Effective administration of supply and logistics is essential to an Army’s survivability
whether in combat or at peace. The distribution, handling and storage of things such as
food, weapons, water and other resources must be planned out. The Roman Army was a
professional highly trained fighting force. During the Jewish War their ability to effectively
plan and coordinate supply and logistics operations lent to their success on the battlefield.
How were the Romans able to coordinate and allocate vast amounts of material and
resources? Who were the people that were responsible for ensuring the Army was well
supplied and most importantly fed? Answering these questions will show how the Roman
Army was capable of effectively sustaining itself during combat operations.
In 66 A.D. a revolt took place during the reign of Nero in Judea. The causes of turmoil fall
along the lines of religious and social unrest. At the start of the conflict Cestius Gallus the
Governor of Syria and the XII Fulminata (12th legion) went in haste to siege the city of
Jerusalem. This was a huge tactical and logistical blunder by Gallus. He took no time to
plan out the upcoming operation. One factor for his decision to strike so quickly is that he
thought the rebels would let him in the city once he had arrived. However, the rebels
refused to surrender. Gallus then set siege to the city. The Romans forces were not
adequately supplied to conduct a sustained siege of the city. Within a week the Roman
supplies were running low. Gallus decided to withdraw to the coast of Judea. During their
retreat to the coast they were harassed by the Jewish rebels.[1]
They were eventually trapped in a defile and ambushed by the Jewish forces that had been
chasing them. The Roman force was decimated though some were able to escape the
slaughter. This defeat cost the Romans greatly in men and material. According to Josephus
the Romans and their allies lost 5,300 infantry and 480 cavalry soldiers. The materials they
lost amount to the entire legion’s siege train to include important artillery pieces such as
catapults. These machines of war were captured by the Jewish forces and eventual turned
against the Romans. In addition the Eagle standard representing the honor of the XII
Fulminata was also taken by the Jews.[2] This was a huge embarrassment to the Roman
forces and the Empire.
Nero’s reaction was to appoint Flavius Vespasianus (Vespasian) commander of the Roman
forces in Judea and gave him the task of suppressing the revolt. Vespasian and his son
Titus with an army of 50,000 were able to secure Galilee and the coastal region of Judea.
In addition they also controlled the region of Peraea. In 68 A.D. Vespasian and his forces
were in a position to take Jerusalem. However, the political situation in Rome pulled
Vespasian out of the fight. Nero was dead and there was a political scramble for position of
Emperor. After the “reign of the four Emperors” he was finally recognized as the Emperor
of Rome in 69 A.D. His son Titus was left in charge of the forces and the mission to seize
control of Jerusalem. In August of 70 A.D. after a very long siege of several months Titus
was able to breach the last of the City’s defenses.
Why did Titus succeed were Gallus had failed? The biggest glaring factor is that Gallus
had no effective tactical and logistical plan. Gallus did not have the men or material
enough to take Jerusalem successfully. Even Titus with vastly larger and well supplied
force had trouble taking the city. However, they did have a logical plan emplaced that was
supported by large logistical effort that supplied a force of about 50,000 soldiers. Logistics
has seen here can make or break an operation.
To understand what logistics is we first must find an operational definition. We must try to
see and understand logistics as the Roman generals would have in this period. Jonathan P.
Roth in his book titled, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264B.C. – A.D. 235)
defines it as the supply and transport of the Roman army’s food, fodder and firewood.
However, as he states in his book that arms, weapons and equipment are important but
secondary. Thus his research is only concerned about the provisioning of food, fodder and
firewood.[3] This only gives us a definition that is partly operational in relation to defining
logistics. Titus and his generals had to consider their primary mission. Conduct of siege
warfare against cities like Jerusalem was their main strategic, tactical and logistical
concern. They had to plan for the requisitioning, building and transportation of siege
engines and artillery pieces. So it is clear that arms, weapons and equipment should be
placed on an equal footing with the others noted above. This leads to a more operational
definition that will help in understanding the scope of this research.
Logistics can be broken down more efficiently into three categories which are bread,
blankets and bullets. Each of these categories than can be further scrutinized through
several logistical consideration. These factors are the acquisition, administration,
allocation, storage and transport of resources needed for the Roman army to conduct
peacetime or wartime operations. The first category under consideration is “bread” what
this refers to is the resources that army needs to sustain its dietary needs of its soldiers,
servants and pack animals. This is where Roth’s food and fodder fit into the Roman
logistical scheme. The next is” blankets”, this is an important catch all category. It covers a
myriad of resources which include, firewood, camp building materials, tents, engineering
tools, bedding, farming implements and medical supplies. The third category designated
“bullets” encompasses weapons, siege engines and the equipment needed to ensure
effective day to day operations of these particular resources. This shows that logistical
planning plays an important part in the overall scheme any combat or peacetime operation.
Ineffective planning can cause combat operations to go awry. The failure of Gallus to take
Jerusalem and his chaotic withdrawal to the coast is just such an example.
Jerusalem was the main target of the Roman forces during the Jewish War. In 70 A.D. Titus
who was now in command of over 50,000 troops which included approximately 20,000
legionaries. The rest of the force consisted of the auxiliary and foreign allies. The legions
involved in this action consisted of the V Macedonica, XV Appollinaris, XII Fulminata and
the X Fretensis.[4] To look at the force as a whole would be too massive in the scope of
this research. However, the effectiveness of logistical planning can still be seen by
studying the core of the forces involved. These are the legions which are listed above.
Each commander had to make decision based on what their mission called for and their
store of resources. These can be related to then the three logistical categories that make up
the operational definition of logistics which are bread, blankets and bullets.
What did the Roman army eat and why. In addition, how were they supplied with the
necessary resources? Answering these questions will give us a detailed look at the “bread”
aspect of our logistical definition. It will also attest to the fact that the Romans were very
efficient in the requisitioning administration, distribution and transportation of food and
fodder. A soldier cannot function at their best in a strenuous situation such as hand to hand
combat without proper nutrition. The Roman generals understood this fact and planned the
soldier’s diet accordingly. In modern terms the daily caloric need for a soldier in the
American soldier is typically 3600 calories. The main basis of this number is a function of
several factors which include age, body size, activity and environment. However, the
Roman soldiers of this period needed fewer calories than today’s modern soldier. The main
factor that influences this outcome stems from the fact that adults in antiquity were shorter
compared to adults today. The average height range for a male was five feet four inches to
five feet seven inches tall. What is unique to note is that Roman record suggest that the
army had a minimum height requirement for enlistment. They also point out that a Roman
soldier was generally taller than a regular citizen.[5]
However through extrapolation we can see how a Roman soldiers caloric need compare to
that of a modern soldier from the United States Army. Based on several factors we can
derive following information. A nineteen year old American soldier who is five feet nine
inches tall and is of average weight would require an RDA (Recommended Daily
Allowance) of 3600 calories. The average age of military service during the Empire was
close to thirty years old. So a thirty year old Roman soldier who is five feet eight inches
tall weighing 145lbs would only need 3000 calories. Even though, we have this
comparison now the Roman leadership did not have this kind of data work from. They
derived their needs based on experience and instinct. It was a common practice to feed
troops just before battles. This would prepare them for the strenuous physical activity they
