Guiding through observance of virtuous agents as examplars, and through the life-long process of moral
learning, for which quick-fix rules are no substitute.
Some have argued that Virtue Ethics is self-centred because its primary concern is with the agent’s own
character, whereas morality is supposed to be about other people, and how our actions affect other
people. Thus, any theory of ethics should require us to consider others for their own sake, and not
because particular actions may benefit us. Some argue that the whole concept of personal well-being
(which is essentially just self-interest) as an ethical master value is mistaken, especially as its very
personal nature does not admit to comparisons between individuals. Proponents counter that virtues in
themselves are concerned with how we respond to the needs of others, and that the good of the agent
and the good of others are not two separate aims, but both result from the exercise of virtue.
Other critics are concerned that Virtue Ethics leaves us hostage to luck, and that it is unfair that some
people will be lucky and receive the help and encouragement they need to attain moral maturity, while
others will not, through no fault of their own. Virtue Ethics, however, embraces moral luck, arguing that
the vulnerability of virtues is an essential feature of the human condition, which makes the attainment
of the good life all the more valuable.