Chapter 2
The Regulatory Environment
Examination Questions and Answers
Answer true or false to the following questions.
1. Insider trading involves buying or selling securities based on knowledge not available to the
general public. True or False
2. The primary reason the Sarbanes-Oxly Act of 2002 was passed was to eliminate insider trading.
True or False
3. Federal antitrust laws exist to prevent individual corporations from assuming too much market
power such that they can limit their output and raise prices without concern for any significant
competitor reaction. True or False
4. A typical consent decree for firms involved in a merger requires the merging parties to divest
overlapping businesses or to restrict anticompetitive practices. True or False
5. Foreign competitors are not relevant to antitrust regulators when trying to determine if a merger of
two domestic firms would create excessive pricing power. True or False
6. The U.S. Securities Act of 1933 requires that all securities offered to the public must be registered
with the government. True or False
7. Mergers and acquisitions are subject to federal regulation only. True or False
8. Whenever either the acquiring or the target firm’s stock is publicly traded, the transaction is
subject to the substantial reporting requirements of federal securities laws. True or False
9. Antitrust laws exist to prevent individual corporations from assuming too much market power
such that they can limit their output and raise prices without concern for how their competitors
might react. True or False
10. Unlike the Sherman Act, which contains criminal penalties, the Clayton Act is a civil statute and
allows private parties injured by the antitrust violations to sue in federal court for a multiple of
their actual damages. True or False
11. The Williams Act of 1968 consists of a series of amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, and it
is intended to protect target firm shareholders from lighting fast takeovers in which they would not
have enough time to adequately assess the value of an acquirer’s offer. True or False
12. Whenever an investor acquires 5% or more of public company, it must disclose its intentions, the
identities of all investors, their occupation, sources of financing, and the purpose of the
acquisition. True or False
13. Whenever an investor accumulates 5% or more of a public company’s stock, it must make a so–
called 13(d) filing with the SEC. True or False
14. If an investor initiates a tender offer, it must make a 14(d) filing with the SEC. True or False
15. In the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission has the exclusive right to approve mergers and
acquisitions if they are determined to be potentially anti-competitive. True or False
16. In the U.S., the Sherman Act makes illegal all contracts, combinations and conspiracies, which
“unreasonably” restrain trade. The Act applies to all transactions and businesses engaging in both
interstate and intrastate trade. True or False
17. Acquisitions involving companies of a certain size cannot be completed until certain information
is supplied to the federal government and until a specific waiting period has elapsed.
True or False
18. If the regulatory authorities suspect that a potential transaction may be anti-competitive, they will
file a lawsuit to prevent completion of the transaction. True or False
19. Under a consent decree, the regulatory authorities agree to approve a proposed transaction if the
parties involved agree to take certain actions following closing. True or False
20. Negotiated agreements between the buyer and seller rarely have a provision enabling the parties to
back out, if the proposed transaction is challenged by the FTC or SEC. True or False
21. About 40% of all proposed M&A transactions are disallowed by the U.S. antitrust regulators,
because they are believed to be anti-competitive. True or False
22. The U.S. antitrust regulators are likely to be most concerned about vertical mergers. True or False
23. The market share of the combined firms is rarely an important factor in determining whether a
proposed transaction is likely to be considered anti-competitive. True or False
24. A heavily concentrated market is one in which a single or a few firms control a disproportionately
large share of the total market. True or False
25. Market share is usually easy to define. True or False
26. U.S. antitrust regulators may approve a horizontal transaction even if it results in the combined
firms having substantial market share if it can be shown that significant cost efficiencies would
result. True or False
27. In addition to market share, antitrust regulators consider barriers to entry, the number of product
substitutes, and the degree of product differentiation. True or False
28. Antitrust authorities may approve a proposed takeover even if the resulting combination will
substantially increase market concentration if the target from would go bankrupt if the takeover
does not occur. True or False
29. Alliances and joint ventures are likely to receive more intensive scrutiny by regulators because of
their tendency to be more anti-competitive than M&As. True or False
30. U.S. antitrust regulators in determining if a proposed business combination is likely to be anti–
competitive consider only domestic competitors or foreign competitors with domestic operations.
