978-1259723223 Test Bank TBChap005 Part 6

subject Type Homework Help
subject Pages 10
subject Words 3953
subject Authors Campbell McConnell, Sean Flynn, Stanley Brue

Unlock document.

This document is partially blurred.
Unlock all pages and 1 million more documents.
Get Access
page-pf1
D.
not be produced, even if voters vote in favor of it.
253.
Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A
proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of
this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to
Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,
$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be
A.
accepted, four in favor and one against.
254.
Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A
proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of
this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to
Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,
$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. Who are likely to vote in favor of this proposal?
A.
Abby, Ben, Clara, and Joe
page-pf2
5-98
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
255.
Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A
proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of
this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to
Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,
$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be
D.
defeated; the public good is not produced, which is the proper outcome.
256.
Majority voting may produce economically inefficient outcomes because it
A.
does not always lead to fair results.
257.
Interest groups result when people
page-pf3
C.
do not all vote in elections.
D.
do not have strong preferences on the issues to be voted on.
258.
The trading of votes to secure favorable outcomes on decisions that would otherwise be
defeated is called
A.
median-voter trading.
259.
Inefficiencies associated with majority voting may get resolved through
A.
using the median-voter model.
page-pf4
260.
Which of the following would be an avenue for resolving the inefficiencies associated with
majority voting?
D.
the paradox of voting
261.
Which would be an avenue for resolving the inefficiencies associated with majority voting?
A.
the paradox of voting
262.
A situation in which society may not be able to rank its preferences consistently through
paired-choice majority voting is
A. the fallacy of limited decisions.
page-pf5
5-101
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Blooms: Understand
Diff i c u l t y:
02 Medium
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
263.
The major problem with paired-choice majority voting is that the outcome
A.
is constant.
264.
Public Good
Voter X
Voter Y
Voter Z
Stadium
2
3
1
Park
1
2
3
Jail
3
1
2
Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative
projects, with "1" being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a stadium and a
park,
D.
a majority of the voters would favor the stadium, 3-to-0.
page-pf6
5-102
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
265.
Public Good
Voter X
Voter Y
Voter Z
Stadium
2
3
1
Park
1
2
3
Jail
3
1
2
Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative
projects, with "1" being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a jail and a stadium,
A. a majority of the voters would favor the jail, 2 to 1.
266.
Public Good
Voter X
Voter Y
Voter Z
Stadium
2
3
1
Park
1
2
3
Jail
3
1
2
Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative
projects, with "1" being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a park and a jail,
page-pf7
5-103
A.
a majority of the voters would favor the jail, 3 to 0.
267.
Public Good
Voter X
Voter Y
Voter Z
Stadium
2
3
1
Park
1
2
3
Jail
3
1
2
Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative
projects, with "1" being the top preference. This situation illustrates the voting inconsistency
where a majority of voters prefer the
A.
stadium over the park, the park over the jail, and the jail over the stadium.
268.
The sometimes inconsistent results coming from a series of paired-choice voting is due to
page-pf8
A.
voters changing their preferences.
269.
Voters are making a choice to spend money on three projects: a dam, a school, or a road. In
the choice between the dam and the school, the majority favors the school. In a choice between a
dam and a road, the majority favors a dam. In a
choice between a road and a school, the
majority favors a road. These rankings indicate that majority voting may
A.
result in economically efficient outcomes because of rent-seeking behavior.
270.
When politicians support policies such as imposing punitive tariffs on imports, which are
popular among voters but which also reduce economic efficiency, we refer to this as
A. regulatory capture.
page-pf9
5-105
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Blooms: Understand
Diff i c u l t y:
02 Medium
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
271.
It is observed that the person representing the middle position on an issue will most likely
determine the outcome of an election. This view is most closely associated with the
A.
fallacy of limited decisions.
272.
When voters have different opinions about an issue, the position that is most likely to be
adopted is that of the
A.
lobbyist.
273.
The median-voter model indicates that political parties will
A.
target only those voters who can be influenced by rent seeking.
page-pfa
5-106
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
B.
direct their work to voters who can be influenced by special interests.
C.
campaign at one end of the distribution of voter sentiments.
D. try to appeal to the sentiments of the voter holding the middle position.
274.
The reason why, under majority voting and consistent voter preferences, the median voter’s
choice will tend to predominate is because
275.
One implication of the median-voter model is that at any point in time, most voters will
A.
be happy with the amount of government involvement in the economy.
page-pfb
5-107
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
276.
As voters "vote with their feet" and move to political districts where the median voter's
preference is closer to their own, the median voter's preference will
A.
strengthen.
True / False Questions
277.
Majority voting produces efficient outcomes because it takes into account the strength of
the preferences of individual voters.
278.
Majority voting on whether or not a public good should be produced could lead to a result
where a public good whose costs are bigger than the benefits would end up getting approved by
the voters.
page-pfc
5-108
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Blooms: Understand
Diff i c u l t y:
02 Medium
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
279.
If a public good provides social benefits that are greater than its costs, then the majority of
voters would always vote in favor of producing the good.
280.
Special-interest groups result from people with strong preferences on a particular issue
banding together to let policymakers know their preferences and could thereby lead to efficient
outcomes.
281.
Political logrolling, or vote trading, can turn a potentially inefficient voting outcome into an
efficient one.
page-pfd
5-109
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Diff i c u l t y:
02 Medium
Learning Objective: 05-03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic
preferences through majority voting.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
282.
If choice A wins over choice B in a majority vote, while choice B wins over choice C in a
majority vote, then we can conclude that choice A would win over choice C.
283.
Political logrolling always produces economically inefficient outcomes.
284.
The appeal to government for special benefits at taxpayers' or someone else's expense is
called the paradox of voting.
page-pfe
5-110
Copyright © 2018 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without the prior
written consent of McGraw-Hill Education.
Test Bank: II
Topic:
Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes
285.
Even if individual voters have clear preferences, and they stay consistent in their
preferences, we could still end up with the paradox of voting.
286.
One consequence of the paradox of voting is that whoever sets the agenda of a vote could
practically predetermine the results of the vote.
287.
In the median-voter model, the median voter refers to the voter who makes her choice at the
midpoint of the voting period.
page-pff
288.
In the median-voter model, half the voters have stronger or more positive preferences than
the median voter, while half of the voters have weaker or more negative preferences.
289.
One prediction of the median-voter model is that during elections, candidates will tend to
become "centrists."
290.
One implication of the median-voter model, as applied to a vote regarding how much
government involvement to have in the economy, is that most voters would find the resulting
government involvement either too large or too small.
page-pf10
5-112
291.
"Voter failure" is one cause of government failure.

Trusted by Thousands of
Students

Here are what students say about us.

Copyright ©2022 All rights reserved. | CoursePaper is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university.