59. The term res ipsa loquitur means:
a. an event was the cause in fact
b. an event was the proximate cause of an injury
c. the thing speaks to the court
d. the thing reveals the truth
e. none of the other choices
60. Cause in fact is established by:
a. evidence showing that a defendant’s action or inaction is the actual cause of an injury that would not have
occurred but for the defendant’s behavior
b. evidence showing the defendant intentionally harmed the victim
c. evidence showing the victim was harmed due to circumstances outside his control
d. evidence showing the victim could not prevent the injury
e. evidence showing that the defendant could not have prevented the injury
61. The sine qua non rule is also known as the:
a. but only rule
b. not only rule
c. but for rule
d. but not rule
e. none of the other choices
62. The sine qua non rule is also known as the:
a. but only rule
b. not only rule
c. but not rule
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other choices
63. The sine qua non rule or but for rule is that:
a. the injury would not have occurred if the victim had known the tortfeasor
b. the injury would not have occurred but for the conduct of the tortfeasor
c. the injury is the fault of the tortfeasor
d. the injury occurred because of the tortfeasor’s lack of knowledge
e. none of the other choices
64. The proximate cause of an injury is the cause of the injury.
a. legal
b. definite
c. probable
d. most likely
e. foreseeable
65. The proximate cause of an injury is the cause of the injury.
a. only
b. definite
c. probable
d. most likely
e. none of the other choices
66. Proximate cause limits liability to harms:
a. whether foreseeable or not
b. resulting from remote occurrences “evolving naturally” from a central event
c. that result from non-negligent conduct
d. that bear a reasonable relationship to the defendant’s negligent conduct
e. that arise from interaction with railroads
67. Proximate cause limits liability to harms:
a. whether foreseeable or not
b. resulting from remote occurrences “evolving naturally” from a central event
c. that result from non-negligent conduct
d. that arise from interaction with railroads
e. none of the other choices
68. For liability to be imposed when negligence is alleged, in many jurisdictions, the injured party must prove that the
defendant’s act was not only the cause in fact of the injury but also the of the injury.
a. superseding cause
b. intervening conduct or strict liability
c. misappropriation
d. proximate cause or substantial factor
e. none of the other choices are required
69. For liability to be imposed when negligence is alleged, in many jurisdictions, the injured party must prove that the
defendant’s act was not only the cause in fact of the injury but also the of the injury.
a. superseding cause
b. intervening conduct or strict liability
c. misappropriation
d. comparative negligence
e. none of the other choices
70. If alleged consequences are too far removed from the negligent conduct:
a. there will be a limit imposed on the damage award
b. the negligent conduct will not result in liability
c. the negligent conduct will still result in liability
d. the victim will be required to have at least two expert witnesses testify on his behalf
e. none of the other choices
71. If alleged consequences are too far removed from the negligent conduct:
a. there will be a limit imposed on the damage award
b. the victim will be required to have at least two expert witnesses testify on his behalf
c. the negligent conduct will still result in liability
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other specific choices
72. For a person‘s negligent conduct to be legally linked to its consequences, the chain of events connecting the two
must be:
a. unbroken
b. foreseeable
c. explainable
d. undisputable
e. none of the other choices
73. For a person‘s negligent conduct to be legally linked to its consequences, the chain of events connecting the two
must be:
a. unbroken b.
continuous c.
explainable d.