True or False
31. Antitrust regulators rarely consider the impact of a proposed takeover on product and technical
innovation. True or False
32. There are no state statutes affecting proposed takeovers. True or False
33. States are not allowed to pass any laws that impose restrictions on interstate commerce or that
conflict in any way with federal laws regulating interstate commerce. True or False
34. Some state anti-takeover laws contain so-called “fair price provisions” requiring that all target
shareholders of a successful tender offer receive the same price as those who actually tendered
their shares. True or False
35. State antitrust laws are usually quite similar to federal laws. True or False
36. Under federal law, states have the right to sue to block mergers they believe are anti-competitive,
even if the FTC or SEC does not challenge them. True or False
37. Federal securities and antitrust laws are the only laws affecting corporate takeovers. Other laws
usually have little impact. True or False
38. Employee benefit plans seldom create significant liabilities for buyers. True or False
39. Unlike the European Economic Union, a decision by U.S. antitrust regulators to block a
transaction may be appealed in the courts. True or False
40. The primary shortcoming of industry concentration ratios is the frequent inability of antitrust
regulators to define accurately what constitutes an industry, the failure to reflect ease of entry or
exit, foreign competition, and the distribution of firm size. True or false
41. Antitrust regulators take into account the likelihood that a firm would fail and exit a market if it is
not allowed to merger with another firm. True or False
42. Efficiencies rarely are considered by antitrust regulators in determining whether to accept or reject
a proposed merger. True or False
43. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of industry concentration used by U.S. antitrust
regulators in determining whether to accept or reject a proposed merger. True or False
44. Horizontal mergers are rarely rejected by antitrust regulators. True or False
45. The Sherman Act makes illegal all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that “unreasonably”
restrain trade. True or False
46. The requirements to be listed on most major public exchanges far exceed the auditor independence
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. True or False
47. U.S. and European Union antitrust law are virtually identical. True or False
48. Transactions involving firms in different countries are complicated by having to deal with multiple
regulatory jurisdictions in specific countries or regions. True or False
49. Antitakeover laws do not exist at the state level. True or False
50. Environmental laws in the European Union are generally more restrictive than in the U.S. True or
Multiple Choice: Circle only one of the alternatives.
1. In determining whether a proposed transaction is anti-competitive, U.S. regulators look at all of
the following except for
a. Market share of the combined businesses
b. Potential for price fixing
c. Ease of new competitors to enter the market
d. Potential for job loss among target firm’s employees
e. The potential for the target firm to fail without the takeover
2. Which of the following is among the least regulated industries in the U.S.?
a. Defenses
b. Communications
c. Retailing
d. Public utilities
e. Banking
3. All of the following are true of the Williams Act except for
a. Consists of a series of amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
b. Facilitates rapid takeovers over target companies
c. Requires investors acquiring 5% or more of a public company to file a 13(d) with the
SEC
d. Firms undertaking tender offers are required to file a 14(d)-1 with the SEC
e. Acquiring firms initiating tender offers must disclose their intentions and business plans
4. The Securities Act of 1933 requires the registration of all securities issued to the public. Such
registration requires which of the following disclosures:
a. Description of the firm’s properties and business
b. Description of the securities
c. Information about management
d. Financial statements audited by public accountants
e. All of the above.
5. All of the following is true about proxy contests except for
a. Proxy materials must be filed with the SEC immediately following their distribution to
investors
b. The names and interests of all parties to the proxy contest must be disclosed in the proxy
materials
c. Proxy materials may be distributed by firms seeking to change the composition of a target
firm’s board of directors
d. Proxy materials may be distributed by the target firm seeking to influence how their
shareholders vote on a particular proposal
e. Target firm proxy materials must be filed with the SEC.
