NGOs in Chile
The dictatorship of general Augusto Pinochet Chile was an issue arousing outside
campaigning and heated public debate among foreign professionals and politicians.
Consequently Chilean NGOs enjoyed high level levels of international aid during the
dictatorship. Besides the NGOs a large amount of aid was given through the Chilean Church,
especially through the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. After the democratic transition the role of the
NGOs decreased substantially. The Archbishop of Santiago dissolved the Vicaría after the
transition in 1990 on the grounds that public welfare was now the responsibility of the
government. Secondly, the international donors believed that their aid was no longer urgent,
and they moved their resources to more troubled regions. The Chilean NGOs were left to
redefine their priorities and bring about their own resources (Lambrou, 1987). Despite these
developments the Chilean NGOs were not lost. Many of them were considered as useful
partners in social policy and the delivery of social services. But the overall political influence
of the NGOs declined as a consequence, and many tasks were allocated to grassroots
movements (as distinguished in this paper).
The role of NGOs during the Pinochet era
The former state apparatus of president Allende (in office 1970-1973) was responsible for the
assistance and investment in the countryside. This apparatus was dismantled when Pinochet
came to power in 1973. Consequently most of the employed personnel that had worked in
agricultural research lost their jobs and at this point they were just trying to survive
financially. At the same time the policies of the authoritarian government neglected and
discouraged local development and employment. The Chilean NGOs aimed at these issues
and became an alcove for anti-government communication. The NGOs involved themselves
in the problems of the country side, which was a former focal point of the state’s activities
(Loveman, 1991). One NGO that illustrates this shift is the growth of OPDECH (now part of
the consortium “Corporation for Regional Development). OPDECH was formed by the
former professionals specialized in the Chilean agriculture. These were the professionals that
were unable to find any other work because their former political affiliation to Allende
impeded them in this process. It was considered daring and dangerous to admit a professional
history as such. These professionals formed groups and formed an ideology and political
opposition against the Pinochet government. Social equity and development on the regional
level were the focal points of the new NGOs. The former political affiliation to Allende, and
the political resistance against the Pinochet regime of the staff created a focus moving away
from the Pinochet regime. It is no surprise then that OPDECH (localized in the country side
of Chile) dedicated its efforts to the social change and the development of regions that were
lagging behind. But more importantly, they focused their efforts on regions that were against
the Pinochet regime (Oxhorn, 1994).
Other NGOs such as GIA and FLACSO (localized in Santiago) also had this focus.
However, as they were localized in the capital of Chile, they had to act with caution. These
NGOs were to maintain the appearance of being in line with the Pinochet government as they
were under strict observation. During this time the role of external agents and external
development cooperation was crucial. The military government was despised in the
international community, and foreign donor agencies were lining up in high quantities. The
result was the formation of a large NGO network that offered many services previously
unavailable from the government. With this change the political influence of the NGOs
increased substantially. The success of the NGOs can be explained by evaluating the factors
that breed NGO political power, defined by Edwards (1999). Edwards evaluates the political
power of NGOs by the factors social network, the ability to influence the political process
and linkages between grassroots organizations, NGOs and donors. (Edwards, 1999. Edwards
states that, if these factors are present, the political influence of NGOs will rise. The common
history of many of the NGO professionals had created a highly coherent social network
between the NGOs. Secondly, the growth of external development funds had greatly
improved their ability to affect the political process (as the NGOs were considered as the
opposition against the central government) and had strengthened the linkages between the
NGOs and donors. Because of this, the role of the state changed and it surrendered its role as
provider of services to the NGOs. There is, however, an exception that needs to be noted. The
state still tried to alleviate poverty through programs that were targeted at the extreme poor.
These programs provided resources to great numbers of poor people. This process neglected
any input from the poor population and did not address any long term issues (Graham, 1993).
During the regime it was not possible for the poor to solve their own problems as they were
unable to participate in the development process. International donor agencies addressed this
issue and aimed at investments in human capital of the local regions of Chile. It must be
noted that all of these NGOs owed their existence to external international development
cooperation (Krut, 1997).
Overcoming difficulties
The development cooperation in rural Chile did not occur without difficulty. During this time
the role of NGOs with the state changed. The majority of the organizations were previously
led by the state. As Pinochet practiced the neo-liberal state reforms, the social services were
privatized and introduced to market competition. Chileans struggled with these market forces
and were trying to get what the government had previously provided. These reforms changed
the relationship between the Chilean NGOs and the government. Whereas the NGOs were
