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Tesla Motors in 2018: Will the New
Model 3 Save the Company?
Arthur A. Thompson
The University of Alabama
Tesla Motors began assembling the first mod-
els of its new “affordably-priced” entry-level
Model 3 electric car in May 2017 and delivered
the first units the last week of July, with a goal of
gradually ramping up production to a total of 1,500
units by the end of September. The first production
vehicles, delivered to employees who had placed pre-
production reservations over a year earlier, were pre-
configured with rear-wheel drive and a long-range
battery; had a range of 310 miles and 0 to 60 mph
acceleration time of 5.1 seconds; and a sticker price
starting at $44,000 with premium upgrades available
for an additional $5,000. Deliveries of the standard
Model 3, with a base price of $35,000, 220 miles of
range, and a 0 to 60 mph acceleration time of 5.6 sec-
onds, were expected to begin in the United States in
November 2017. Dual motor all-wheel drive configu-
rations were scheduled to be available in early 2018.
Plans called for international deliveries of the Model
3 to begin in late 2018, contingent upon regulatory
approvals, starting with left-hand drive markets and
followed by right-hand drive markets in 2019.
Tesla had unveiled six drivable prototypes of the
Model 3 for public viewing and a limited number of
test drives on the evening of March 31, 2016. Buyer
reaction was overwhelmingly positive. Over the next
two weeks, some 350,000 individuals paid a $1,000
deposit to reserve a place in line to obtain a Model 3;
reportedly, the number of reservations grew to nearly
400,000 units over the next several months. Because
of the tremendous amount of interest in the Model
3, Tesla Chairman and CEO Elon Musk announced
in May 2016 that Tesla was advancing its schedule to
begin producing the Model 3 from late 2017 to mid-
2017 and further that it was going to accelerate its
efforts to expand production capacity of the Model
3, with a goal of getting to a production run rate of
500,000 units annually by year-end 2018 instead of
year-end 2020.
In early August 2017, in a letter updating share-
holders on the company’s second quarter 2017
results, Musk said:
Based on our preparedness at this time, we are confi-
dent we can produce just over 1,500 [Model 3] vehicles
in Q3 and achieve a run rate of 5,000 vehicles per week
by the end of 2017. We also continue to plan on increas-
ing Model 3 production to 10,000 vehicles per week at
some point in 2018.1
But in his third quarter 2017 update on
November 1, 2017, Musk related a host of produc-
tion bottlenecks and challenges that were blocking
the ramp-up of Model 3 production and delaying
deliveries, saying, “this makes it difficult to predict
exactly how long it will take for all bottlenecks to be
cleared or when new ones will appear. Based on what
we know now, we currently expect to achieve a pro-
duction rate of 5,000 Model 3 vehicles per week by
late Q1 2018.”2
But Tesla’s “production hell” with the Model 3
continued to haunt the company in early 2018. Many
analysts believed Tesla’s problems stemmed from
having taken huge shortcuts in the parts approval
process, production line validation, and full beta test-
ing of the Model 3 in order to begin early assembly
and production ramp-up. There were other reasons,
including ongoing parts bottlenecks and inconsis-
tent manufacturing quality. Production line employ-
ees interviewed by reporters indicated significant
CASE 18
Copyright ©2019 by Arthur A. Thompson. All rights reserved.
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C-192 PART 2 Cases in Crafting and Executing Strategy
numbers of units coming off the assembly line had
quality problems involving malfunctioning parts/
components and/or faulty installation issues that
required reworking. A big parking lot just outside the
assembly plant in Fremont, California, was said to be
full of Model 3s awaiting corrective attention; a few
were even being junked because of the high cost of
restoring them to a condition that would pass final
pre-delivery inspection. On February 7, 2018, Musk
reported:
We continue to target weekly Model 3 production rates
of 2,500 by the end of Q1 and 5,000 by the end of Q2.
It is important to note that while these are the levels
we are focused on hitting and we have plans in place to
achieve them, our prior experience on the Model 3 ramp
has demonstrated the difficulty of accurately forecasting
specific production rates at specific points in time. What
we can say with confidence is that we are taking many
actions to systematically address bottlenecks and add
capacity in places like the battery module line where we
have experienced constraints, and these actions should
result in our production rate significantly increasing dur–
ing the rest of Q1 and through Q2.
