on Charter’s strategy through Liberty Broadband Corporation’s (Liberty) substantial equity stake in Charter. Malone is
the controlling shareholder in Liberty.
When Comcast’s deal was thwarted by regulators, the highly leveraged Charter took a less aggressive approach
getting Mr. Malone more involved in the initial phases of the deal. He called TWC’s CEO Rob Marcus initially
indicating that Charter wanted a friendly deal. Charter deliberately avoided making what would be perceived by TWC
as an excessively low offer so as not to alienate TWC’s CEO and board. Charter’s offer of $195 per TWC share was
also structured to give TWC shareholders more choice: $110 in cash and $95 in stock or $115 in cash and the
remainder in stock. The deal involved a breakup fee. If regulators block the deal, Charter could owe Time Warner Cable
about $2 billion, or Time Warner Cable would be responsible for the breakup fee if it had accepted an offer from a rival
suitor.
In the wake of the failure of market leader Comcast to get approval to acquire TWC, why did Charter believe it could
get approval? There is little market overlap between Time Warner, Charter and Bright House and the combined
businesses will still not be as big a Comcast’s broadband/cable business. By some estimates, a tie-up between Comcast
and TWC would have given the combined firms almost two thirds of the broadband market. Moreover, Charter is not as
vertically integrated as Comcast which produces considerable amounts of its own content. The Federal Communication
Commission’s clearer definition of so-called net neutrality rules, which essentially bans discrimination against
businesses wishing to access the internet through gateway services such as cable, makes it more difficult for a cable
firm to hamper access to potential competitors. Finally, the emergence of online video alternatives to cable promotes
increased competition for the traditional cable firms.
The impact of the consolidation among cable providers on content providers is ominous. The Charter/TWC deal
shrinks the number of major internet and cable TV distributors in the US to just four: Comcast, Charter, Verizon and
AT&T/DirecTV. With fewer outlets to sell their shows, TV and cable network content providers have less leverage to
demand high fees and the inclusion of their niche channels in packages of services offered to cable customers. This is
likely to hurt revenue at content providers such as Discovery, AMC Networks, Scripps Networks Interactive, and even
Viacom. Their only recourse may be for the networks to merge or be acquired by cable and internet distributors
themselves.
While content distributors may currently have the upper hand in their dealings with content providers, their
advantage may be short lived as Amazon, Facebook and Apple could enter the business of providing streaming video on
demand. This would enable the major TV networks to seek partners from firms such as Facebook or Apple when they
launch their own internet based video service. The cable companies turned online video and broad band suppliers must
remain vigilant and aware of changing circumstances in the industry. A clear vision of where they want to compete and