Make Greece Spartan Again
Perhaps the most serious question raised in the Peloponnesian War is about the morality
of the belief that might makes right, not preemptive strikes against those viewed as a threat.
Certainly, preemptive strikes are useful. This is a common occurrence in the modern day, and
has happened in every major war of the last century in some form or another, whether on the
small scale of a military unit launching an ambush or on the large scale of an entire country
doing so. Consider the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. For a few years up to this point,
Imperial Japan had been carving up Asia and colonizing it piece by piece, first Korea and
Manchuria, much of northern coastal China, southern coastal China, and then French Indochina.
And then they thought it would be a good idea to attack Pearl Harbor, thinking they could cripple
the United States Navy and prevent American intervention should worse come to worse. That, of
course, did not end well for them, but from a tactical perspective, it was worth the risk. While
they underestimated the economic, industrial, and military might of the sleeping giant that was
the United States, tactically and strategically, it was the best move imaginable in order to protect
the Japanese military hegemony in Asia. And this same move was mirrored long before by the
Athenians against the Melians, but ultimately, the Athenians made the gamble it paid off for
them, unlike the Japanese. Then, the Melian Dialogue occurred, where the Athenians and the
Melians debated over the war, specifically homing in on two specific concepts, as said by the
Athenians; “ […] the strong will take what they can and the weak will give what they must.”
Following this, the Melians responded with, “As for our weakness, we expect that our allies the
Lacedaemonians (Spartans) will more than make up for it.”
The first of these two ideas, that the strong will take whatever they can and the weak will
suffer under the rule of the strong what they must, is a central pillar of the position of realists
such as Thucydides. The realist position was correct in that, inevitably, the Athenians used
overpowering might against the Melians, and “[…] put to death all the men of military age and
sold the women and children into slavery. They then took the land of Melos for themselves,
sending five hundred of their own citizens as colonists.” The weak suffered what they had to, and
the strong took what they could. The Melians relied on the hope that their brothers, the Spartans,
would save them, but the Spartans did not come. Many nations in the world rely on the security
of having allies. Nations have had this since the dawn of nations, and before the dawn of
nationstates, there were kingdoms that allied with each other to provide security for one another
through collective strength. In the Sengoku Jidai, translating to “the age of the country at war,”
Japanese warlords allied themselves with each other. The Oda clan and Tokugawa clan were
allied with one another, until of course the Tokugawa shogunate ruled as military leader of