indisputable
e. none of the other choices
74. While Mrs. O’Leary may have been negligent in leaving an oil lamp in the barn for her cow to kick over, she would
not be held liable for the Great Chicago Fire of 1871 because the chain of events from the cow kicking the lantern
to the destruction of the city was not:
a. foreseeable
b. indisputable
c. unavoidable
d. all of the specific choices
e. none of the specific choices
75. In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, where Palsgraf was hit by machinery that fell when an explosion occurred
at a train station, and she sued the railroad for negligence, the New York high court held that the railroad:
a. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, so could be liable for her injury
b. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but the cause of the accident was a careless passenger, not
the railroad, so it was relieved of liability by intervening conduct
c. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but the explosion was not the proximate cause of the
accident, so there was no liability
d. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but its actions were not a substantial factor in what caused
the accident, so there was no liability
e. was not liable because of a lack of proximate cause
76. In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, where Palsgraf was hit by machinery that fell when an explosion occurred
at a train station, and she sued the railroad for negligence, the New York high court held that the railroad:
a. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, so could be liable for her injury
b. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but the cause of the accident was a careless passenger, not
the railroad, so it was relieved of liability by intervening conduct
c. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but the explosion was not the proximate cause of the
accident, so there was no liability
d. was negligent for exposing Palsgraf to danger, but its actions were not a substantial factor in what caused
the accident, so there was no liability
e. none of the other choices are correct
77. In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, involving a woman injured by an accidentally dropped package of
fireworks that exploded as it was run over by a train, the railroad should not have been held liable for negligence
because:
a. Palsgraf should not have been standing so close to the tracks
b. railroad employees repeatedly warned Palsgraf that she was standing in a dangerous location
c. there was nothing about the package that would suggest it was dangerous if dropped
d. the railroad employees acted in an unreasonable manner
e. none of the other choices
78. In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company, involving a woman injured by an accidentally dropped package of
fireworks that exploded as it was run over by a train, Palsgraf’s injuries were not a result of negligence on the part
of the railroad because:
a. the railroad has strict regulations against carrying fireworks on trains
b. the victim knew the package contained fireworks, but the railroad employees did not
c. the victim knew the man carrying the package of fireworks
d. there was nothing in the situation to suggest to a cautious mind that the package would cause damage
e. there were the required number of railroad employees present
79. Due to the requirement of proximate cause, in order for a person to be held liable for negligence it must be shown
that:
a. a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the danger and done something to prevent it
b. the defendant knew or should have known that the victim would be harmed
c. the defendant acted with less than reasonable care, despite the foreseeability of harm to the victim
d. all of the specific choices
e. none of the specific choices
80. Due to criticism that the proximate cause rule is difficult to understand and apply, some states have replaced it with
the:
a. fault factor test
b. considerable factor test
c. substantial factor test
d. ultimate cause rule
e. none of the other choices
81. Due to criticism that the proximate cause rule is difficult to understand and apply, some states have replaced it with
the:
a. fault factor test
b. unforeseen cause rule
c. considerable factor test
d. ultimate cause rule
e. none of the other choices
82. The test states “A legal cause of injury is a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”
a. considerable factor
b. substantial factor
c. legal factor
d. proximate cause
e. sine qua non
83. The test states “A legal cause of injury is a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”
a. considerable factor
b. proximate factor
c. sine qua non
d. proximate cause
e. none of the other choices
84. If causal connection between a person’s act and the resulting harm to another is broken by an intervening act or
event, the act or event is called:
a. proximate cause b.
unforeseen cause c.
superseding cause d.
foreseeable cause
e. none of the other choices
85. If causal connection between a person’s act and the resulting harm to another is broken by an intervening act or
event, the act or event is called:
a. proximate cause
b. unforeseen cause
c. determinative cause
d. foreseeable cause
e. none of the other choices
86. A superseding cause is an act that:
a. happens just before the act that causes harm to the victim
b. breaks the causal connection between a person’s act and the resulting harm to another
c. links a person’s act to the resulting harm to another
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other specific choices
87. A superseding cause is an act that:
a. happens just before the act that causes harm to the victim
b. makes the causal connection between a person’s act and the resulting harm to another
c. causes a person to commit the act that results in harm to another
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other specific choices
88. In some states, such as California, proximate cause has been replaced by a negligence rule of liability that holds: A
legal cause of injury is a cause which is a(n) in bringing about the injury.
a. intervening conduct
b. superseding cause
c. sine qua non
d. substantial factor
e. none of the other choices are correct
89. In some states, such as California, proximate cause has been replaced by a negligence rule of liability that holds: A
legal cause of injury is a cause which is a(n) in bringing about the injury.
a. intervening conduct
b. superseding cause
c. sine qua non
d. contributory factor
e. none of the other choices are correct
90. Defenses to a negligent act include:
a. assumption of the risk
b. existence of proximate cause
c. existence of a substantial factor
d. res ipsa loquitur
e. all of the other choices
91. With the gradual adoption of some portions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, courts will:
a. rely less on the notion of proximate cause
b. move away from the notion of the “substantial factor”
c. use a “risk standard” to help judge when liability should be imposed
