Suppose two companies, Macrosoft and Apricot, and considering whether to develop a
new product, a touch-screen t-shirt. The payoffs to each of developing a touch-screen
t-shirt depend upon the actions of the other, as shown in the payoff matrix below (the
payoffs are given in millions of dollars).
Suppose Apricot makes its decision first, and then Macrosoft makes its decision after
seeing Apricot’s choice. What will happen if, before Apricot chooses, Macrosoft
announces that it is going to develop a touch-screen t-shirt no matter what Apricot
does?
A. Apricot will develop a touch-screen t-shirt, and Macrosoft will not because
Macrosoft’s threat is not credible.
B. Macrosoft will develop a touch-screen t-shirt, and Apricot will not because it’s not in
Apricot’s interest to develop a touch-screen t-shirt if Macrosoft also develops one.
C. Both Apricot and Macrosoft will develop a touch-screen t-shirt because neither
company will want to back down.
D. Neither Apricot nor Macrosoft will develop a touch-screen t-shirt because they will
both realize that they are in a no-win situation.
As consumers’ incomes decrease, the demand curve for bologna sandwiches shifts to
the right. Therefore bologna sandwiches are:
A. normal goods.
B. complement goods.
C. substitute goods.
D. inferior goods.