6. The purpose of the 1968 Williams Act was to
a. Give target firm shareholders time to review takeover proposals
b. Prosecute target firm shareholders who misuse information
c. Protect target firm employees from layoffs
d. Prevent tender offers
e. Promote tender offers
7. Which of the following represent important shortcomings of using industry concentration ratios to
determine whether the combination of certain firms will result in an increase in market power?
a. Frequent inability to define what constitutes an industry
b. Failure to measure ease of entry or exit for other firms
c. Failure to account for foreign competition
d. Failure to account properly for the distribution of firms of different sizes
e. All of the above
8. In a tender offer, which of the following is true?
a. Both acquiring and target firms are required to disclose their intentions to the SEC
b. The target’s management cannot advise its shareholders how to respond to a tender offer
until has disclosed certain information to the SEC
c. Information must be disclosed only to the SEC and not to the exchanges on which the
target’s shares are traded
d. A and B
e. A, B, and C
9. Which of the following are true about the Sherman Antitrust Act?
a. Prohibits business combinations that result in monopolies.
b. Prohibits business combinations resulting in a significant increase in the pricing power of
a single firm.
c. Makes illegal all contracts unreasonably restraining trade.
d. A and C only
e. A, B, and C
10. All of the following are true of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act except for
a. Acquisitions involving firms of a certain size cannot be completed until certain
information is supplied to the FTC
b. Only the acquiring firm is required to file with the FTC
c. An acquiring firm may agree to divest certain businesses following the completion of a
transaction in order to get regulatory approval.
d. The Act is intended to give regulators time to determine whether the proposed
combination is anti-competitive.
e. The FTC may file a lawsuit to block a proposed transaction
11. All of the following are true of antitrust lawsuits except for
a. The FTC files lawsuits in most cases they review.
b. The FTC reviews complaints that have been recommended by its staff and approved by
the FTC
c. FTC guidelines commit the FTC to make a final decision within 13 months of a
complaint
d. As an alternative to litigation, a company may seek to negotiate a voluntary settlement of
its differences with the FTC.
e. FTC decisions can be appealed in the federal circuit courts.
12. All of the following are true about a consent decree except for
a. Requires the merging parties to divest overlapping businesses
b. An acquirer may seek to negotiate a consent decree in advance of consummating a deal.
c. In the absent of a consent decree, a buyer usually makes the receipt of regulatory
approval necessary to closing the deal.
d. FTC studies indicate that consent decrees have historically been largely ineffectual in
promoting competition
e. Consent decrees tend to be most effective in promoting competition if the divestitures
made by the acquiring firms are to competitors.
13. U.S. antitrust regulators are most concerned about what types of transaction?
a. Vertical mergers
b. Horizontal mergers
c. Alliances
d. Joint ventures
e. Minority investments
14. Which of the following are used by antitrust regulators to determine whether a proposed
transaction will be anti-competitive?
a. Market share
b. Barriers to entry
c. Number of substitute products
d. A and B only
e. A, B, and C
15. European antitrust policies differ from those in the U.S. in what important way?
a. They focus on the impact on competitors
b. They focus on the impact on consumers
c. They focus on both consumers and competitors
d. They focus on suppliers
e. They focus on consumers, suppliers, and competitors
16. Which other types of legislation can have a significant impact on a proposed transaction?
a. State anti-takeover laws
b. State antitrust laws
c. Federal benefits laws
d. Federal and state environmental laws
e. All of the above
17. State “blue sky” laws are designed to
a. Allow states to block M&As deemed as anticompetitive
b. Protect individual investors from investing in fraudulent securities’ offerings
c. Restrict foreign investment in individual states
d. Protect workers’ pensions
e. Prevent premature announcement of M&As
18. All of the following are examples of antitakeover provisions commonly found in state statutes
except for
a. Fair price provisions
b. Business combination provisions
c. Cash-out provisions
d. Short-form merger provisions
e. Share control provisions
19. A collaborative arrangement is a term used by regulators to describe agreements among
competitors for all of the following except for
a. Joint ventures
b. Strategic alliances
c. Mergers and acquisitions
d. A & B only
e. A & C only
20. Vertical mergers are likely to be challenged by antitrust regulators for all of the following reasons
except for
a. An acquisition by a supplier of a customer prevents the supplier’s competitors from
having access to the customer.
b. The relevant market has few customers and is highly concentrated
c. The relevant market has many suppliers.
d. The acquisition by a customer of a supplier could become a concern if it prevents the
customer’s competitors from having access to the supplier.
e. The suppliers’ products are critical to a competitor’s operations
21. All of the following are true of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act except for which of the
following:
a. The U.S. law carries anti-bribery limitations beyond U.S. political boundaries to within
the domestic boundaries of foreign states.
b. This Act prohibits individuals, firms, and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms from paying
anything of value to foreign government officials in exchange for obtaining new business
or retaining existing contracts.
c. The Act permits so-called facilitation payments to foreign government officials if
relatively small amounts of money are required to expedite goods through foreign custom
inspections, gain approvals for exports, obtain speedy passport approvals, and related
considerations.
d. The payments described in c above are considered legal according to U.S. law and the
laws of countries in which such payments are considered routine
e. Bribery is necessary if a U.S. company is to win a contract that comprises more than 10%
of its annual sales.