d. presume duty almost always exists where there is a risk of physical harm
e. all the other choices
92. With the gradual adoption of some portions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, courts will:
a. rely less on the notion of ultimate cause
b. put a limit on damage awards
c. use a “risk standard” to help judge when liability should be imposed
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other specific choices
93. With the gradual adoption of some portions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, courts will:
a. agree to standard damage awards for each type of injury
b. put a limit on damage awards
c. use a “ultimate standard“ to help judge when liability should be imposed
d. all of the other specific choices
e. none of the other specific choices
94. Even if an injured party establishes the required elements of negligence, the injured party may be denied
compensation if the defendant establishes:
a. a plausible cause
b. a valid defense
c. a proximate cause
d. a proximate defense
e. a substantial defense
95. Even if an injured party establishes the required elements of negligence, the injured party may be denied
compensation if the defendant establishes:
a. a plausible cause
b. a substantial defense
c. a proximate cause
d. a proximate defense
e. none of the other choices
96. Defenses to a negligent act include:
a. assumption of the risk
b. existence of proximate cause
c. existence of a substantial factor
d. res ipsa loquitur
e. all of the other choices
97. Defenses to a negligent act include:
a. assumption of the risk
b. comparative negligence
c. assumption of the risk and comparative negligence
d. existence of proximate cause
e. none of the other choices
98. Defenses to a negligent act include:
a. comparative negligence
b. existence of proximate cause
c. existence of a substantial factor
d. res ipsa loquitur
e. all of the other choices
99. Defenses to intentional torts are:
a. useless to defendants in negligence torts
b. not available to defendants in negligence torts
c. also available to defendants in negligence torts
d. rarely available to defendants in negligence torts
e. none of the other choices
100. Defenses to intentional torts are:
a. useless to defendants in negligence torts
b. not available to defendants in negligence torts
c. the only defenses available to defendants in negligence torts
d. rarely available to defendants in negligence torts
e. none of the other choices
101. The assumption of risk defense requires that:
a. the injured party knew or should have known of the risks involved in a situation and voluntarily assumes the
risk
b. the defendant had an “assumption of risk” insurance policy
c. the defendant posted warning signs where the victim could have read them
d. all of the specific choices
e. none of the specific choices
102. Assumption of risk is a(n):
a. fail safe way to protect oneself from negligence liability
b. valid defense against a negligence action
c. insurance policy against being sued for negligence
d. all of the specific choices
e. none of the specific choices
103. Baseball fans who willingly sit where they might be hit by a stray baseball during the normal course of play are:
a. assuming the risk of being hit by a stray baseball
b. prime candidates for bringing a negligence tort action against any player who hits a ball into the stands
c. unknowingly putting themselves in danger
d. covered by the baseball players’ “assumption of risk” insurance
e. none of the other choices
104. Assumption of risk is a defense.
a. proactive
b. positive
c. conciliatory
d. redundant
e. none of the other choices
105. Assumption of risk is a(n) defense.
a. proactive
b. positive
c. conciliatory
d. affirmative
e. none of the other choices
106. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, which means it must be:
a. specifically raised by the defendant
b. supported by at least two witnesses
c. specifically raised by the plaintiff
d. specifically raised before the case is brought to court
e. none of the other choices
107. Once established, assumption of risk:
a. does not bar the plaintiff from recovery, if the defendant was negligent
b. usually bars the plaintiff from recovery, even if the defendant was negligent
c. usually bars the plaintiff from recovery, unless the defendant was negligent
d. prevents the defendant from having to pay more than half of the damage award
e. none of the other choices
108. In Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, where Geczi suffered an injury when a treadmill at Lifetime malfunctioned but a
jury held Lifetime not to be negligent, the appeals court held that Lifetime:
a. was liable for negligence for failure to warn Geczi of the risks
b. was liable for negligence because the machine was not properly maintained
c. was not liable because Geczi had been seen not exercising good judgment when using the machine
d. was not liable because Geczi assumed the risk and signed a liability waiver
e. none of the other choices
109. In Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, where Geczi suffered an injury when a treadmill at Lifetime malfunctioned but a
jury held Lifetime not to be negligent, the appeals court held that Lifetime:
a. was liable for negligence for failure to warn Geczi of the risks
b. was liable for negligence because the machine was not properly maintained
c. was not liable because Geczi had been seen not exercising good judgment when using the machine
d. was not liable because working out is known to be dangerous
e. none of the other choices
110. In Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, where Geczi suffered an injury when a treadmill at Lifetime malfunctioned but a
jury held Lifetime not to be negligent, the appeals court held that Lifetime was not liable because:
a. Geczi expressly assumed the risk of injury
b. Geczi was over 18 when she signed the release of liability form
c. Geczi was a rational adult who should have understood the inherent risks of a treadmill
d. Geczi signed the release of liability form in front of witnesses
e. all of the other choices are correct
111. In Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, where Geczi suffered an injury when a treadmill at Lifetime malfunctioned but a
jury held Lifetime not to be negligent, the appeals court held that Lifetime was not liable because Geczi
.
a. implicitly assumed the risk
b. definitely assumed the risk
c. expressly assumed the risk
d. refused to assume the risk
e. none of the other choices are correct
112. In Geczi v. Lifetime Fitness, where Geczi suffered an injury when a treadmill at Lifetime malfunctioned but a
jury held Lifetime not to be negligent, the appeals court held that Lifetime was not liable because Geczi.
a. implicitly assumed the risk of treadmill use
b. definitely assumed the risk of treadmill use by ignoring warnings of possible dangers
c. assumed the risk by her “wanton and careless” behavior
d. refused to assume the risk, which thereby voided her membership in Lifetime
e. none of the other choices are correct