Chapter 10. Less-Developed Countries and the Good Society
Chapter Overview
Less developed countries have much greater economic, social, and cultural diversity than high
income North American and Western European countries. It is not surprising that with all this
diversity that they have much greater political diversity. North American and Western European
countries are all full democracies. In contrast, while some less-developed countries are full
democracies, others are ruled by monarchs, military leaders, a single political party, and
personalist leaders. Many of these leaders claim to rule by democratic means, but these means
differ greatly from those in full democracies. This chapter examines three common types of
regimes found in developing countries with different degrees of democracy:
flawed democracies
that share some of the same features as democracies in high-income countries but fall short on
others;
semi-democracies
that exist in a gray area between democracy and authoritarianism; and
regimes that use the trappings of democracy to maintain authoritarian control. The chapter
summarizes the characteristics of each type and offers a case study of a country that typifies each
type: Brazil exemplifying a flawed democracy, Nigeria exemplifying semi-democracy, and Iran
exemplifying how authoritarian regimes use elections to help maintain control of the population.
Flawed democracies have universal suffrage, regularly scheduled elections in which multiple
parties can compete, and constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights. In practice,
however, elections are often marred by ballot fraud, and citizens’ rights are violated by local
strongmen in urban slums and rural areas. Political parties often rely upon patronage or appeals
to ethnic identity to win votes rather than presenting voters with policy alternatives that appeal to
broad categories of voters. States tend to have high percentages of patronage appointments and
to be weaker than states in North American and Western European democracies. In the absence
of coherent, policy-based political parties supporting policies to improve the lives of poorer
citizens, it is difficult to reduce income inequality and improve the capabilities of poor citizens.
Brazil is an example of a flawed democracy. Its state is relatively strong compared with those of
many less-developed countries. Political parties linking state and society have historically been
marked by patronage and dominated by elites who had little interest in improving the lives of
low-income Brazilians. This made it difficult for poorer Brazilians to use their numbers to elect
presidents and legislators to represent their interests. This changed with the election of President
Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party in 2000, who implemented several policies to improve
education and health care for poor children during his two terms in office. Political culture has
changed in ways more supportive of democracy while remaining distinctively Brazilian. Changes
in the political economy produced rapid economic growth, a growing middle class, and declines
in income inequality between 2000 and 2010, but subsequently economic growth slowed. In
2013, large numbers of Brazilians participated in demonstrations in major cities protesting the
huge sums spent preparing for the soccer World Cup in 2014 and demanding better public
transportation, better education, health care, safer streets, and less government corruption.
Semi-democracies are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian, but rather a mix of both.
They hold regularly scheduled elections in which leaders of political parties compete to hold
public offices. These elections do matter because incumbents can be defeated by challengers.
Still, democracy in these regimes is weakly institutionalized. Personal relationships and winning
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office often matter more than following formal rules.1 In many semi-democratic regimes,
democracy was introduced relatively recently, and political elites are not firmly committed to its
values, as witnessed by their tendency to buy votes, stuff ballot boxes, and intimidate supporters
of other candidates.
Nigeria is a prototypical semi-democracy. Its history of British colonialism left it at
independence with a weak sense of nationhood. This legacy still presents problems for Nigeria’s
most recent effort to establish democratic government. The state is weak and has difficulty
enforcing law and order. Large parts of its northeast are under the control of the Islamic
fundamentalist Boko Haram movement. Political parties linking state and society are regionally
based, and the dominant political party uses patronage, intimidation, and vote buying to win
elections. Large majorities of citizens expressed support for democracy after the return to
democracy in 1999, and a clear majority still support it over any alternative, but support for
democracy has eroded. Many Nigerians take an interest in politics, know how it affects their
lives, and make efforts to stay informed about government activities. But very low levels of trust
in political institutions, and in other citizens, weakens Nigerian democracy. Its political economy
is marked by large-scale corruption and rent seeking. After 2000, its presidents have been able to
implement some economic reforms that have stimulated economic growth, but it remains to be
seen whether this growth is sustainable.
A third common type of regime in less developed countries uses electoral authoritarianism. Such
regimes use competitive multiparty elections to claim they are democracies and to mask the
reality of authoritarian rule. Electoral rules are tilted strongly in favor of the ruling party or
faction so that opposition parties have little chance of taking power. Many regimes using
electoral authoritarianism have a strong ruling political party. Such parties generally have
procedures for selecting the country’s leaders and provide a setting in which disputes among
different party factions can be resolved. Regimes using electoral authoritarianism that govern
without benefit of a ruling political party have to find other ways of selecting leaders and
balancing the interests of competing factions. Authoritarian regimes that allow multiparty
elections also need strong security and military forces. If large-scale protests erupt, security and
military forces are necessary to subdue them. Officers and troops must have both the ability and
the will to suppress demonstrations, even if doing so requires killing large numbers of people.
