Introduction
Scope Management
Scope Development
Originally, the scope of BAE’s project was limited to building an automated baggage
transportation scheme for United Airlines in the new Denver International Airport. This original
scope was realistic, defined, and doable. In most airports around the world, each individual
airline commissioned a contractor to develop their own baggage handling system. BAE had
completed this task 70 times at major airports around the world, and defined a realistic two and a
half year timeline to complete the project.
Change Management
The downfall of the BAE project began with their poor approach to change management.
After already starting construction on the United Airlines baggage project, BAE accepted a
contract to change the scope of the project to include a complex, integrated baggage system for
the entire airport. This decision was completely outside the scope of the project, and practically
replaced the original project with a new one.
In addition to the tremendous scope creep created by this decision, BAE failed to develop
a realistic and doable scope for the new airport-wide project. BAE normally completed baggage
projects for individual airlines within an airport, and described their idea for the integrated
airport-wide baggage project as the “most complex automated baggage system ever built”.
Despite committing to an extraordinarily more complex project, BAE agreed to a significantly
shorter timeframe for the project.
Initially, the original baggage project, limited to only United Airlines, was set to be
complete in two and a half years. The new scope of the project, on the other hand, began in April
of 1992, while the airport was scheduled to open in October 1993, giving BAE one and a half
years. It makes little sense to expect to complete a significantly larger and more complicated
project in a year less than the original project. Therefore, the change to the original scope was
not only creating an entirely new project, but the scope for that new project was entirely
unrealistic and undoable for BAE. Ultimately, their ineffective change management and
unrealistic scope lead to the failure of the project because they were unable to complete the
project on time.
Furthermore, BAE continued to struggle with change management as the project
progressed, which made it impossible for them to complete the project on their already shortened
timeline. Di Fonso, the project manager, claimed that six months prior to the opening date of the
airport, BAE was still accepting time-consuming requests for changes to the system from the
airlines. For example, they agreed to change United Airlines’ system to only have one loop of
track instead of two, add ski-claim devices and elevators to the terminal, build baggage-sorting
systems, and develop new maintenance tracks for the Telecars. None of these alterations were
within the original project scope, and adding them to the project further complicated BAE’s
ability to complete the project on time.