program.
Applicants to the special program were judged only against each other. While it was in place, the
special admissions program admitted only minorities, even though many poor white applicants
applied via the economic disadvantage component.
In 1973 and 1974, Alan Bakke, a 33-year-old University of Minnesota alum, was denied
admission by the Davis Medical School under its main admissions program. Bakke’s test scores
were significantly higher than those of admittees under the special admissions program. He sued
the University of California, claiming the special program violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legal Question: Is the UC Davis special admissions program a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
Concurrence/Dissent (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun):
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Relevant Case Facts: The University of Michigan Law School had an admissions policy
designed to promote a diverse student body. Specifically, the school sought a “critical mass” of
minority students – enough so that none of the minority students would be made to feel like
spokespersons for their race at the school. To meet this goal, the school looked beyond test
scores and GPAs, and looked at each application carefully. According to expert analysis of the
program, had race not been considered, the minority population at the school would have been
10% instead of 35%. Barbara Grutter, a white applicant with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score,
challenged the law school’s program on Equal Protection grounds after she was denied
admission.
(A challenge to Michigan’s undergraduate admission’s program was decided the same day. In
that case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court held that the program violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it used race as a decisive factor in a mechanical fashion.)
Legal Question: Is the law school’s admission policy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
Dissent (Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas):
Dissent (Kennedy):
Dissent (Scalia and Thomas):
Dissent (Thomas and Scalia):
Reed v. Reed (1971)
Relevant Case Facts: Section 15-314 of the Idaho Code, which provided a ranking guide for
who should administer the estate of a person who dies without a will, said that if there are
competing claims from two potential administrators with the same relationship to the deceased
(e.g., both are parents), men should be preferred to women. Sally Reed and Cecil Reed were the
divorced parents of Richard Reed, who died at 16. Both Reed parents made a claim to administer
Richard’s estate – which was only a few personal items and a small savings account. Cecil Reed
was appointed administrator by a probate judge, citing Section 15-314. Sally Reed, with the legal
help of future justice Ginsburg and the ACLU, challenged the law as a violation of her Equal
Protection rights.
Legal Question: Does the Idaho law discriminating against women violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
3.2 beer, and Carolyn Whitner, who owned a liquor store, sued the state, claiming the law
discriminated on the basis of gender, and was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Legal Question: Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by establishing different drinking ages for men and women?
Reasoning:
Dissent (Rehnquist):
United States v. Virginia (1996)
Relevant Case Facts: Virginia Military Institute, a public institution, had a single-sex (men
only) admissions policy. In 1990, after receiving a complaint from a female high school student,
the U.S. sued the state and VMI, contending that the single-sex policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The state court of appeals ruled against the state. In response, the state created
the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VMIL), a female-only academy designed to
produce “citizen–soldiers” like VMI. The U.S. took the state to court once again, charging that
VMIL was not an adequate solution because it was not on par with VMI.
Legal Question: Is the state’s creation of the VMIL a sufficient remedy to the VMI admissions
policy under the Equal Protection Clause?
Reasoning:
Concurrence (Rehnquist):
Dissent (Scalia):
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973)
Relevant Case Facts: Texas public schools were funded in part by money generated through
property taxes. The Edgewood district in San Antonio, which was roughly 90% Mexican-
American, had an assessed property value of $5,960 per pupil, the lowest in the city. Even
factoring in the other sources of funding, Edgewood students got only $356 per pupil. By
contrast, in the wealthier Alamo Heights district, where property values were $49,000 per pupil
(even though the tax rate was lower than Edgewood), the total funding level was $594 per
student. Demetrio Rodriguez and other Mexican-American parents from the Edgewood district,
backed by groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU, sued on Equal Protection grounds. They
won at federal court, and the state appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Question: Is the Texas system of financing public education a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause?
Reasoning:
Dissent (Marshall):
Plyler v. Doe (1982)
Relevant Case Facts: In May 1975 the Texas legislature revised its laws to withhold from local
school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not legal U.S. residents.
The law also allowed local school districts to deny enrollment to any student who was an
undocumented alien under Section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code. In September 1977 a
suit was filed against James Plyler, superintendent of the Tyler Texas Independent School
District, on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin who lived in Smith County, Texas.
Because they could not prove their legal status, these children had been denied admission to
school.
Legal Question: May a state deny funds to school districts that is used for children who are not
legally U.S. residents?
Reasoning:
Concurring (Marshall)
Dissenting (Burger, White, Rehnquist, O’Connor)
Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)
Relevant Case Facts: Grand Prairie, a white St. Louis neighborhood, had a restrictive covenant
since 1911. The covenant, which had been renewed frequently since its creation, held that
properties were not to be sold to non-whites. In August 1945, J.D. and Ethel Shelley, a black
couple, bought a house in Grand Prairie. Louis and Fern Kraemer, who were white, sued to have
a court enforce the restrictive covenant. Missouri Supreme Court ordered that the covenant be
enforced and the Shelley’s’ property be taken away. Shelley’s legal team, led by Thurgood
Marshall, argued that once the court enforced the covenant, the covenant became state action
subject to the Equal Protection Clause.
Legal Question: Are court-enforced restrictive covenants a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961)
Relevant Case Facts: Wilmington Parking Authority, a city agency in Wilmington, Delaware,
owned and operated a parking garage. To help cover the costs of garage, the city leased space
within the ramp itself to Eagle Coffee Shoppe. In August 1958, William Burton, who was black,
parked in the garage and went to the coffee shop, where he was denied service because of his
race. Burton sued claiming an Equal Protection Violation. The trial court agreed, but the state
supreme court reversed, holding that the discrimination was purely private.
Legal Question: Does the coffee shop’s discriminatory practice count as state action subject to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Reasoning:
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis. (1972)
Relevant Case Facts: A white member of the Lodge was denied service because his guest, K.
Leroy Irvis, was black. (Irvis happened to a member of the PA state legislature.) The Lodge
claimed it was simply upholding rules of Supreme Lodge, its national authority. Irvis sued,
claiming that because Lodge had a state liquor license, the state was in effect endorsing the
Lodge’s discriminatory policies.
Legal Question: Does the Lodge’s practices classify as state action subject to the proscriptions
of the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it has been licensed by the state to serve liquor?
Reasoning:
Dissent (Brennan):