Despite the delays that we experienced in our pro-
duction ramp, Model 3 net reservations remained stable
in Q4. In recent weeks, they have continued to grow as
Model 3 has arrived in select Tesla stores and received
numerous positive reviews, including Automobile maga-
zine’s 2018 Design of the Year award.3
A week or so later, Tesla shut down the Model 3
assembly line for four days to address some of the
assembly problems being encountered. Nonetheless,
in early March 2018, there were reports from mul-
tiple sources that Tesla had not been able to consis-
tently achieve a production run rate of 800 units per
week. So Musk’s target of a weekly production rate
of 2,500 Models 3 by the end of March seemed very
much in jeopardy.
In addition, there were accumulating reports
from the owners of Model 3s relating to touch–
screen issues—one related to the audio system vol–
ume suddenly blasting higher without the screen
having been touched; another related to drivers
returning to their parked Model 3 and discovering
the touchscreen on and the audio sound blaring;
still another related to “phantom” inputs along the
edges of the touchscreen when certain apps were
opened. In some instances, Tesla had replaced the
touchscreens; in others, it promised a software solu–
tion would soon be forthcoming. A second reported
problem, in which the battery capacity decreased
noticeably while the car was parked in the sun on
a hot day for several hours, had been reported by a
number of Model 3 owners and, to a lesser extent,
by a few Model S and Model X owners. It appeared
that battery drain problems often occurred in Model
3 vehicles experiencing touchscreen issues. A cou–
ple of Model 3 owners with technical backgrounds
had speculated the problem related to touchscreens
being mounted on a large metal pedestal such that
large temperature differentials between a vehicle’s
hot interior and its cooler exterior caused the touch–
screen and plastic touchpad to warp and produce
other anomalies as the metal pedestal absorbed heat
from inside the vehicle. As of March 27, 2018, the
cause had not been pinpointed, but if the problem
did relate to a faulty pedestal design, then correct–
ing the design problem could cause further delays in
ramping up Model 3 production and drive up war–
ranty costs for Model 3s already delivered. During
the last week of March, Elon Musk tweeted that he
had taken over the role of supervising Model 3 pro–
duction for the time being.
The first week of April 2018, Tesla reported that it
produced 34,494 vehicles in the first quarter of 2018.
Tesla’s Q1 deliveries were 29,980 vehicles, of which
11,730 were Model S; 10,070, were Model X; and
8,180 were Model 3; as of March 31, 4,060 Model S
and Model X vehicles and 2,040 Model 3 vehicles
were in transit to customers. Tesla also reported that
after shifting some production resources away from
Model S and Model X production over to production
and assembly of the Model 3 during the last week of
March, it was able to produce 2,020 Models 3s in the
last seven days leading up to April 3. In its produc-
tion and delivery announcement, the company fur-
ther said:
Given the progress made thus far and upcoming actions
for further capacity improvement, we expect that the
Model 3 production rate will climb rapidly through Q2.
Tesla continues to target a production rate of approxi-
mately 5,000 units per week in about three months.
Finally, we would like to share two additional points
about Model 3:
• The quality of Model 3 coming out of production is
at the highest level we have seen across all our prod-
ucts. This is reflected in the overwhelming delight
experienced by our customers with their Model 3s.
Our initial customer satisfaction score for Model
3 quality is above 93 percent, which is the highest
score in Tesla’s history.
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CAse 18 Tesla Motors in 2018: Will the New Model 3 Save the Company? C-193
features. Retail sticker prices in 2018 ranged from a
base price of $80,700 to $97,000 for a well-equipped
Model X to $140,000 for a fully loaded model. Both
the Model S and Model X were being sold in North
America, Europe, and Asia in 2017 and 2018.
The Model S was the most-awarded car of
2013, including Motor Trend’s 2013 Car of the Year
award and Automobile magazine’s 2013 Car of the
Year award. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NTSHA) in 2013, 2014, and 2015
awarded the Tesla Model S a 5-star safety rating, both
overall and in every subcategory (a score achieved
by approximately 1 percent of all cars tested by
the NHTSA). Consumer Reports gave the Model S
a score of 99 out of 100 points in 2013, 2014, and
2015, saying it was “better than anything we’ve ever
tested.” However, the Tesla Model S did not make the
Consumer Reports list of the “10 Top Picks” in 2016,
2017, and 2018, but the Model S did earn a perfect
100 score on the 2018 road test drive.
