Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and
Research
Author(s): Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney
Source:
The Sociological Quarterly,
Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter, 1982), pp. 33-47
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Sociological Quarterly 23 (Winter 1982):33-47
Relative Deprivation and Social Movements:
A Critical Look at Twenty Years
of Theory and Research*
Joan Neff Gurney, University of Richmond
Kathleen J. Tierney, University of California, Los Angeles
The relative deprivation perspective was widely employed in the social movement lit-
erature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In spite of the growing popularity of some
newer approaches which criticize the relative deprivation perspective (resource mo-
bilization or resource management perspectives), there have been no attempts to
analyze and evaluate the relative deprivation perspective in any systematic fashion.
The purpose of this paper is to review some of the “classic” relative deprivation
literature in order to critically assess the perspective on the basis of its theoretical co-
herence and clarity and its empirical validity. The general conclusion reached is that
while the relative deprivation perspective was an advance over earlier approaches
which viewed social movements as resulting from the expression of irrational im-
pulses, the relative deprivation perspective is itself affected by too many serious con-
ceptual, theoretical, and empirical weaknesses to be useful in accounting for the emer-
gence and development of social movements.
Introduction
The concept of relative deprivation (RD) in the study of social movements is
practically as old as sociology itself. Although their references to RD were im-
plicit, both Marx and de Tocqueville developed formulations which have made
the transition into current social movement theory virtually intact. Writers in one
branch of the RD school use Marx’s “emiseration thesis” to emphasize the im-
portance of “relative” in relative deprivation (Bottomore, 1963). Tocqueville
brought the “rising expectations” argument into currency by noting that the
strongholds of the French Revolution were precisely those regions in which the
greatest improvements in the standard of living had occurred and by observing
that any relaxation of an oppressive regime engenders expectations in the popu-
lace that further reforms are on the way. He asserted failure to deliver reforms
renders the situation increasingly intolerable to members of affected groups and
pushed revolutionary fervor to the point of explosion (cf. Tocqueville, 1955).
RD gained its present-day status and importance through its extensive use as
an analytic and interpretive tool in The American Soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949).
RD was employed as an “interpretive intervening variable” (Merton and Kitt,
1950:45) to explain the relationship between background characteristics such
as age, education, and marital status and soldiers’ attitudes toward army life. At-
@1982 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/82/1600-0033$00.75
*The authors thank the following persons for their critical comments on several earlier versions of this
paper: E. L. Quarantelli, Bill Roy, and Patrick J. Gurney. We also express appreciation to the anonymous
reviewers whose comments were helpful in refining several sections of the paper. Joan Neff Gurney’s ad-
dress is Department of Sociology, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia 23173.
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34 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
titudes were seen as differing depending upon what group the individual used as
a standard of comparison-other soldiers, comparable civilians, and so on.
Beginning in the 1960s a number of social movement (SM) scholars used the
RD concept in both theoretical and empirical work. This emphasis peaked late
in that decade, with numerous published studies linking urban civil disturbances
to various objective and subjective deprivations. In contrast with that period,
which emphasized social psychological aspects of movements, like RD, the dec-
ade of the 1970s has been marked by an increasing concern with SM organiza-
tion (cf. Oberschall, 1973, 1978; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973,
1977). Currently, attempts to link the emergence and growth of movements to
widespread feelings of deprivation appear to have given way to analyses which
emphasize the contribution of social solidarity to movement mobilization (Tilly,
1978; Traugott 1978) and the ways movements function as organizations, re-
cruiting members and mobilizing other resources to achieve collective ends.
Despite the fact that proponents of the organizational/resource mobilization per-
spective reject the RD approach, the notion of deprivation as a factor in move-
ment development and dynamics still retains considerable appeal (cf., Isaac,
Mutran, and Stryker, 1980; Useem, 1980). The time thus seems right for a sys-
tematic critical assessment of the concept as used in SM research.
To explore the extent to which RD approaches elucidate SM phenomena, we
present a critical review of some representative works in the literature. Our re-
view, while not exhaustive, does focus on a number of influential scholarly works
in the RD tradition. The critique consists of two major divisions, the first dealing
with conceptual and theoretical issues and the second focusing on the conduct of
empirical research. We consider RD theory and research separately because, as
we later show, problems in one cannot be totally eliminated by attempts to im-
prove upon the other.
In advancing this critique we recognize that many of the points we raise have
appeared previously in the works of others (McPhail, 1971; Turner and Killian,
1972; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Berk, 1974; Orum,
1974). However, we have pulled together and synthesized these widely scattered
commentaries into a systematic and coherent portrait of the contribution RD
has made to the study of SM’s.
