Taylor Jakeman
Professor Jennings
Technology in Society
25 February 2020
The Challenger Disaster, Case Study
On January 28th, 1986, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
launched the flight of the long-awaited Challenger, which abruptly ended 73 seconds later in a
fireball of hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The readings “the last flight of space shuttle
challenger” by Michael T. Charles and “The naked launch: Assigning blame for the challenger
explosion” by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, intensely covers all aspects of the events leading
to what is arguably the worst space program disaster in history. The explosion resulted in the
death of 7 crew members as well as an excess cost of $2 billion to replace the lost STS (space
transportation system). Impactfully, this shook the nations and furthermore the world’s trust with
NASA, who at the time were leading the space race. There are many important factors talked
about in both readings that play significant roles in the explosion of the Challenger. An
engineering failure on one hand is to blame. The technical flaw of an O–ring, which failed to
function properly in the cold weather conditions. On the other hand, faulty decision making, and
arguably egotistical attitudes are to blame. In an environment of pressured decision making,
politics, contracts, funding and military influences it is easy to see how the “blame” cannot be
solely placed on one factor.
Michael T. Charles talks in depth around the communication and organization failings
that led to this disaster, which is ultimately why I see the challenger disaster as being caused by