In a previous work I expounded upon the fufility of Czechoslovakia’s resistance to Germany in the
autumn of 1938, this is intended to be a sort of follow up in regards to that to both substanfiate that
thesis with further evidence under similar condifions, and to carry the theme further into pracfical
operafions. It is also a fascinafing comparison that any student of war would be well rewarded for
examining.
We start o& with the Russian Army in the summer of 1914, and we’ll cover that organisafion’s campaigns
unfil the retreat from Poland in the later summer of 1915. It is not necessary to explore the causes of the
First World War at this fime, but as diplomafic brakes failed to avert the catastrophe the Great Powers
mobilised for war.
Opposed to Germany and Austria-Hungary were Russia and France, soon joined by England and many
others. The Eastern Front, however, was a contest con3ned solely between the Austrians and Germans
on one side, and the Russians on the other. Though Romania did indeed join Russia a4er the success of
the Brusilov O&ensive in the summer of 1916, that development extends beyond the scope of our work.
Our 3rst map is that of European Russia in 1914, displaying the immensity of territorial space and
therefore strategic depth possessed by the Russian Empire. Russia had progressively advanced in all
direcfions following the consolidafion of Muscovy at the end of the sixteenth century and especially
a4er the reforms of Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth. By the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667,
the process of Polish disintegrafion was begun. In that year, Poland lost all of le4 bank Ukraine, that is,
Ukraine east of the Dnieper, to Russia. But it was to be another century before Russia could finally
eliminate her old rival and truly enter the heart of European polifics.
Speaking of Poland near the middle of the nineteenth century, an exiled Polish historian wryly observed;
“The course which the Russian cabinet has hitherto pursued towards Poland is not pracficable; it must
and will be enfirely changed, or Russia must resign her posifion not only as a 3rst rate power, but even as
a European state, because this enfirely depends on her possession of Poland. If Poland is wrested from
Russia, she must not only resign her projects on Turkey, but she will be even menaced with the loss of
her Balfic provinces, which being German by their civilisafion, although not by the bulk of their
populafion, would then probably unite with Germany, parficularly if the restorafion of Poland is e&ected
by the assistance of the Germans. This would reduce Russia to the same territorial posifion as she had at
the accession of Peter the Great, or even to that which she occupied before the treaty of Andrushov
1667. Therefore to possess or to lose Poland is for Russia to be or not to be a European power.” – Valerian
Krasinski, “Panslavism and Germanism,” pages 94-95, italics original
Krasinski meant that Russian intolerance and oppression would inevitably result in the separafion of
Poland from Russia, which would be fatal for Russian pretensions, and that Russia’s policy ought to have
been based around the reconciliafion of the Polish nafion with the Tsarist state, but I digress.
A4er Poland’s sinking into administrafive chaos and decentralisafion, Russia for a fime controlled her as
a puppet. In 1732 the three powers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the infamous Löwenwolde
Treaty, by which they pledged themselves to perpetuate the internal disorder of the Commonwealth.
This was put into pracfical e&ect the following year as King Augustus II of Poland-Saxony died and Poland
aCempted to reform by the elecfion of Stanislaus Leszczyński.
Leszczyński had the support of France, Poland’s ancient ally, and France’s partner in crime, Spain, the
two aCacking Austria in Italy and along the Rhine to begin the War of the Polish Succession.
Nonetheless, Prussia joined her army to Austria’s on the Rhine, while the Russians marched on Warsaw
and thence on Danzig where Leszczyński escaped seeking the protecfion of a French expedifion. A4er a
lively siege of about three months, despite the succours of the French Navy, Danzig fell to the Russians in
June of 1734, and the Russian puppet Augustus III of Saxony was imposed upon Poland as King. Though
France and Spain defeated Austria and stripped her of her Italian possessions with the Treaty of Vienna
ending the war in 1738, Poland remained 3rmly under Russia’s thumb.
