Figure 14-9
Refer to Figure 14-9. Uniguest, Inc. is a company that provides PCs with internet
access and touch-sensitive screens to hotels. Suppose the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino
in Las Vegas informs Uniguest that it is considering installing these systems in its hotel
rooms. The Hard Rock expects to be able to charge higher prices for these rooms if it
installs Uniguest’s systems in its rooms. The two companies begin bargaining over what
price the Hard Rock will pay Uniguest for its systems, and the decision tree shown
above illustrates this bargaining game. Note that the profit figures listed in the decision
tree are additional profits for the Hard Rock and total profits for Uniguest.
a. Suppose the Hard Rock offers Uniguest $1,200 per system. Will Uniguest accept or
reject this offer? Why?
b. Suppose the Hard Rock offers Uniguest $800 per system. Will Uniguest accept or
reject this offer? Why?
c. Suppose Uniguest attempts to obtain a favorable outcome from the bargaining by
telling the Hard Rock it will reject an $800-per-system offer. If the Hard Rock does not
believe the threat is credible, what will it do? Why? What will Uniguest do? Why?
d. Is there a sub-game perfect equilibrium in this situation? Explain.