MY EMOTION – YOUR EMOTION: BRAIN AND BODY IN
EMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION
Cornelia Herbert
University of Ulm
Language is embodied and closely related to the self. This has been shown for
the processing of words and sentences. What does this relationship between
words, self, body and the brain imply for the verbal communication of emotions?
Evidence from a series of studies will be reviewed that used electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG), functional imaging and psychophysiological methods to explore how
emotions are decoded from words when these refer to the reader’s own or other
people‘s emotions (e.g., my vs. his fear, pleasure). EEG, memory and reaction
time data suggest that healthy subjects intuitively respond to positive self-related
content but that discrimination between own and other-related emotions is an ela-
borate process appearing at later cortical processing stages. Functional imaging
reveals activation in a large-scale network involved in relevance detection (amyg-
dala), integration of bodily and sensory signals (insula), and self-referential pro-
cessing (VMPFC). Physiologically, evaluation of own and other-related emotion
words compared to words of neutral meaning increases autonomous-nervous sys-
tem activity (heart rate, skin conductance). However, participants are facially
more expressive when they evaluate positive emotions of other people. Crucially,
selective blocking of facial muscle activity impairs evaluation of words describ-
ing other people’s emotion but has little effect on the evaluation of own emotions.
Together, the results argue in favor of a differentiated view of embodiment when
processing own and other-related emotions from language stimuli.
This research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG-
HE5880/3-1).
SENDER IDENTITY AND SENDER COMPETENCE ENHANCE
PROCESSING OF SOCIO-EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE
FEEDBACK
Sebastian Schindler, & Johanna Kissler
University of Bielefeld
The personal significance of a language statement depends on its context. Three
studies are presented that investigate how the implied source of evaluative state-
ments alters their processing. Participants’ brain event-related potentials (ERPs)
were recorded in response to word-streams consisting of positive, negative, and
neutral trait adjectives, stated to either represent personal feedback from a human
or to be generated by a computer. In experiment 1 the computer was portrayed as
acting randomly, in experiment 2 it was portrayed as a socially intelligent system.
In experiment 3, human sender competence was further manipulated in that feed-
back was said to be given by either an expert psychotherapist or a na
€
ıve rater (in
addition to a random computer). All experiments revealed strong effects of per-
ceived sender. In experiment 1, feedback from a human amplified the early pos-
terior negativity (EPN) and the Late Positive Potential (LPP). Emotional content
enhanced the LPP. In contrast, in experiment 2, EPN was modulated by emotional
content only, while P3a and LPP responded to both sender and content. Experi-
ment 3 replicated the effects from experiment 1 and further revealed a larger N1
when the human sender was thought to be an expert. Evidently, both perceived so-
cial competence and perceived humaneness amplify visual processing at distinct
processing stages. For humans, feedback by others is vital as belonging to a com-
munity reflects a strong motivational desire. This has robust repercussions even
for processing single word messages in imaginary communicative context.
EMOTIONAL FACIAL PRIMING OF LANGUAGE
COMPREHENSION
Pia Knoeferle, & Katja M€
unster
University of Bielefeld
In a series of visual-world eye-tracking studies, we investigated the effects of fa-
cial emotions and of action depictions on spoken language comprehension in
5-year olds, younger, and older adults. The action depictions modulated
comprehension in all three age groups in a qualitatively similar manner, albeit
with different time courses. Emotional facial priming affected the young and old-
er adults’ comprehension (in a qualitatively different manner depending on va-
lence). Moreover, the type of prime face (e.g., schematic faces such as smileys
vs. natural faces) mattered, with somewhat more pronounced effects of natural
faces than for smileys.
LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTS EMOTION
Kristen Lindquist
University of North Carolina
In this talk, I present evidence for the psychological constructionist hypothesis
that language plays a constitutive role in emotion by shaping affective percep-
tions and experiences into instances of discrete emotions (e.g., anger, fear, dis-
gust). I first present evidence that healthy participants and patients with
neurodegenerative disease cannot perceive discrete emotions on faces when they
cannot access the meaning of emotion words. Next, I present meta-analytic data
from neuroimaging experiments demonstrating that brain regions associated with
emotional experiences and perceptions (e.g., inferior frontal gyrus, dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, lateral temporal cortex) overlap with regions involved in se-
mantics. Finally, I close with meta-analytic evidence showing different brain ac-
tivity when emotion words are included versus not included in studies of emotion
experiences. Neuroimaging studies that include emotion words in the experimen-
tal task find greater activity within the inferior frontal gyrus and thalamus when
participants experience emotions, regions associated with semantic retrieval and
sensory processing. By comparison, studies that do not include emotion words
find greater amygdala activity when participants experience emotions, a region
associated with processing uncertain stimuli. These findings are consistent with
the psychological constructionist view that words prompt retrieval of emotion
concept knowledge that is used to disambiguate the discrete emotional meaning
of otherwise ambiguous affective feelings.
S22 SPR Abstracts 2015