Yet the Poles repeatedly sought to shake o& Russian patronage through the use of what remained of
their sovereignty, such as the Confederafion of Bar formed in 1768, the reforms of the Great Sejm in
1791, and the great uprising of Kościuszko in 1794. At the end of each of these rebellions against Russian
dominafion Poland was stripped of territory unfil finally eliminated enfirely, comprising three parfifions
in 1772, 1793, and 1795 respecfively.
Informal control over Polish a&airs had been much more preferable to occupafion, but Polish resistance
was tenacious and her determinafion to adequately reform impressive. With 34een millions of
inhabitants even as late as the Second Parfifion, much more than Prussia and not far behind Austria, a
fightly centralised Poland would have been a most formidable obstacle for Russian inJuence. Worse sfill,
the Prussians and Austrians had revealed themselves as opposed to Russian expansion westwards and
had brieJy sought to bolster Poland against Russia, unfil the demands of the French Revolufion called
them away.
For this reason, Russia ulfimately decided to take advantage of the preoccupafion of the Germans to
liquidate Poland enfirely. Contrary to popular belief, however, there was a fourth parfifion. Unfortunately
for Russia, Napoleon defeated the Prussians in 1806, and when the Russians aCempted to aid them, the
French pursued them to Eylau and Friedland, where they came to terms on the River Niemen at Tilsit.
Part of this agreement was the stripping of Prussia of all of her spoils of the Second and Third parfifions,
and creafing out of them a rump Polish state called the ‘Grand Duchy of Warsaw.’ A4er Austria’s defeat
and the Treaty of Schönbrunn in 1809, Austria was forced to cede so-called ‘West Galicia,’ that is, her
gains of the Third Parfifion, to the Grand Duchy.
Since these comprised the heart of Poland, her most populous and prosperous districts, Tsar Alexander I
may well have insisted upon retaining them a4er Napoleon’s defeat as the Germans were more
vulnerable to French aggression and France was ever seeking to restore Poland. Henceforth, France
could not restore Poland by defeafing Austria in Italy or Prussia along the Rhine, as what remained to
them of Polish territory could hardly be erected into independent states if forced by France to disgorge
them. Poland IS the Vistula basin, it cannot exist without it, and this was precisely what Russia sought to
acquire.
Accordingly, the Fourth Parfifion was enacted in 1814 by the Congress of Vienna, parfifioning the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw between Prussia and Russia. The western part became the Grand Duchy of Posen in
the Kingdom of Prussia, while the majority was reconsfituted as the Kingdom of Poland in personal union
with Russia, usually referred to as the ‘Congress Kingdom.’ It was the 1814 boundaries were fought along
at the start of the First World War, with the single excepfion of Cracow, which was made Free City by the
Congress of Vienna, but which was annexed by Austria and incorporated into Galicia in 1846 a4er the
Galician Slaughter and aborfive Polish uprisings in 1846 and 1848.
The Congress Kingdom was dissolved in 1867 following the November Rising of the Poles in 1830, and
the very basis of Polish ethnicity and language were persecuted by Russia following the failed January
Uprising in 1863. A4er 1867 Poland was oLcially redesignated the Vistula Land, and was administrafively
divided up into gubernias to be directly incorporated into the Russian body polific as mere provinces.
Even before then, in 1841, signs towards loss of autonomy and fighter union with Russia were already
apparent, such as the abolifion of the Polish currency and its subsfitufion by the rouble. But despite
growing fricfion between the Russian state apparatus and the Polish people, Russia nevertheless
retained her Polish territories up to the eve of 1914.
Whatever mofivafions inspired Alexander’s decision in 1814, he placed his country in a parficularly
unenviable situafion should she face the two German powers in combinafion. AdmiCedly this was a
remote prospect at the fime, but much had changed over the last one hundred years.
Our second map displays the planned deployments of the Russian Army for acfion against the Central
Powers. The Russian chief-of-sta& General Alexander Sukhomlinov in the pre-war years outlined two
possible mobilisafion plans, both of which, however, depended upon the deployment of the First Army
under General Paul von Rennenkampf and the Second Army under General Aleksandr Samsonov against
East Prussia; and the mustering of the Fi4h Army under General Paul von Plehve, the Third Army under
General Nikolai Ruzsky, and the Eighth Army under General Brusilov in the south against Galicia.
