978-1259723223 Test Bank TBChap005 Part 6

D.

not be produced, even if voters vote in favor of it.

253.

Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A

proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of

this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to

Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,

$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be

A.

accepted, four in favor and one against.

254.

Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A

proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of

this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to

Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,

$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. Who are likely to vote in favor of this proposal?

A.

Abby, Ben, Clara, and Joe

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Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

255.

Assume that Abby, Ben, Clara, Joe, and Matt are the only citizens in a community. A

proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All five citizens will share an equal portion of

this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $220 to

Abby, $210 to Ben, $210 to Clara,

$180 to Joe, and $120 to Matt. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be

D.

defeated; the public good is not produced, which is the proper outcome.

256.

Majority voting may produce economically inefficient outcomes because it

A.

does not always lead to fair results.

257.

Interest groups result when people

C.

do not all vote in elections.

D.

do not have strong preferences on the issues to be voted on.

258.

The trading of votes to secure favorable outcomes on decisions that would otherwise be

defeated is called

A.

median-voter trading.

259.

Inefficiencies associated with majority voting may get resolved through

A.

using the median-voter model.

260.

Which of the following would be an avenue for resolving the inefficiencies associated with

majority voting?

D.

the paradox of voting

261.

Which would be an avenue for resolving the inefficiencies associated with majority voting?

A.

the paradox of voting

262.

A situation in which society may not be able to rank its preferences consistently through

paired-choice majority voting is

A. the fallacy of limited decisions.

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Blooms: Understand

Diff i c u l t y:

02 Medium

Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

263.

The major problem with paired-choice majority voting is that the outcome

A.

is constant.

264.

Public Good

Voter X

Voter Y

Voter Z

Stadium

2

3

1

Park

1

2

3

Jail

3

1

2

Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative

projects, with “1” being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a stadium and a

park,

D.

a majority of the voters would favor the stadium, 3–to–0.

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Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

265.

Public Good

Voter X

Voter Y

Voter Z

Stadium

2

3

1

Park

1

2

3

Jail

3

1

2

Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative

projects, with “1” being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a jail and a stadium,

A. a majority of the voters would favor the jail, 2 to 1.

266.

Public Good

Voter X

Voter Y

Voter Z

Stadium

2

3

1

Park

1

2

3

Jail

3

1

2

Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative

projects, with “1” being the top preference. In a paired-choice vote between a park and a jail,

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A.

a majority of the voters would favor the jail, 3 to 0.

267.

Public Good

Voter X

Voter Y

Voter Z

Stadium

2

3

1

Park

1

2

3

Jail

3

1

2

Refer to the provided table, which shows the ranked preferences of voters for three alternative

projects, with “1” being the top preference. This situation illustrates the voting inconsistency

where a majority of voters prefer the

A.

stadium over the park, the park over the jail, and the jail over the stadium.

268.

The sometimes inconsistent results coming from a series of paired-choice voting is due to

A.

voters changing their preferences.

269.

Voters are making a choice to spend money on three projects: a dam, a school, or a road. In

the choice between the dam and the school, the majority favors the school. In a choice between a

dam and a road, the majority favors a dam. In a

choice between a road and a school, the

majority favors a road. These rankings indicate that majority voting may

A.

result in economically efficient outcomes because of rent-seeking behavior.

270.

When politicians support policies such as imposing punitive tariffs on imports, which are

popular among voters but which also reduce economic efficiency, we refer to this as

A. regulatory capture.

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Blooms: Understand

Diff i c u l t y:

02 Medium

Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

271.

It is observed that the person representing the middle position on an issue will most likely

determine the outcome of an election. This view is most closely associated with the

A.

fallacy of limited decisions.

272.

When voters have different opinions about an issue, the position that is most likely to be

adopted is that of the

A.

lobbyist.

273.

The median-voter model indicates that political parties will

A.

target only those voters who can be influenced by rent seeking.

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B.

direct their work to voters who can be influenced by special interests.

C.

campaign at one end of the distribution of voter sentiments.

D. try to appeal to the sentiments of the voter holding the middle position.

274.

The reason why, under majority voting and consistent voter preferences, the median voter’s

choice will tend to predominate is because

275.

One implication of the median-voter model is that at any point in time, most voters will

A.

be happy with the amount of government involvement in the economy.

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Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

276.

As voters “vote with their feet” and move to political districts where the median voter’s

preference is closer to their own, the median voter’s preference will

A.

strengthen.

True / False Questions

277.

Majority voting produces efficient outcomes because it takes into account the strength of

the preferences of individual voters.

278.

Majority voting on whether or not a public good should be produced could lead to a result

where a public good whose costs are bigger than the benefits would end up getting approved by

the voters.

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Blooms: Understand

Diff i c u l t y:

02 Medium

Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

279.

If a public good provides social benefits that are greater than its costs, then the majority of

voters would always vote in favor of producing the good.

280.

Special-interest groups result from people with strong preferences on a particular issue

banding together to let policymakers know their preferences and could thereby lead to efficient

outcomes.

281.

Political logrolling, or vote trading, can turn a potentially inefficient voting outcome into an

efficient one.

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Diff i c u l t y:

02 Medium

Learning Objective: 05–03 Appendix: Explain the difficulties of conveying economic

preferences through majority voting.

Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

282.

If choice A wins over choice B in a majority vote, while choice B wins over choice C in a

majority vote, then we can conclude that choice A would win over choice C.

283.

Political logrolling always produces economically inefficient outcomes.

284.

The appeal to government for special benefits at taxpayers’ or someone else’s expense is

called the paradox of voting.

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Test Bank: II

Topic:

Public Choice Theory and Voting Paradoxes

285.

Even if individual voters have clear preferences, and they stay consistent in their

preferences, we could still end up with the paradox of voting.

286.

One consequence of the paradox of voting is that whoever sets the agenda of a vote could

practically predetermine the results of the vote.

287.

In the median-voter model, the median voter refers to the voter who makes her choice at the

midpoint of the voting period.

288.

In the median-voter model, half the voters have stronger or more positive preferences than

the median voter, while half of the voters have weaker or more negative preferences.

289.

One prediction of the median-voter model is that during elections, candidates will tend to

become “centrists.”

290.

One implication of the median-voter model, as applied to a vote regarding how much

government involvement to have in the economy, is that most voters would find the resulting

government involvement either too large or too small.

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291.

“Voter failure” is one cause of government failure.