The sleek styling and politically correct power
source of Tesla’s Model S and Model X were thought
to explain why thousands of wealthy individuals in
countries where the two models were being sold—
anxious to be a part of the migration from gasoline-
powered vehicles to electric-powered vehicles and to
publicly display support for a cleaner environment—
had become early purchasers and advocates for
Tesla’s vehicles. Indeed, word-of-mouth praise among
current owners and glowing articles in the media
were so pervasive that Tesla had not yet spent any
money on advertising to boost customer traffic in its
showrooms. In a presentation to investors, a Tesla
officer said “Tesla owners are our best salespeople.”5
As Tesla’s current chairman and CEO, Elon
Musk’s strategic vision for the automotive segment
of Tesla’s operations featured three major elements:
1 . Bring a full-range of affordable electric-powered
vehicles to market and become the world’s foremost
manufacturer of premium quality, high- performance
electric vehicles.
2. Convince motor vehicle owners worldwide that
electric-powered motor vehicles were an appealing
alternative to gasoline-powered vehicles.
3. Accelerate the world’s transition from carbon-
producing, gasoline-powered motor vehicles to
zero emission electric vehicles.
At one point, Musk’s stated near-term strate-
gic objective was for Tesla to achieve sales of about
• Net Model 3 reservations remained stable through Q1.
The reasons for order cancellation are almost entirely
due to delays in production in general and delays in
availability of certain planned options, particularly
dual motor AWD and the smaller battery pack.4
Despite the difficulties being experienced with
the Model 3, production and sales of the company’s
trailblazing Model S sedan (introduced in 2012) and
Model X sports utility vehicle (introduced in late
2015) were proceeding largely on plan. Combined
sales of these two models reached nearly 101,500
units in 2017 (see Exhibit 1). The Model S was a fully
electric, four-door, five-passenger luxury sedan with
an all-glass panoramic roof, high definition backup
camera, a 17-inch touchscreen that controlled most
of the car’s functions, keyless entry, xenon head-
lights, dual USB ports, tire pressure monitoring, and
numerous other features that were standard in most
luxury vehicles. The cheapest Model S had a base
price of $75,700 in 2018 and, when equipped with
options frequented selected by customers, carried a
retail sticker price ranging from $95,000 to $136,000.
The Model X was the longest range all-electric pro-
duction sport utility vehicle in the world; it could seat
up to seven adults and incorporated a unique falcon
wing door system for easy access to the second and
third seating rows. The Model X had an all-wheel
drive dual motor system and autopilot capabilities,
along with a full assortment of standard and optional
EXHIBIT 1 Tesla’s Deliveries of the
Model s, Model X, and
Model 3 to Customers, 2012
through the First Quarter
of 2018
Period Model S
Deliveries
ModelS plus
Model X
Deliveries
Model 3
Deliveries
2012 2,653
2013 22,477
2014 31,655
2015 50,332
2016 76,230
2017 101,420 1,734
Q1 2018 21,815 8,182
Source: Company 10K reports and press releases.
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C-194 PART 2 Cases in Crafting and Executing Strategy
enable them to compete head-on with the Model S,
Model X, and Model 3. Several vehicle makers were
also pursuing the development of electric-powered
semi trucks for commercial uses.
