A. Sweezy oligopoly.
B. Cournot oligopoly.
C. Stackelberg oligopoly.
D. Bertrand oligopoly.
If you advertise and your rival advertises, you each will earn $4 million in profits. If
neither of you advertises, you will each earn $10 million in profits. However, if one of
you advertises and the other does not, the firm that advertises will earn $1 million and
the non-advertising firm will earn $5 million. If you and your rival plan to be in
business for 10 years, then the Nash equilibrium is:
A. for each firm to advertise every year.
B. for neither firm to advertise in early years, but to advertise in later years.
C. for each firm to not advertise in any year.
D. for each firm to advertise in early years, but not advertise in later years.
Consider an auction with 1,000 risk-neutral bidders. It is known that these bidders have
affiliated values. Based on this information, we know the expected revenues for the
different auction types will be:
A. English > Second-price, sealed-bid > First-price, sealed-bid = Dutch.
B. English = Second-price, sealed-bid = First-price, sealed-bid = Dutch.