The map depicts the so-called ‘Polish Salient.’ This consisted of the Vistula Land west of the line formed
roughly by the Vistula, the Narew, and the Forest of Augustów. The Russians had recognised the
vulnerability of this salient and had intenfionally limited their military railway lines to stop short of the
German fronfier, so as to make a German advance more diLcult, and had inifially intended to retain
their forces on the right bank of the Vistula.
Pre-war planning had resulted in the construcfion of the ‘Polish Trilateral,’ the anchor of the Russian
forward posifion. In a triangle formed by the fortresses of Novogeorgievsk (Modlin, at the conJuence of
the Narew and Vistula), Ivangorod (Dęblin, at the conJuence of the Wieprz with the Vistula), and Brest–
Litovsk (at the conJuence of the Muchawiec with the Bug) the Russians held a vast forfi3ed complex
further supplemented by the old vast Alexander Citadel in Warsaw. This would be the central posifion
and nexus of the Russian operafions in 1914 and 1915.
According to the schedule the Russian First and Second armies were to face the German Eighth Army in
East Prussia. The First Army was to muster around the fortress of Kauen on the Niemen. The Second
Army was to mobilise around Białystok on the Narew.
To the south the Fi4h Army was to deploy between the Bug and the Styr, concentrafing around Chelm.
The Third Army was to concentrate to the east of the Styr, around Rovna, while the Eighth was to gather
around Proskarov, the two together holding the line from the Styr to the Dniester.
The di&erences in plans consisted of the intended locality of the Fourth Army under General Anton von
Saltza. ‘Plan G (Germany)’ called for the deployment of Fourth Army to Mitau, between the Düna and
the Niemen, for operafions against East Prussia. ‘Plan A (Austria-Hungary)’ called for the transference of
Fourth Army to the south, taking up posifion between the Vistula and the Bug between Ivangorod and
Chelm to parficipate in acfions against Austria in Galicia.
What should be readily apparent from all of this, with the visual aid of the map, is that the Russians
mobilised far to the east of their actual forward fronfier. Instead of deploying around Lodsch or
Tschenstochau for operafions against Silesia, West Prussia, or Cracow, the Russians pulled back
eastwards to the right bank of the Vistula.
At 3rst glance this would appear strange considering that Russian forces concentrated around
Tschenstochau could strike either the industries of Silesia in Germany, or push towards the Moravian
Gate to pierce Austria’s mountain defences and march on Vienna. Russians around Lodsch could push
north to capture Danzig and the Vistula delta, or advance west towards Posen and the old fortress of
Küstrin on the Warthe, near its juncfion with the Oder, where a young Frederick the Great was once held
prisoner by his angry father, not far beyond which lies the German capital of Berlin.
But one must take into considerafion the long projecfing arms of the Austrian and German fronfiers. The
salient of East Prussia juCed out well over two-hundred miles east of Kalisch, close to the border of
Silesia and Russian Poland, to the lower current of the Niemen on the border of Lithuania. Austrian
territory in Lodomeria and the Bukovina extended even farther east, about another one-hundred miles,
to the Sbrusch which formed the border between Lodomeria and Ukraine, a4erwards delineafing the
border between Poland and the Soviet Union in the interwar years.
As such, the Russians could not risk advancing westward while German and Austrian forces could be
deployed so far to the east on their Janks and rear. The Russians quite wisely decided to abandon the
Polish salient depicted on map two, in order to clear the Austrians out of Galicia and the Germans out of
East Prussia before proceeding westwards. That they were able to do this was because Russia, as can be
seen from map one, had plenty of space to spare. The loss of Poland west and south of the Vistula would
not have been fatal by any means, it was a loss Russia could a&ord. Russia was, however, to deviate from
this well-considered strategy for various reasons which we shall discuss later.
On the other side of the lines, Germany’s ‘Schlie&en Plan’ called for the deployment of all but one army,
