Mikadze 1
Luka Mikadze
Professor Shepardson
Philosophy of Human Nature
9 December 2019
The Soul and its Relation to the Person in Locke
Many philosophers have theorized possible connections between the soul and the body.
Preceding Locke, few offered an apprehensive distinction of one’s consciousness. Locke’s
publication, Essay II, provided an account designated towards his iteration of a “person” and the
soul. He believed that a person is separate from the soul and body, and defined it as a “thinking
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing at different times and places” (Locke 115). With this declaration, he offered
various examples supporting his claim of the soul and its relation to the person.
To better understand Locke’s theory, it is first essential to accentuate the thought
experiment that it may resolve. The predicament embellished in the “Ship of Theseus” thought
experiment was whether an item that has had the entirety of its parts replaced remains
fundamentally the same object or not. The experiment denied the concept of identity and left a
desire for clarity. Locke would argue that since the point of which the object becomes different is
too vague and complicated to determine, there must be another force clarifying the condition of
its identity. This conclusion introduced his hypothesis of “persons,” which suggested a third
factor crucial for personal identity. Although objects may not have souls, Locke believed that
humans have three determining conditions: the soul, the body, and the concept of “persons.” He
argued that personal identity is consistent with the identity of a “person” rather than a soul.
Mikadze 2
Locke first argued that the consistency of the soul is not necessary for personal identity.
By suggesting that the same substance is irrelevant to the sameness of self, Locke clarified that
“consciousness unites actions” (Locke 118). He provided evidence for this first argument by
indicating that “whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to
whom they both belong” (Locke 118). Locke furthered his claim by demonstrating that since his
present consciousness could also be the one that witnessed the Thames overflowing last winter
and saw Noah’s ark that this would be the same self regardless of the material or immaterial
substances. With this example, he illustrated how there might be a third, more important factor in
personal identity, which holds self-consciousness. This factor is his concept of a “person,” which
is essentially the conscious thinking thing that can feel various emotions and is the primary
determinant of personal identity. The soul’s existence in different times and places is
