Figure 14-4
Rainbow Writer (RW) is a
small online company selling a highly rated software package for printing color labels
directly onto CDs. The firm currently earns a profit of $2 million per year selling its
package exclusively on its Web site. Odeon, the producer of the most popular software
package for editing and burning CDs and DVDs, has expressed interest in bundling
Rainbow Writer’s product into its own package. Odeon expects that bundling would
further boost its sales and allow it to sell the new bundled product at a higher price, thus
raising its profits beyond its current profit of $12 million. Figure 14-4 shows the
decision tree for the Rainbow Writer-Odeon bargaining game.
What is the equilibrium outcome in this game and is this a subgame-perfect
equilibrium?
A) In the equilibrium, neither offer is accepted as Rainbow Writer holds out for a better
deal. The two rejection outcomes are subgame-perfect equilibria.
B) In the equilibrium, Odeon offers $40 per copy of the software package and is
accepted but this is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
C) Either offer of $30 or $40 per copy of the software package is accepted and these
two equilibria are subgame-perfect equilibria.
D) Either offer of $30 or $40 per copy of the software package is accepted but these are
not are subgame-perfect equilibria.
Owners of a corporation share in the profits of the firm