Research Paper
Does the enforcement of quasi contracts infringe on the liberties of
a citizen?
(Definition)Quasi contracts are a controversial and unclear subject. A
quasi contract can be defined only after a definition of the characteristics of
the alternatives: the terms of an express contract are written; and in implied
contracts, based on conduct and surrounding circumstances. Quasi-contracts
go one step further – not based on what is intended, but what occurs after
the fact, and tries to designate a liability around that concept. One may
visualize these three as the spectrum of contract law, where enforcement of
express contracts is straightforward, and quasi-contracts are nebulous and
problematic to enforce.
(Purpose)This paper will provide a summary analysis of quasi-
contracts in order to better understand their controversial existence in legal
doctrine. First, an analysis into the definition of a quasi-contract and its
beginnings will provide a foundation for understanding. Second, an analysis
of the main arguments for and against quasi-contracts will allow a
questioning of the implications of their use. Third, a comparison of landmark
cases related to the concept will show the proof in results when quasi-
contracts are applied. Finally, an economic application of quasi-contract
enrichment quantification will prove that this enforcement is actually good
for society, and does not infringe on the liberties of a citizen.
At the core of every contract, it is essential for a meeting of the minds
to occur, based on the intention of the parties. If there is no intention or
meeting of the minds, then a contract does not exist. Thus quasi-contracts
lay on the outer edges of this contract spectrum, where a contract does not
truly exist, and yet the parties involved are subject to what seems like the
judicial application of contract standards of liability. Even definitions of quasi-
contracts are problematic: “an instance in which someone receives a benefit
and later a court creates or constructs a fictitious contract between the
benefit-giver and the benefit-recipient, although no actual contract existed
nor were promises made” (Swygert, Yanes 22). It may be misleading to use
the term contract, since by definition it is the very lack of a contract that
portends quasi-contract treatment. Regardless, a quasi-contract, which is not
implied by the parties, and therefore is independent of intention, is not based
on terms, surroundings, or intention. Quasi-contracts are based on the need
for a correction of an imbalance due to unjust enrichment.
The concept of unjust enrichment is rooted in the belief of one party,
who has been affected by the other, so much so that they feel something is
due to them. In essence, the right for the plainti2 to recover is established on
their principles and beliefs. For example, in the case of Nobel v. Williams,
the plainti2s argued that because they spent their own money in order to
conduct classes, the school board should have to pay for their expenditures.
The school board argued that they did not request this from them, or promise
payment. Who should pay? Here one may begin to suspect the controversy
of the situation, since it is these very unclear principles and beliefs that
shape the finding of the court. Principles and beliefs are di7cult to measure.
Another one of the drawbacks to quasi-contracts is the problem of an
infringement on citizen’s rights. There is some confusion about whether a
quasi-contract is actually a contract or not, since the imposition of a duty
implies that a contract exists in some kind of form. There is a strong
argument that by enforcing a duty without actually having a contract is a
violation of a citizen’s liberties. Citizens have the right to make their own
contracts, and the justice system works with them to enforce this contract.
The constitution does not give this power to judges, to quote from Sceva
v. True: “To sit in judgment upon [someone] and enforce their own
contract… is judicial usurpation. The constitution gave the court no such
power. The court has no power to make contracts for people…” Of course the
counter-claim would be, then, that a quasi-contract is not, in fact, a contract
at all, but a remedy. But in the case of no contract, where one party is
benefitted unjustly, what is the best course of action? Should we, as a
society, allow unjust enrichment to occur for the sake of one citizen’s rights?
Should we sacrifice one to keep the other sacrosanct?
To quote one opponent: “My analysis, which supports the idea that
judicial decision-making is indeterminate, is rendered vulnerable by our
experience of being able to speculate successfully about how at least some
cases will come out. One response is that our ability to speculate has less to
do with the determinacy of doctrine than with our sensitivity to cultural
values and understandings as they impinge on and are created by our
decision makers” (Dalton 5). In fact, the argument that judges are not
necessarily impartial and fair is absolutely true. Adding to the possible
damage is the imperfect nature of utilizing the court system, where a judge
decides what the plainti2 or defendant is then required to do. Here is the
nature of the controversy revealed, because the parties did not intend to
assume an obligation by their actions, and yet a verdict is being forced upon
him by an external third party. How can a grey area be enforced if it is not
defined by the parties at first?
However, since the parties cannot come to an agreement outside of a