3. Tesla had yet to prove it could boost operating
efficiency and lower costs enough to be both
price competitive and attractively profitable in
producing and marketing its vehicle models. It
reported both a loss from operations and a net
loss each of the past five years, despite growing
its automotive sales and leasing revenues from
$2.61 billion in 2013 to $9.64 billion in 2017—see
Exhibit 2. In February 2018, the company did say
it expected to generate a positive quarterly oper–
ating income before the end of 2018 (but not a
positive operating income for the year). While
Tesla’s ongoing operating losses and net losses
were partly, or perhaps largely, due to the sizable
new product development costs associated with
the Model X and Model 3 and to the required
accounting treatments for both leased vehicles
and Tesla’s generous stock compensation plan, it
was nonetheless disconcerting that Tesla’s oper–
ating loss of $1.63 billion in 2017 was the largest
in the company’s history—an outcome that had to
be reversed soon. The extent of Tesla’s growing
operating losses was illustrated by the fact that in
the first quarter of 2017 General Motors reported
an operating profit of $1,418 for every vehicle it
sold around the world and Ford’s reported oper–
ating profit per vehicle sold was $1,174—in com–
parison, Tesla’s operating profit per vehicle was
−$15,855.6
A possible fourth challenge seemed to be gath-
ering steam on the Tesla message boards. People
with Model 3 reservations who, because of all the
production problems and delivery delays they had
been hearing about, had posted concerns about tak–
ing delivery of the Model 3 they had ordered. In
one anecdotal case, a poster told of when he went
to the Tesla delivery location to take delivery of a
black Model 3, he could clearly see paint swirls on
the hood; when told by the delivery person that the
service department had done the best job it could to
buff out the swirls and that the car would be sold
“as is,” the poster refused delivery. But after further
conversation with the delivery person he said he
then agreed to pay an extra $1,000 for a red Model 3
500,000 electric vehicles annually by year-end 2018,
but the difficulties in ramping up production of the
Model 3 has pushed achievement of this objective out
to the end of 2019 at the earliest and more probably
the end of 2020, assuming sales of the Model 3 took
off as expected. Musk planned for the company to
begin deliveries of the Tesla Semi truck in late 2019
and a new version of the Tesla Roadster in 2020. His
strategic intent was for Tesla to be the world’s big-
gest and most highly-regarded producer of electric-
powered motor vehicles, dramatically increasing the
share of electric vehicles on roads across the world
and causing global use of gasoline-powered motor
vehicles to fall into permanent long-term decline.
At its core, therefore, Tesla’s strategy was aimed
squarely at utilizing the company’s battery and elec-
tric drivetrain technology to disrupt the world auto-
motive industry in ways that were sweeping and
transformative. If Tesla’s strategy proved to be as suc-
cessful as Elon Musk believed it would be, industry
observers expected that the Tesla’s competitive posi-
tion and market standing vis-à-vis the world’s best-
known automotive manufacturers would be vastly
stronger in 2025 than it was in 2018.
But in 2018 there were three challenges with the
potential to imperil Musk’s vision for Tesla Motors:
1 . Gasoline prices across much of the world had
dropped significantly from 2015 to early 2017 and
were expected by many knowledgeable observ–
ers to remain permanently “low” (below $80 or
even lower) because the abundance of shale oil
and the sharply-lower costs of extracting oil from
shale deposits. Affordable gasoline prices made
the purchase of electric vehicles less attractive,
given that (1) electric vehicles were higher priced
than vehicles with gasoline engines, (2) electric
vehicles so far were limited to an upper range of
about 300 miles on a single battery charge, and
(3) new vehicles powered by gasoline engines were
getting more miles per gallon (due to government-
mandated mileage-efficiency requirements).
2. Tesla was facing the prospect of much more formida–
ble competition from virtually all of the world’s major
motor vehicle manufacturers (BMW, Mercedes,
Jaguar, Volkswagen-Audi, Toyota, Honda, Nissan,
General Motors, and Ford) that were rushing to
introduce affordable and high-end electric vehicles
with features and engine configurations that would
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CAse 18 Tesla Motors in 2018: Will the New Model 3 Save the Company? C-195
positive in Q3 and Q4.”7 The company also reported
significant increases in energy storage deployments
for utilities and other commercial enterprises and
record deliveries of Powerwall systems for residences,
resulting in Q1 revenues for energy generation and
storage of $410.0 million, versus $213.9 million in
the first quarter of 2017. Musk believed the company
would generate positive cash in Q3 and Q4.
On the negative side, however, Tesla reported its
largest quarterly net loss ever—$784.6 million, a loss
from operations of $597.0 million, a negative cash flow
from operations of $398.4 million, and a net decrease
in cash and cash equivalents of $745.3 million. It was
unclear whether, given expected capital expenditures
of almost $3 billion, the company would need to raise
additional capital to get through the year; the com–
pany ended Q1 with a cash balance of $2.67 billion.