22. Foreign direct investment in U.S. companies that may threaten national security is regulated by
which of the following:
a. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
b. Defense Production Act
c. Sherman Act
d. Federal Trade Commission Act
e. Clayton Act
23. A diligent buyer must ensure that the target is in compliance with the labyrinth of labor and
benefit laws, including those covering all of the following except for
a. Sexual harassment
b. Age discrimination,
c. National security
d. Drug testing
e. Wage and hour laws.
24. All of the following factors are considered by U.S. antitrust regulators except for
a. Market share
b. Potential adverse competitive effects
c. Barriers to entry
d. Purchase price paid for the target firm
e. Efficiencies created by the combination
25. The Sarbanes-Oxley bill is intended to achieve which of the following:
a. Auditor independence
b. Corporate responsibility
c. Improved financial disclosure
d. Increased penalties for fraudulent behavior
e. All of the above
Case Study Short Essay Examination Questions
Overcoming Regulatory Hurdles: Exelon Buys Constellation Energy
Key Points:
• Rising costs associated with more stringent environmental laws and the need to upgrade power
grids are spurring consolidation in the fragmented U.S. electric utility industry.
• However, acquiring utilities often is particularly challenging due to the complex regulatory
approval process.
______________________________________________________________________________
Reflecting increased demands for clean power, an aging electric power grid and other infrastructure, and
the rising cost of fuels to generate power, the highly fragmented U.S. electric utility industry has undergone
significant consolidation in recent years. By achieving increased scale, electric utilities are hoping to lower
operating costs and gain the financial strength to finance the necessary investments in infrastructure and
alternative energy sources. Utilities also are increasingly confronted by a combination of regulated and
non-regulated electricity markets.
In most retail electricity markets in which electricity is sold directly to the end customer, rates that can
be charged are regulated by local public utility commissions. While some utilities own their own
generating capacity, others are dependent to varying degrees on purchasing electric power in the wholesale
power market. A wholesale electricity market exists when competing generators offer their electricity
output to retailers. Increasingly, large end-users can bypass retail electric utility companies to buy directly
from wholesale power generators in a bid to access lower cost power by eliminating the middleman. Some
states allow competition in their electricity markets while others do not. In competitive markets, power
suppliers, including renewable and conventional oil and gas power generators, compete against each other
to provide the best possible service at the lowest cost in order to attract and retain customers. In contrast, in
monopoly-regulated states, power providers have no incentive to innovate or lower costs because
ratepayers are captive to their monopoly-protected supplier.
Some utilities are attempting to shift to a mix of regulated and non-regulated electricity markets. The
latest illustration of this strategy is Exelon Corp’s acquisition of Constellation Energy for $7.9 billion in
April 2011. The deal creates the largest electric utility and power generator in the U.S. The combined firm
will gain stakes in five nuclear reactors and become the largest U.S. electricity marketer. Exelon is
currently the largest owner and operator of U.S. nuclear plants and owns electric utilities Commonwealth
Edison in Chicago and Peco Energy in Pennsylvania. Constellation owns the utility Baltimore Gas &
Electric. Most of its revenue comes from the retail sale of electricity in states that allow competition. The
merger creates the number one competitive energy provider with one of the industry’s cleanest and lowest
cost power generation plant systems in the country.
The combined company will keep the Exelon name and its headquarters in Chicago, as well as own
more than 34 gigawatts of power generation. The company’s power generation mix would be 55 percent
nuclear, 24 percent natural gas, 6 percent hydro and renewable, and 7 percent oil, and 6 percent coal.
Exelon will add 1.2 million electric customers in Constellation service areas.
This deal is Exelon’s largest transaction. Exelon has tried unsuccessfully three times to buy other
electric power companies since 2003. Exelon was thwarted by regulators in efforts to buy independent
power producer NRG Energy in 2009, Public Service Enterprise Group in 2006, and Illinois Power in 2003.
