office often matter more than following formal rules.1 In many semi-democratic regimes,
democracy was introduced relatively recently, and political elites are not firmly committed to its
values, as witnessed by their tendency to buy votes, stuff ballot boxes, and intimidate supporters
of other candidates.
Nigeria is a prototypical semi-democracy. Its history of British colonialism left it at
independence with a weak sense of nationhood. This legacy still presents problems for Nigeria’s
most recent effort to establish democratic government. The state is weak and has difficulty
enforcing law and order. Large parts of its northeast are under the control of the Islamic
fundamentalist Boko Haram movement. Political parties linking state and society are regionally
based, and the dominant political party uses patronage, intimidation, and vote buying to win
elections. Large majorities of citizens expressed support for democracy after the return to
democracy in 1999, and a clear majority still support it over any alternative, but support for
democracy has eroded. Many Nigerians take an interest in politics, know how it affects their
lives, and make efforts to stay informed about government activities. But very low levels of trust
in political institutions, and in other citizens, weakens Nigerian democracy. Its political economy
is marked by large-scale corruption and rent seeking. After 2000, its presidents have been able to
implement some economic reforms that have stimulated economic growth, but it remains to be
seen whether this growth is sustainable.
A third common type of regime in less developed countries uses electoral authoritarianism. Such
regimes use competitive multiparty elections to claim they are democracies and to mask the
reality of authoritarian rule. Electoral rules are tilted strongly in favor of the ruling party or
faction so that opposition parties have little chance of taking power. Many regimes using
electoral authoritarianism have a strong ruling political party. Such parties generally have
procedures for selecting the country’s leaders and provide a setting in which disputes among
different party factions can be resolved. Regimes using electoral authoritarianism that govern
without benefit of a ruling political party have to find other ways of selecting leaders and
balancing the interests of competing factions. Authoritarian regimes that allow multiparty
elections also need strong security and military forces. If large-scale protests erupt, security and
military forces are necessary to subdue them. Officers and troops must have both the ability and
the will to suppress demonstrations, even if doing so requires killing large numbers of people.
Iran is an example of an authoritarian regime using electoral authoritarianism as a means of
holding on to power. While Iran has regularly scheduled elections in which multiple candidates
compete against each other to become president or a member of parliament, real power is in the
hands of leaders who are not popularly elected. The most powerful politician in Iran is the
Supreme Leader, not the president, and the Supreme Leader is not popularly elected. Elected
institutions are hemmed in on all sides by unelected institutions that keep them in check and
prevent any substantial challenge to rule by Islamic clerics. National politics centers on struggles
among factions of clerics to control the state and use it to promote their favored policies. The
leaders of the state maintain control of society by channeling subsidies to their supporters in
society, holding elections for the presidency and the parliament, allowing citizens to vote for
competing candidates representing different factions in the ruling group, and using suppression.
1 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa,” Journal of
Democracy 18:3 (July 2007), p. 127.
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