Iran is an example of an authoritarian regime using electoral authoritarianism as a means of
holding on to power. While Iran has regularly scheduled elections in which multiple candidates
compete against each other to become president or a member of parliament, real power is in the
hands of leaders who are not popularly elected. The most powerful politician in Iran is the
Supreme Leader, not the president, and the Supreme Leader is not popularly elected. Elected
institutions are hemmed in on all sides by unelected institutions that keep them in check and
prevent any substantial challenge to rule by Islamic clerics. National politics centers on struggles
among factions of clerics to control the state and use it to promote their favored policies. The
leaders of the state maintain control of society by channeling subsidies to their supporters in
society, holding elections for the presidency and the parliament, allowing citizens to vote for
competing candidates representing different factions in the ruling group, and using suppression.
1 Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young, “The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa,” Journal of
Democracy 18:3 (July 2007), p. 127.
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The state tightly controls unions and womens’ groups. Iranian political culture is marked by
widespread verbal support for democracy along with high levels of support for a strong leader,
low levels of self-expression values, and extremely low levels of social trust.
Iran has a political
economy in which the state intervenes extensively in the economy to provide benefits to
many different groups in society in exchange for their support for clerical rule.
In the
2000s, the rising expenses of this redistributionist political economy has forced state elites to
attempt to cut back on subsidies and introduce more efficiency and productivity by privatizing
many state-owned enterprises, starting in 2010. The reforms were less successful than reformers
hoped, and U.S. and European economic sanctions aimed at slowing the development of Iranian
nuclear weapons created increasing economic hardship after 2012.
The chapter next turns to comparing capabilities among Brazil, Nigeria, and Iran. All three
countries succeeded in lowering infant mortality rates between 1990 and 2010, but Brazil and
Iran had much greater success than Nigeria. Brazil had the most success in terms of percentage
change. All three countries also succeeded in increasing literacy rates, and as with infant
mortality Brazil and Iran led Nigeria. Iran had the greatest success in percentage terms. Iran also
had by far the best record in homicide rates. Its homicide rate per 100,000 people in 2011 was
only 3, while Nigeria’s was 12.2, and Brazil’s was an extremely high 22.7. In democracy
rankings, Brazil came in highest, followed by Nigeria, with Iran coming in last.
The chapter concludes with three main points. First, democratic regimes differ not only by type,
whether presidential or parliamentary, but also by the degree of democracy, and there are degrees
of authoritarianism as well as degrees of democracy. The second conclusion is that authoritarian
regimes do not have a clear advantage over democracies in decision making. Finally, although
the governments of Brazil and Iran both have brought down infant mortality rates and increased
educational opportunities for the children of poor families, poor Brazilians have more
opportunity to participate effectively in political choices that affect their lives than do their poor
Iranian counterparts.
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Learning Objectives
Upon completion of this chapter students will be able to do the following:
10.1 Explain why there are more regime types in less developed countries than in Western
Europe and North America.
10.2 Summarize the main features of flawed democracy.
10.3 Describe the history, state, relations between state and society, political culture, and political
economy of Brazil.
10.4 Summarize the main features of semi-democracy.
10.5 Describe the history, state, relations between state and society, political culture, and political
economy of Nigeria.
10.6 Summarize the main features of electoral authoritarianism.
10.7 Describe the history, state, relations between state and society, political culture, and political
economy of Iran.
10.8 Compare capabilities in Brazil, Nigeria, and Iran.
Copyright © 2016, 2012, 2008 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
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Chapter Outline
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Developing countries are more diverse economically and socially than the affluent
democracies in the previous chapter.
1. Per capita incomes differ.
2. Levels of labor productivity and technology differ.
3. Extent of urbanization differs.
1. Flawed democracies represented by Brazil.
2. Semi-democracies represented by Nigeria.
3. Electoral authoritarianism represented by Iran.
1. Have large populations, and as a result, their governments’ policy choices
affect the capabilities of tens of millions of people.
2. Represent different levels of economic development.
3. They are from different regions of the world.
a. Brazil—Latin America
b. Nigeria—sub-Saharan Africa
c. Iran—Middle East
4. They are important to the United States and other affluent democracies.
5. Enforcement of civil and political rights not as effective as in full democracies
but better than in semi-democracies.
