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D. responders will accept offers at a higher rate but will exact greater emotional penalties
on the proposer.
93. Suppose Gina and Henry play two rounds of the ultimatum game. In the first round they
play for $10; in the second round they play for $1,000. In the first round Gina suggests an
80/20 split ($8 to Gina, $2 to Henry), but Henry quickly rejects the offer as unfair. If in
the second round Gina offers the same split ($800 to Gina, $200 to Henry), research by
behavioral economists suggests that Henry will
94. Suppose Gina and Henry play two rounds of the ultimatum game. In the first round they
play for $10; in the second round they play for $1,000. In the first round Gina suggests an
80/20 split ($8 to Gina, $2 to Henry), but Henry quickly rejects the offer as unfair.
Assuming Gina is interested in gaining financially from the experience and that she
understands behavioral economics, we would expect her to