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Necessity or Overreaction
September 11, 2001, will always be remembered as a day of great loss for the United
Stated of America. Nineteen terrorists hijacked four airliners in one coordinated attack,
accounting for the direct loss 265 lives from 80 different nations on board the flights
(“Remembering”), and of countless more in the aftermath. But American people will also recall
9/11 as a day of solidarity. Horrified by the unfolding events, and helpless to immediately affect
the outcome, an entire nation stood by, ready and willing to contribute in whatever fashion they
could. The assaults on World Trade Center and Pentagon changed the lives of all Americans.
In a speech addressed to Congress and a national television audience, President George
W. Bush said, “How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our
command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war — to the disruption
and to the defeat of the global terror network.” In this speech, he also announced the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security and first coined the term “war on terror” (Eidenmuller).
The Transportation Security Agency, now part of the Department of Homeland Security,
has been surrounded by controversy since its inception. The need for better security in the
nation’s airports was obvious. The ease with which the terrorists carried out their plot was
shocking, making the U.S. appear an obvious target for future attacks. The purpose of the TSA
was to provide protection from and prevent any future assaults. Yet, every new regulation or
layer of security established by the TSA seemed to have just as many drawbacks to the public as
to potential attackers. People began to wonder if the costs of all this security outweighed the
benefits.
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The debate over TSA policy covers almost every aspect of its existence, including
escalating budgets, employee effectiveness and training, and the gradual decline of passenger
rights. No doubt remains that screening passengers and their belongings is vital to ensuring the
safety of the American skies, but these inspections cannot be considered an absolute degree of
protection.
The core functions of the TSA include baggage screening, verifying passenger
identification, and passenger screening. These would seem to be logical steps in the path to
airline security. Taking on a task of this magnitude and responsibility initially required enough
funding to train and hire 30,000 new employees, as well as research, design, purchase and install
massive amounts of equipment. The 2002 budget of $1.345 billion did not begin to cover the
costs incurred, and so was increased by almost 350%, to $4.8 billion, in 2003 (“Transportation”).
In taking over the contracts held by private screening companies, the TSA began putting
standardized policies and procedures in place, and had at the end of one year, achieved their
goal of screening all baggage for explosives (“TSA: History”). Ironically, after having put many
airport employees on the unemployment line during the last year, the TSA was still entirely
dependant on airline employees to implement many of these new procedures. Private employees
were compelled to do the government’s bidding. No TSA screeners worked at the check-in
counters; instead, it was, and still is, left to private employees to handle all baggage directly from
the passenger, before it has passed any inspection. Airline employees are also first to cope with
the impatience of passengers faced with paperwork and identification scrutiny, a series of
questions of dubious value, and the latest list of restricted items.
The TSA, in cooperation with the FBI and other sources, implemented the watch list and
no–fly list. These databases, compiled with intelligence from the FBI, the CIA, and other sources
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contained the names of those known to be involved in radical groups, suspected extremists, and
others considered high risk, from all over the world. This data was used to track the movements
of potentially violent people and to prevent them from boarding any flights inside the U.S.
borders. In concept, this simple policy of verifying every passenger’s identity against a register
of those deemed to be unsafe should have been an effective tool in keeping terrorists from our
skies. Flaws in the system quickly became apparent.
Again, the government regulations became the airlines’ responsibility. Airline employees
were given the additional duty of establishing each person’s identity before issuing a boarding
pass. Counter agents, without direct access to the databank, were unable to sell tickets directly to
passengers at the check-in counter. Instead, they directed travelers to a telephone to make their
purchase, where there was still no ability to instantly verify their information. Last minute
flights, sometimes a necessity, became all but unavailable.
The sheer number of people on the watch list and no-fly list became cause for concern on
its own. Neither the actual names nor the total number of people on the list were ever released to
the public, for security reasons. In reality, many average Americans were misidentified, leading
to many incidents of unwarranted delay and harassment. In December 2002, Electronic Privacy
Information Center filed a lawsuit against the TSA, seeking to learn, among other things, the
criteria used to put people on the lists (“Documents”). The TSA did institute a grievance process,
involving a complaint form and an ombudsman, to help those people constantly delayed or
inconvenienced by the watch list, but it never became a high priority. Not until 2010 did the TSA
launch the Secure Flight program, finally bringing all the agencies’ databases together into one
standardized unit. Individual airlines were no longer required to match passengers to the
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database; instead, new regulations stipulated that the data be sent to the TSA for vetting (“TSA:
Secure”).
What seemed a simple, economical plan has instead been shown to be an unwieldy,
expensive, and ineffective method of airline security. The costs incurred to consolidate the data
from multiple agencies and computer systems were far higher than expected. Potential terrorists
are still able to forge identification or send another recruit in their place. To date, the only
heavily publicized capture of terrorists, due to the watch list, were apprehended while driving
across the U.S. border from Mexico (“Iraqi”).
Screening all baggage for explosives, another of the primary functions of the TSA, is also
an excellent, common sense layer of security. Taking down an aircraft would be a relatively
effortless endeavor, if the luggage were not inspected first. Bombings could easily become