Constellation has been the target of two failed bids by other suitors. A $14.8 billion sale of Constellation to
NextEra Energy Inc., the largest U.S. wind–power generator and owner of Florida’s largest utility,
collapsed in 2005.
Exelon announced on December 20, 2011 that it had received approval by the U.S. Justice Department
to buy Constellation Energy Group Inc. The approval was contingent on Exelon selling three electricity
generating plants in Maryland. The sale of the three power plants in the Baltimore area will significantly
reduce the combined firm’s market share in that region. The Justice Department believed that the
combination, as originally proposed, would have lessened competition in the wholesale electricity market
and increased prices for consumers in the Mid-Atlantic states (i.e., New York, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland). Exelon and Constellation have also received regulatory approval from the Maryland and New
York regulators as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Discussion Questions:
1. What is anti-trust policy and why is it important? Why might its application be particularly
important in the utility industry?
2. How does the FTC define market share? In the electric utility market, to what extent does this
methodology apply? To what extent does it not apply?
3. What factors other than market share should be considered in determining whether a potential
merger might result in an increased pricing power? Of these factors, which do you believe
represent the most important justifications for the merger of Exelon and Constellation?
Justice Department Requires VeriFone Systems to Sell Assets
before Approving Hypercom Acquisition
Key Points:
• Asset sales commonly are used by regulators to thwart the potential build-up of market power
resulting from a merger or acquisition.
• In such situations, defining the appropriate market served by the merged firms is crucial to
identifying current and potential competitors.
______________________________________________________________________________
In late 2011, VeriFone Systems (VeriFone) reached a settlement with the U.S. Justice Department to
acquire competitor Hypercom Corp on the condition it sold Hypercom’s U.S. point–of-sale terminal
business. Business use point-of-sale terminals are used by retailers to accept electronic payments such as
credit and debit cards.
The Justice Department had sued to block the $485 million deal on concerns that the combination would
limit competition in the market for retail checkout terminals. The asset sale is intended to create a
significant independent competitor in the U.S. The agreement stipulates that private equity firm Gores
Group LLC will buy the terminals business.
San Jose, California-based VeriFone is the second largest maker of electronic payment equipment in the
U.S. and Hypercom, based in Scottsdale, Arizona, is number three. Together, the firms control more than
60 percent of the U.S. market for terminals used by retailers. Ingenico SA, based in France, is the largest
maker of card-payment terminals. The Justice Department had blocked a previous attempt to sell
Hypercom’s U.S. point–of-sale business to rival Ingenico, saying that it would have increased concentration
and undermined competition.
VeriFone will retain Hypercom’s point–of-sale equipment business outside the U.S. The acquisition will
enable VeriFone to expand in the emerging market for payments made via mobile phones by giving it a
larger international presence in retail stores and the opportunity to install more terminals capable of
accepting mobile phone payments abroad.
Discussion Questions
1. Do you believe requiring consent decrees that oblige the acquiring firm to dispose of certain target
company assets is an abuse of government power? Why or why not?
2. What alternative actions could the government take to limit market power resulting from a business
combination?
The Legacy of GE’s Aborted Attempt to Merge with Honeywell
Many observers anticipated significant regulatory review because of the size of the transaction and the
increase in concentration it would create in the markets served by the two firms. Most believed, however,
that, after making some concessions to regulatory authorities, the transaction would be approved, due to its
perceived benefits. Although the pundits were indeed correct in noting that it would receive close scrutiny,
they were completely caught off guard by divergent approaches taken by the U.S. and EU antitrust
authorities. U.S regulators ruled that the merger should be approved because of its potential benefits to
customers. In marked contrast, EU regulators ruled against the transaction based on its perceived negative
impact on competitors.
Honeywell’s avionics and engines unit would add significant strength to GE’s jet engine business. The
deal would add about 10 cents to GE’s 2001 earnings and could eventually result in $1.5 billion in annual
cost savings. The purchase also would enable GE to continue its shift away from manufacturing and into
services, which already constituted 70 percent of its revenues in 2000.1 The best fit is clearly in the
combination of the two firms’ aerospace businesses. Revenues from these two businesses alone would total
$22 billion, combining Honeywell’s strength in jet engines and cockpit avionics with GE’s substantial
business in larger jet engines. As the largest supplier in the aerospace industry, GE could offer airplane
manufacturers “one-stop shopping” for everything from engines to complex software systems by cross-
selling each other’s products to their biggest customers.
