D. x < 50
Consider the following innovation game: Firm A must decide whether or not to
introduce a new product. Firm B must decide whether or not to clone firm A’s product.
If firm A introduces and B clones, then firm A earns $2 and B earns $15. If A introduces
and B does not clone, then A earns $8 and B earns $1. If firm A does not introduce, both
firms earn profits of 0. Which of the following is true?
A. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium profits are ($2, 15).
B. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium profits are ($8, 1).
C. It is not in A’s interest to introduce.
D. None of the answers is correct.
Suppose that JVC is trying to decide how to price a new stereo system composed of a
receiver, CD player, and speakers. The company’s economists have estimated that two
different groups will purchase these products: students and club owners. The
economists’ analysis suggests that the total market for its brand of stereos consists of
10,000 students and 50,000 club owners. In addition, it is estimated that the maximum
amount each group will pay for each stereo component is as follows:
JVC’s objective is to maximize revenues, and it is considering three strategies to price
its stereo components: (1) a standard strategy whereby it prices each stereo component
separately; (2) perfect price discrimination; or (3) bundling the three components
together and selling only bundles containing the receiver, CD player, and speakers.a. If