23–2
23–7 Current cost is the cost of purchasing an asset today identical to the one currently held if
an identical asset can currently be purchased; it is the cost of purchasing an asset that provides
services like the one currently held if an identical asset cannot be purchased. Historical–cost–
based measures of ROI compute the asset base as the original purchase cost of an asset minus
any accumulated depreciation.
Some commentators argue that current cost is oriented to current prices, while historical
cost is past–oriented.
23–8 Special problems arise when evaluating the performance of divisions in multinational
companies because
a. The economic, legal, political, social, and cultural environments differ significantly
across countries.
b. Governments in some countries may impose controls and limit selling prices of
products.
c. Availability of materials and skilled labor, as well as costs of materials, labor, and
infrastructure may differ significantly across countries.
d. Divisions operating in different countries keep score of their performance in different
currencies.
23–9 In some cases, the subunit’s performance may not be a good indicator of a manager’s
performance. For example, companies often put the most skillful division manager in charge of
the weakest division in an attempt to improve the performance of the weak division. Such an
effort may yield results in years, not months. The division may continue to perform poorly with
respect to other divisions of the company. But it would be a mistake to conclude from the poor
performance of the division that the manager is performing poorly.
A second example of the distinction between the performance of the manager and the
performance of the subunit is the use of historical cost–based ROIs to evaluate the manager even
though historical cost–based ROIs may be unsatisfactory for evaluating the economic returns
earned by the organization subunit. Historical cost–based ROI can be used to evaluate a manager
by comparing actual results to budgeted historical cost–based ROIs.
23–10 Moral hazard describes situations in which an employee prefers to exert less effort (or to
report distorted information) compared with the effort (or accurate information) desired by the
owner because the employee’s effort (or validity of the reported information) cannot be
accurately monitored and enforced.
23–11 No, rewarding managers on the basis of their performance measures only, such as ROI,
subjects them to uncontrollable risk because managers’ performance measures are also affected
by random factors over which they have no control. A manager may put in a great deal of effort
but her performance measure may not reflect this effort if it is negatively affected by various
random factors. Thus, when managers are compensated on the basis of performance measures,
they will need to be compensated for taking on extra risk. Therefore, when performance–based
incentives are used, they are generally more costly to the owner. The motivation for having some
salary and some performance–based bonus in compensation arrangements is to balance the
benefits of incentives against the extra costs of imposing uncontrollable risk on the manager.
© 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. SM Cost Accounting 14/e by Horngren