6. Political parties tend to rely on patronage and appeals to ethnic and religious
identity, but some flawed democracies also have programmatic parties such as
Brazil’s Workers’ Party.
7. Stronger states with higher autonomy and capacity than states in weak
democracies.
8. Stronger social foundations than weak democracies.
a. Larger business sectors
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b. Stronger labor unions
c. Numerous civil society organizations
9. Often have considerable economic inequality between classes, ethnic, and
racial groups.
B. Examples of electoral democracies include Brazil, Mexico, India, and Indonesia.
III. BRAZIL
A. Introduction
1. “Brazil is the country of the future, and always will be.”
2. Signs that Brazil is beginning to live up to its potential
a. Over a decade of strong, stable economic growth from 2000 to 2010
b. Increasing international recognition—chosen to host the 2016 Olympics
3. In several ways, still remains the country of the future
a. Inequality is extreme, although it has begun to decline
b. Public education is woeful.
c. Violent crime rates high
B. Historical background
1. Became a colony of Portugal in 1500s
a. Population divided between a small European elite who owned sugar
plantations and slaves brought from Africa to work on the plantations.
2. Independence from Portugal in 1822 brought little change in the social
structure.
3. By 1900s, power shifting from sugar barons in the northeast to ranchers and
coffee growers in the southeast.
4. President Getulio Vargas (1930–1945; 1951–1954)
a. Came to power in 1930 as leader of new coalition of industrialists, middle
class, and urban workers
b. Left lasting legacy in his years in power
i. State-led industrialization
ii. Control of labor through corporatist practices
iii. Distribution of state benefits to key political constituencies
5. Increasing political tensions in 1950s and early 1960s
a. Political polarization between social classes
b. Peasants and industrial workers on one hand and large landowners and
industrialists on the other
c. Ended with military coup d’état in 1964
6. Military rule (1964–1985)
a. Military promoted rapid industrialization through state-led
industrialization.
b. Military ruthlessly suppressed left-wing parties and their leaders.
c. Between 1968 and 1974 the economy grew very rapidly—references to a
“Brazilian miracle.”
d. In the 1980s, economy plunged into prolonged stagnation and even
supporters of the military became critical of its rule.
1. State relatively strong in comparison with other less-developed countries
a. Recent successes include ending chronic inflation, increasing capabilities
of lower-income citizens.
b. Has one of the most effective anti-HIV/AIDS programs in the world.
c. Has not been as effective in promoting literacy, improving health care, and
controlling crime.
2. Presidential form of government
3. Presidency
a. The most powerful political office
b. Presidents are elected by voters every four years and limited to two
consecutive terms in office.
c. The president initiates most legislation.
d. In 2010, Dilma Rousseff was chosen as Brail’s first woman president.
e. She succeeded her mentor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the most popular
president in Brazilian history.
f. Rousseff re-elected in 2014
4. Legislature
a. Lower house is the Chamber of Deputies, elected for four-year terms.
b. Upper house is the Senate, with three senators from each state and the
federal district, are elected for eight-year terms.
c. Fragmented party system makes it difficult for presidents to win
legislative majorities.
D. State and society
1. Social class the most important political cleavage
a. One of world’s most economically unequal societies
10.
ii. Measured by Gini Index.
iii. Wealth more unevenly distributed than income.
iv. Organized labor was separated from much larger number of
unorganized workers in the informal sector, weakening the ability of
unions to pressure governments for improvements in capabilities.
v. Brazil has lacked the sorts of interest groups and parties that could
enable poor citizens to improve their well-being by taking advantage
of their large numbers.
b. Fragmented political organizations perpetuate inequality.
i. To maintain privileges, wealthier Brazilians only need to maintain
existing institutions.
ii. Poorer Brazilians need broad-based organizations and political
parties to take advantage of their larger numbers to change
institutions and policies.
c. Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) a broad-based party with
strongest support among poorer Brazilians.
i. Grew out of the labor union movement.
ii. In early years, leaders emphasized class struggle and were critical
of capitalism.
