10) These regulators were aware of the problem and tried to blow the whistle in 2003:
a. Security and Exchange Commission and Federal Reserve Board
b. Iowa and North Carolina State Attorneys
c. Office of the Comptroller of the currency and Office of Thrift Supervision
d. Federal banking regulators
e. None of the above
11) A fundamental problem with Goldman Sachs’ GSAMP Trust was that:
a. Loans were given to people with poor credit histories
b. Homeowners’ equity in the securitized mortgages was less than 1 percent on average
c. Loans were given to people with no income
d. 58 percent of the securitized loans had little or no documentation
e. All of the above
12) A fundamental problem with Goldman Sachs’ GSAMP Trust, impeding Goldman’s ability to
foreclose on defaulted mortgages was that:
a. Homeowners’ equity in the securitized mortgages was less than 1 percent
b. 40 percent of the securitized loans had little or no documentation
c. Investors relied on Goldman Sachs
d. The underlying assets were second mortgages
e. The mortgages were allocated into thirteen tranches with different risk characteristics
13) Goldman Sachs’ GSAMP Trust was able to create AAA rated securities by:
a. Separating the mortgage portfolio into tranches and assigning the tranches to share risks of
default equally.
b. Not disclosing the risks clearly
c. Guaranteeing or protecting some tranches
d. Separating the mortgage portfolio into tranches and designating the A-1, A-2, and A-3
tranches last in order, after the M-1 to M-7 and B-1 to B-3 tranches, to suffer losses if a
default occurred
e. All of the above
14) Investors relied on the judgment of credit rating agencies because:
a. Credit rating agencies are supposed to be the experts in evaluating credit risk
b. Information directly available to investors on mortgage pools was insufficient
c. Credit rating agencies are supposed to perform a thorough due diligence before rating a given
security
d. All of the above