Conceptual and Theoretical Problems in the RD Literature
The concept of relative deprivation. The SM literature contains several implicit
and explicit definitions of RD. Gurr (1970) and Morrison (1973), for example,
both employ a relatively broad definition of RD as the perception that individual
achievements have failed to keep pace with individual expectations. James
Geschwender defines RD somewhat more narrowly, using the notion of refer-
ence groups. He argues RD is the perception that one’s membership group is in
a disadvantageous position, relative to some other group. However, he asserts
status inconsistency and rising expectations can also be subsumed under the RD
concept (Geschwender, 1964). A common thread in the literature is that RD is
a perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality. Wilson (1973) and
Runciman (1966) even argue there need not be an objective referent correspond-
ing to the perception.
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Relative Deprivation and Social Movements 35
One difficulty in virtually all conceptualizations of RD is that the nature of
the relationship between objective conditions and perceptions is never delineated.
This may be due in part to the fact that theorists typically make distinctions
among types and patterns of RD, without clarifying what these distinctions mean,
or what they imply for measurement. Gurr (1970), for example, discusses three
main “patterns” of RD: decrimental,. aspirational, and progressive. Additionally,
he identifies four “sources” of value expectations: past conditions, abstract
ideals, standards of a leader, and reference groups. Morrison (1971) distin-
guishes two “types” of RD-decrimental and aspirational-which he defines in
a manner similar to Gurr. Feierabend et al. (1969) present graphs of five “pat-
terns” of rapid social change they claim are highly conducive to the development
of systemic frustration, a concept which they define in RD terms.
These distinctions confuse, rather than clarify, the concept. Should types, pat-
terns, or sources be thought of as objective circumstances or as perceptions? Does
aspirational, decrimental, or progressive deprivation refer to structural circum-
stances from which the perception of RD arises or to qualitatively different types
of perceptions? Questions like these are important because they imply the way
RD should be measured. For example, if decrimental, aspirational, and other
variants are viewed as sources of RD, then logically RD becomes an intervening
perceptual variable which explains the relationship between structural conditions
and resultant social movement activity. This view necessitates measuring the per-
ceptions of a population under a set of conditions A, B, and C in order to deter-
mine which condition or combination of conditions leads to the development of
RD. While some authors (e.g., Davies) advocate this approach, it is not used.
Instead, discussions blur the distinction between structural conditions which may
give rise to RD and the perception of RD itself. The confusion of structural and
psychological levels has led to misguided attempts to infer individual attitudes
from macroeconomic indices, such as the GNP.
Even resource mobilization theorists acknowledge that deprivations of various
kinds may play a role as background factors in emerging social movements (cf.
Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Before the RD concept can have
general utility, however, certain issues must be resolved. As indicated, there
needs to be a greater degree of consensus on the definition of RD. First, the ques-
tion of whether it should be used solely in reference group terms, or used more
broadly to refer to any negative discrepancy between aspirations and achieve-
ments, needs to be addressed. In addition, greater consideration should be given
to how to define RD-in objective or subjective terms. Writers may wish to
employ the concept in both senses. On the other hand, they may wish to define
RD solely in perceptual terms; if so, they should do so consistently. Finally, they
should measure the concept at the individual level and attempt to clarify the link-
ages between RD and its objective antecedents and consequents.
Theoretical bases of the RD perspective. The link between RD and SM’s is
grounded in longstanding principles of social psychology, specifically either
frustration-aggression theory or cognitive balance approaches. Several writers
employ the frustration-aggression model to explain linkages between RD and the
occurrence of civil strife (Gurr, 1969, 1970); revolution (Davies, 1962, 1969);
or political violence (Feierabend et al., 1969). The cognitive balance approach
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36 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
is similar to the frustration-aggression model in that it posits an underlying state
of individual psychological tension that is relieved by SM participation. Al-
though this perspective is not as well developed in the literature as the frustration-
aggression approach, at least two proponents (Morrison, 1973; Geschwender,
1964, 1968) make a cognitive balance approach central to their formulations.
Morrison sees RD as a type of cognitive dissonance (between a legitimate expec-
tation and the belief it will not be fulfilled) which produces psychic tension, lead-
ing to tension-reduction activities such as “organized group action to change the
structural source of the blockage” (1973:109-10). Drawing on Lenski’s status
inconsistency formulations (1954, 1956), Geschwender (1964) explains black
social movement participation by arguing that blacks in the 1960s were increas-
ingly status inconsistent both in an absolute sense and in relation to whites. Later
he argues RD is a result of cognitive dissonance having its origins in status in-
consistency (Geschwender, 1968).
The adequacy of both these theoretical models can be challenged on several
grounds. Each problem area is discussed briefly below.
1. Strength of the association between underlying psychological processes and
specific tension-reducing activities: Social-psychological research suggests that
regardless of which of the two perspectives is adopted, the strength of the asso-
ciation between psychological tensions and SM activities will be extremely weak,
at best. The original version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis posited a
necessary and sufficient relationship between the two variables (Dollard et al.,
1939). This stance was modified by Miller (1941), who argued aggression is
but one possible consequence of frustration. In the decades following these ini-