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Multiple Choice
38. The European Union's enforcement agency in antitrust matters, which is analogous to the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission and Justice Department, is the:
a. Commission of the European Union.
b. European Enforcement Agency.
c. European Antitrust Task Force.
d. None of the above.
39. The court that hears appeals from the EU's antitrust enforcement agency and referrals from the courts of the EU
member states on competition issues is the:
a. European Court of Justice.
b. Community Supreme Court.
c. European Court of Appeals.
d. Antitrust Appellate Court.
40. In keeping with the litigious character of the American legal system, U.S. antitrust laws:
I. Are stated in general terms.
II. The details are to be worked out through administrative regulations.
a. I only.
b. II only.
c. Both I and II.
d. Neither I nor II.
41. The substance of many countries' antitrust law is very similar in focusing on two types of activity. The two types of
activities are:
a. Prohibitions against price cutting and resale price agreements.
b. Prohibitions against agreements attempting to restrict competition and the abuse of a dominant market
position.
c. Prohibitions against economizing to achieve greater market share and lack of marginal return.
d. Both A and B.
42. The European Union regulation that deals with "A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant
position...(impeding) competition...in the common market..." is:
a. EU Antitrust Act.
b. EU Workers Regulation.
c. EU Unfair Trade Regulation.
d. EU Merger Regulation.
43. When evaluating the effect of a merger, the European Union seeks to determine:
a. The impact of the merger by totaling the total number of competitors left.
b. Amount of capital invested in the combined companies in relation to the remaining competitors.
c. The compatibility of the merger with the common market, which is presumed if market share will not exceed
25 percent.
d. None of the above.
44. The primary reason for the absence of much litigation under foreign competition law is:
I. The preapproval process reduces the necessity for litigation.
II. Differences in the remedies and types of sanctions for violations.
III. Cultural attitudes toward antitrust law differ.
a. I only.
b. II only.
c. III only.
d. I and I.
e. I, II, and III.
45. Under U.S. antitrust law:
I. Most actions are brought by private individuals.
II. Successful litigants can collect treble damages.
a. I only.
b. II only.
c. Both I and II.
d. Neither I nor II.
46. The U.S. antitrust law distinguishes between actions that are:
a. Per se wrong and actions to which the role of reason applies.
b. Marginally wrong and actions to which the rule of reason applies.
c. Partially wrong and actions to which the rule of best judgment applies.
d. Good and bad.
47. Under U.S. antitrust law, the rule of reason applies to situations where:
a. A person must decide to bring a lawsuit or not.
b. Through analysis, an action is not found to be anticompetitive.
c. The amount of damages awarded is reasonable.
d. A merger is anticipated and valid if reasonable.
48. The European Union uses an exemption system in its competition law. This means that:
a. Certain industries are exempted from antitrust law because of their technology.
b. An agreement can be entered into if the prospective parties can obtain a "negative clearance" from the
European Commission.
c. Certain countries are exempt from the competition law until they reach further economic development.
d. None of the above.
49. Under the EU merger regulations, preapproval is not needed under which of the following conditions:
a. Where a non-EU firm is involved in the merger.
b. Where the firms are involved in agricultural trade.
c. Where the merger falls under a de minimis exception or has the benefit of a block exception.
d. All of the above.
50. The European Commission has given exemptions in all of the following areas except:
a. Exclusive purchasing agreements.
b. Patent license agreements.
c. Motor vehicle distribution agreements.
d. Merger agreements.
51. Under U.S. antitrust law, certain mergers and joint venture agreements must be brought before whom before they
are concluded?
a. Congress.
b. President.
c. Federal Trade Commission.
d. Department of Justice.
52. EU competition law applies only to agreements and transactions that:
a. Involve an EU-based company.
b. Have an effect on intra-EUC trade.
c. The EU wishes to have its approval and involvement.
d. Have a direct impact on foreign commerce.
