________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
HBS Professor Timothy Luehrman and HBS MBA Heide Abelli prepared this case solely as a basis for class discussion and not as an
endorsement, a source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management. This case, though based on real events, is
fictionalized, and any resemblance to actual persons or entities is coincidental. There are occasional references to actual companies in the
narration.
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TIMOTHY LUEHRMAN
HEIDE ABELLI
New Heritage Doll Company:
Capital Budgeting
In mid-September of 2010, Emily Harris, vice president of New Heritage Doll Company’s
production division, was weighing project proposals for the company’s upcoming capital budgeting
meetings in October. Two proposals stood out based on their potential to strengthen the division’s
innovative product lines and drive future growth. However, due to constraints on financial and
managerial resources, Harris knew it was possible that the firm’s capital budgeting committee would
decline to approve both projects. She also knew that New Heritage’s licensing and retail divisions
would promote compelling projects of their own. Consequently, Harris had to be prepared to
recommend one of her projects over the other.
The Doll Industry
Revenues in the U.S. toy and game industry totaled $42 billion in 2008 and were projected to
increase by 4.6% per year to $52.5 billion by 2013. The market was divided into two broad segments:
video games (48%) and traditional toys and games (52%). The second segment was further divided
into infant/preschool toys (14.5%), dolls (14.1%), outdoor & sports toys (12.3%), and other toys &
games (59.1%) including arts and crafts, plush toys, action figures, vehicles, and youth electronics.
The U.S. market for toys and games was dominated by large global enterprises that enjoyed
economies of scale in design, production, and distribution. Revenues were highly seasonal; the
largest selling season in the United States coincided with the winter holiday period.
Within the toy and game segment, U.S. retail sales of dolls totaled $3.1 billion in 2008 and were
projected to grow by 3% per year to $3.6 billion by 2013. The doll category included large, soft, and
mini dolls, as well as doll clothing and other accessories. The phenomenon of “age compression”—
the tendency of younger children to acquire dolls that had traditionally been designed for older
girls—reduced growth in the “baby-doll” sub-segment. Competition among doll producers was
vigorous, as a small number of large producers targeted similar demographics and marketed their
dolls through the same media. Lasting franchise value for a branded line of dolls was rare; the
enormous success of Barbie® dolls was an obvious exception. More recently and on a much smaller
scale, New Heritage also had created a durable franchise for its line of heirloom dolls. But the
popularity of most doll lines waned after a few years.
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SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
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