Honeywell had been on the block for a number of months before the deal was consummated with GE.
Its merger with Allied Signal had not been going well and contributed to deteriorating earnings and a much
lower stock price. Honeywell’s shares had declined in price by more than 40 percent since its acquisition of
Allied Signal. While the euphoria surrounding the deal in late 2000 lingered into the early months of 2001,
1 BusinessWeek, 2000b
rumblings from the European regulators began to create an uneasy feeling among GE’s and Honeywell’s
management.
Mario Monti, the European competition commissioner at that time, expressed concern about possible
“conglomerate effects” or the total influence a combined GE and Honeywell would wield in the aircraft
industry. He was referring to GE’s perceived ability to expand its influence in the aerospace industry
through service initiatives. GE’s services offerings help differentiate it from others at a time when the prices
of many industrial parts are under pressure from increased competition, including low-cost manufacturers
overseas. In a world in which manufactured products are becoming increasingly commodity-like, the true
winners are those able to differentiate their product offering. GE and Honeywell’s European competitors
complained to the EU regulatory commission that GE’s extensive services offering would give it entrée into
many more points of contact among airplane manufacturers, from communications systems to the expanded
line of spare parts GE would be able to supply. This so-called range effect or portfolio power is a relatively
new legal doctrine that has not been tested in transactions of this size.2
On May 3, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the buyout after the companies agreed to sell
Honeywell’s helicopter engine unit and take other steps to protect competition. The U.S. regulatory
authorities believed that the combined companies could sell more products to more customers and therefore
could realize improved efficiencies, although it would not hold a dominant market share in any particular
market. Thus, customers would benefit from GE’s greater range of products and possibly lower prices, but
they still could shop elsewhere if they chose. The U.S. regulators expressed little concern that bundling of
products and services could hurt customers, since buyers can choose from among a relative handful of
viable suppliers.
To understand the European position, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of competition in the
European Union. France, Germany, and Spain spent billions subsidizing their aerospace industry over the
years. The GE–Honeywell deal has been attacked by their European rivals from Rolls-Royce and Lufthansa
to French avionics manufacturer Thales. Although the European Union imported much of its antitrust law
from the United States, the antitrust law doctrine evolved in fundamentally different ways. In Europe, the
main goal of antitrust law is to guarantee that all companies be able to compete on an equal playing field.
The implication is that the European Union is just as concerned about how a transaction affects rivals as it
is consumers. Complaints from competitors are taken more seriously in Europe, whereas in the United
States it is the impact on consumers that constitutes the litmus test. Europeans accepted the legal concept of
“portfolio power,” which argues that a firm may achieve an unfair advantage over its competitors by
bundling goods and services. Also, in Europe, the European Commission’s Merger Task Force can prevent
a merger without taking a company to court.
The EU authorities continued to balk at approving the transaction without major concessions from the
participants—concessions that GE believed would render the deal unattractive. On June 15, 2001, GE
submitted its final offer to the EU regulators in a last-ditch attempt to breathe life into the moribund deal.
GE knew that if it walked away, it could continue as it had before the deal was struck, secure in the
knowledge that its current portfolio of businesses offered substantial revenue growth or profit potential.
Honeywell clearly would fuel such growth, but it made sense to GE’s management and shareholders only if
it would be allowed to realize potential synergies between the GE and Honeywell businesses.
GE said it was willing to divest Honeywell units with annual revenue of $2.2 billion, including regional
jet engines, air-turbine starters, and other aerospace products. Anything more would jeopardize the
rationale for the deal. Specifically, GE was unwilling to agree not to bundle (i.e., sell a package of
components and services at a single price) its products and services when selling to customers. Another
stumbling block was the GE Capital Aviation Services unit, the airplane-financing arm of GE Capital. The
EU Competition Commission argued that that this unit would use its influence as one of the world’s largest
purchasers of airplanes to pressure airplane manufacturers into using GE products. The commission seemed
2 Murray, 2001