53. In 1982, the U.S. Congress passed a law to clarify the standard to be applied in determining the extraterritorial effect
of American antitrust laws. This was:
a. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act.
b. The Miller-Hastings Antitrust Extraterritorial Act.
c. The Antitrust Effect Act.
d. The Jones-Burden Competition Act.
54. The 1982 act passed by Congress in order to clarify the standard to be applied in determining the extraterritorial
effect of American antitrust law provides that:
a. American antitrust law extends to all countries that do not have enforceable antitrust laws of their own.
b. American antitrust law does not apply outside the U.S.
c. American antitrust law applies only to conduct that has a direct, substantial, foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce.
d. American antitrust law applies only to firms whose economic power is so substantial that they could directly
and significantly dominate foreign markets.
55. "Blocking Legislation" in international antitrust action refers to:
a. Laws that block certain goods from entering a country.
b. Provisions that prevent the discovery of documents by foreign countries and bar enforcement.
c. Setting aside certain blocks of businesses exempt from antitrust laws.
d. None of the above.
56. The American antitrust law policy toward patent licenses:
a. Tends to be more forgiving of a patent holder's restrictions on its licenses.
b. Views the patent monopoly as a danger to competition.
c. Lends itself to abuse by the patent holder.
d. None of the above.
57. Which of the following Acts created a review process under which mergers, joint venture agreements, and similar
transactions must be brought before the Department of Justice for review before they are concluded?
a. The Clayton Act
b. The Smoot-Hawley Act
c. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
d. The Kyoto Protocol
58. Which U.S. Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or to
tend to create a monopoly?
a. The Clayton Act
b. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
c. The Smoot-Hawley Act
d. The Kyoto Protocol
59. In the U.S., which type of merger is considered to pose the biggest threat to competition because they are the most
likely to create or enhance dominance in the market?
a. horizontal
b. vertical
c. multi-industry
d. all of the above
60. In recent years, Japan has brought its stance on mergers more into line with international practices by revising its
Antimonopoly Act to require:
a. horizontal mergers.
b. confidential prior consultation.
c. prior notification.
d. all of the above
61. In China, a qualifying merger or acquisition is referred to as a:
a. concentration of businesses.
b. concentration of undertakings.
c. controlled undertaking.
d. none of the above
62. Under Chinese law, a merger or acquisition qualifies for review if:
a. a transfer of control must occur.
b. it will result in the acquisition of control over another undertaking.
c. it results in the ability to exercise decisive influence over another undertaking.
d. all of the above
63. Antitrust law in poses the possibility of criminal liability, but this is not possible in .
a. the United States; Europe
b. the United States; China
c. China; the United States
d. Europe; Japan
64. In what ways is the U.S. "rule of reason" analysis inappropriate and appropriate under EU competition laws?
65. Weigh the relative benefits and short-comings of the EU preapproval model and the U.S. litigation model as
exemplified by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act.
66. In what instances would both the U.S. and EU extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition laws apply? Would only one
apply?
67. Compare and contrast the EU implementation within the community test with the U.S. effects test.
68. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages -- from the perspective of competition law -- in having a wholly foreign
subsidiary in Europe.
69. Compare and contrast the Sherman Act and Articles 81 and 85 of the EU Treaty and/or other Competition laws.
70. Compare and contrast the approaches of the EU and the U.S. with regard to IPR issues (patents, know-how
transfer agreements).
71. Consider in what ways the histories of the U.S., Japan, and Europe may explain their respective laws regarding
market competition and competition.
72. Weigh the benefits and detriments of the EU and U.S. rules regarding jurisdiction and forum in privately enforced
competition laws.
73. Knowledgeable that Canada, Germany, and the UK have enacted blocking legislation, craft a treaty on this issue.
How might the different interests of these countries and partnerships (or lack thereof) with them affect any treaty?
Students may also wish to read Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
for further background).
74. Draft guidelines for the application of anti-trust laws to anti-competitive practices outside of the U.S. or critique any
(existing) proposed guidelines.
75. Write an argument that clawback provisions violate international law.