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iii. Party’s leader, Lula da Silva, finally won the presidency in 2002 by
downplaying class struggle and anticapitalist rhetoric.
iv. Reached out to middle class
v. Reassured Brazilian and foreign businesses
vi. Policies also supported sustained economic growth
vii. Also improved lives of many poor people
2. Race also an important political cleavage
a. Differences from United States
i. In the United States, there have been two racial categories: black
and white.
ii. In Brazil, there are many intermediate categories with no sharp
distinction between black and white.
iii. Brazil has never had state-imposed racial segregation similar to that
in the southern states of the United States.
iv. Brazil’s 1988 constitution describes racism as a crime.
v. Many Brazilians believe they are citizens of a “racial democracy.”
b. Brazilians are nevertheless stratified by color, with citizens of African
descent more likely to live in poverty, have less education, and be
illiterate.
i. These inequalities did not become a significant political issue until
1990s.
ii. The absence of stark categories dividing blacks and whites, racial
fluidity, and absence of legalized racism made it more difficult to
organize using issue of racial inequality.
iii. Not until 1995 that a Brazilian president directly addressed racial
issues and initiated programs to improve the lives of Afro-
Brazilians.
iv. Brazil’s fragmented politics have made it difficult to pass
affirmative action legislation and fund it.
v. Presidents Lula and Rousseff pressed for improvements in the lives
of Afro-Brazilians
vi. One policy was to institute racial quotas in dozens of Brazilian
universities
E. Political culture
1. Brazil differs from political culture of the United States on major points.
2. Main historical themes of United States’ political cultures
a. Suspicion of a strong state
b. Acceptance of free markets
c. Individuals should take responsibility for their lives
d. Promise of equality before the law
4. Brazilian political culture changing but still differs from U.S., only in a more
muted fashion.
a. Accepts greater role for state in the economy
b. More suspicious of markets
c. More aware of class conflict
d. Still more tolerance of privileges for elites
F. Political economy
1. For most of twentieth century used state-led industrialization
a. Many state officials believed that Brazilian capitalists were not up to the
task of enabling Brazil to catch up with developed countries.
b. Used tax incentives, credits, subsidies, and wage and price controls.
2. Drawbacks to state-led industrialization under military governments
a. Periodic economic crises with very high inflation and outflows of capital
b. Disregard for Brazil’s poor
3. Changes in economic policies in the late 1990s and 2000s
a. Privatization of a number of companies
b. Tighter fiscal policy with restraints on state spending and budget deficits
c. Monetary policy used effectively to stimulate sustained growth
4. Leadership
a. Cardoso (1994–2002) implemented privatization of a number of
companies, introduced anti-inflationary policies.
b. Lula (2003–2010) maintained many of Cardoso’s policies, and the country
benefited from booming prices in world markets for agricultural and
industrial exports.
c. President Rousseff came into office in 2011.
2014.
ii. Other major goal was to make Brazilian industries more competitive.
iii. Proposals ran into difficulty when growth rate slowed after 2010.
iv. A proposal to raise bus fares in Sao Paulo sparked 2013 protests that
spread to other cities, came to encompass other government policies.
v. Protesters lost momentum because there was no interest group,
social movement, or political party to represent them.
IV. SEMI-DEMOCRACY
A. Characteristics of weak democracies
1. Have regularly scheduled elections in which candidates compete to hold
offices by citizens’ votes.
2. Democracy is weakly institutionalized.
a. Personal relationships matter more than formal rules.
b. Political leaders buy votes, stuff ballot boxes, and intimidate supporters of
other candidates.
3. Democracy often has a short history in these countries, and leaders are weakly
committed to it.
4. States are weak, with little autonomy or capacity, and have high levels of
corruption.
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5. Have weak foundations on society
a. Civil society organizations small and mainly limited to cities.
6. Examples of semi-democracies include Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria.
V. NIGERIA
A. Introduction
1. Africa’s most populous country and world’s eighth largest
2. Among world’s top ten oil exporters
3. At time of independence from Britain in 1960, expected to be a success story
4. Instead it remains a poor country. In 2010, 62 percent of its population below
the absolute poverty line of $1.25 per day
5. Has made some headway in improving capabilities since democracy was
restored in 1999 after years of military rule
B. Historical background
1. Nigeria is an artificial country created by British colonialism
a. British enclosed more than 250 ethnic groups that lacked a history of
common political institutions into one country
b. Colonialism left four damaging legacies.
i. A weak sense of nationhood because of ethnic divisions and
religious divisions between Christians and Muslims
ii. “Divide and rule” tactics that pitted ethnic groups against each other
iii. A system of personal rule by “big men” instead of rule of law
iv. An active and interventionist state well-suited for patronage politics
C. The state
1. Nigeria has a weak state
a. Cannot maintain law and order throughout the country
b. Cannot meet citizens’ need for health, education, and safety, and secure
political and civil rights
2. Reasons for state weakness
a. Widespread use of patronage appointments in government agencies
b. No constitutional arrangement has lasted long enough to become fully
institutionalized.
c. Four constitutions since independence in 1960
d. Political history has been marked by civil war, failed democracies and
long periods of military rule.
Copyright © 2016, 2012, 2008 Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.