employees, concessions made to unions in the early 1990s to pay workers even when their plants were shut
down reduced the ability of the firm to adjust to changes in the cyclical car market. GM was increasingly
burdened by so-called legacy costs (i.e., healthcare and pension obligations to a growing retiree
population). Over time, GM’s labor costs soared compared to the firm’s major competitors. To cover these
costs, GM continued to make higher margin medium to full–size cars and trucks, which in the wake of
higher gas prices could only be sold with the help of highly attractive incentive programs. Forced to
support an escalating array of brands, the firm was unable to provide sufficient marketing funds for any one
of its brands.
With the onset of one of the worst global recessions in the post–World War II years, auto sales
worldwide collapsed by the end of 2008. All automakers’ sales and cash flows plummeted. Unlike Ford,
GM and Chrysler were unable to satisfy their financial obligations. The U.S. government, in an
unprecedented move, agreed to lend GM and Chrysler $13 billion and $4 billion, respectively. The intent
was to buy time to develop an appropriate restructuring plan.
Having essentially ruled out liquidation of GM and Chrysler, continued government financing was
contingent on gaining major concessions from all major stakeholders such as lenders, suppliers, and labor
unions. With car sales continuing to show harrowing double-digit year over year declines during the first
half of 2009, the threat of bankruptcy was used to motivate the disparate parties to come to an agreement.
With available cash running perilously low, Chrysler entered bankruptcy in early May and GM on June 1,
with the government providing debtor in possession financing during their time in bankruptcy. In its
bankruptcy filing for its U.S. and Canadian operations only, GM listed $82.3 billion in assets and $172.8
billion in liabilities. In less than 45 days each, both GM and Chrysler emerged from government-sponsored
sales in bankruptcy court, a feat that many thought impossible.
Judge Robert E. Gerber of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of New York approved the sale in view of the
absence of alternatives considered more favorable to the government’s option. GM emerged from the
protection of the court on July 10, 2009, in an economic environment characterized by escalating
unemployment and eroding consumer income and confidence. Even with less debt and liabilities, fewer
employees, the elimination of most “legacy costs,” and a reduced number of dealerships and brands, GM
found itself operating in an environment in 2009 in which U.S. vehicle sales totaled an anemic 10.4 million
units. This compared to more than 16 million in 2008. GM’s 2009 market share slipped to a post–World
War II low of about 19 percent.
While the bankruptcy option had been under consideration for several months, its attraction grew as it
became increasingly apparent that time was running out for the cash-strapped firm. Having determined
from the outset that liquidation of GM either inside or outside of the protection of bankruptcy would not be
considered, the government initially considered a prepackaged bankruptcy in which agreement is obtained
among major stakeholders prior to filing for bankruptcy. The presumption is that since agreement with
many parties had already been obtained, developing a plan of reorganization to emerge from Chapter 11
would move more quickly. However, this option was not pursued because of the concern that the public
would simply view the post–Chapter 11 GM as simply a smaller version of its former self. The government
in particular was seeking to position GM as an entirely new firm capable of profitably designing and
building cars that the public wanted.
Time was of the essence. The concern was that consumers would not buy GM vehicles while the firm
was in bankruptcy. Consequently, a strategy was devised in which GM would be divided into two firms:
“old GM,” which would contain the firm’s unwanted assets, and “new GM,” which would own the most
attractive assets. “New GM” would then emerge from bankruptcy in a sale to a new company owned by
various stakeholder groups, including the U.S. and Canadian governments, a union trust fund, and
bondholders. Only GM’s U.S. and Canadian operations were included in the bankruptcy filing. Figure 16.2
illustrates the GM bankruptcy process.
Buying distressed assets can be accomplished through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization or a post–
confirmation trustee. Alternatively, a 363 sale transfers the acquired assets free and clear of any liens,
claims, and encumbrances. The sale of GM’s attractive assets to the “new GM” was ultimately completed