Despite all the uncertainties, in May 2018 Musk had
pledged no capital raise would be needed in 2018.
This pledge baffled many Wall Street analysts, most
all of the company’s critics and skeptics, and other
keen observers because Musk, during the May 2,
2018 conference call with analysts to discuss Tesla’s
Q1 2018 financial results, expressed his appreciation
to the Chinese government for its announcement that
foreign companies would henceforth be allowed to
have 100 percent ownership of manufacturing facili–
ties in China and said Tesla could have a Gigafactory
capable of vehicle production in China “not later
than the fourth quarter” of 2018.8
Exhibit 2 presents selected financial statement
data for Tesla for 2013 through2017.
COMPANY BACKGROUND
Tesla Motors was incorporated in July 2003 by
Martin Eberhard and Marc Tarpenning, two Silicon
Valley engineers who believed it was feasible to pro-
duce an “awesome” electric vehicle. Tesla’s name-
sake was the genius Nikola Tesla (1856–1943),
an electrical engineer and scientist known for his
impressive inventions (of which more than 700
were patented) and his contributions to the design
of modern alternating-current (AC) power transmis-
sion systems and electric motors. Tesla’s first vehicle,
the Tesla Roadster (an all-electric sports car) intro-
duced in early 2008, was powered by an AC motor
that descended directly from Nikola Tesla’s original
1882 design.
after being promised by the delivery person it would
be ready for pickup in one week—after 10 days, the
poster said he had received no notification to come
pick up the red Model 3. There were also message
board posts from some Model S and Model X own-
ers about the repair problems they were experiencing
with their vehicles. There was one extreme example
where an unhappy Model S owner reported having to
take his vehicle to the Tesla service center for repairs
six times in the past five months. Then in late March
2018 Tesla announced it was recalling about 123,000
Model S sedans globally after discovering that cer-
tain corroding bolts in cold weather climates could
lead to a power-steering failure.
However, when Tesla announced its finan-
cial and operating results for the first quarter of
2018 ending March 31, the outcomes were in some
respects better than many investors and Wall Street
analysts expected. Tesla reported delivery of 8,182
Model 3s during the quarter and after having imple-
mented numerous adjustments in assembly methods
and correcting problems with faulty and improperly
designed parts it was now able to sustain a produc-
tion rate of 3,000 Model 3s per week. Elon Musk said
that continued refinements of the assembly process
and improved operational uptime of the associated
machinery should lead to a production rate of “well
over 5,000” vehicles per week by the end of June or
beginning of July. Musk admitted that he had been
wrong in mandating use of so many robots along
the assembly line, and that now the assembly line
had been and was still being greatly simplified, with
more use being made of semi-automated and manual
assembly to perform certain tasks until the com-
pany had enough time to perfect the use of robots
and enable full automation to resume. Musk con-
fidently predicted that the Model 3 would become
the best-selling medium-sized premium sedan in the
United States before year end—the company had over
450,000 Model 3 reservations at the end of Quarter
1. Musk indicated that if Tesla executed according to
plan the company would achieve positive cash flows
and positive net income (excluding non-cash stock–
based compensation) in both the third and fourth
quarters of 2018. According to Musk, this was “pri-
marily based on our ability to reach Model 3 pro-
duction volume of 5,000 units per week and to grow
Model 3 gross margin from slightly negative in Q1
2018 to close to breakeven in Q2 and then to highly
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C-196 PART 2 Cases in Crafting and Executing Strategy
EXHIBIT 2 selected Financial Data for Tesla, Inc., 2013–2017 (in millions, except
share and per share data)
Years Ended December 31
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013
Income Statement Data:
Revenues:
Automotive sales $ 8,534.8 $ $5,589.0 $ 3,431.6 $ 2,874.4 $ 1,921.9
Automotive leasing 1,106.5 761.8 309.4 132.6
Total automotive revenues 9,641.3 6,350.8 3,741.0 3,741.0
Energy generation and storage 1,116.3 181.4 14.5 4.2
Services and other 1,001.2 468.0 290.6 191.3 91.6
Total revenues 11,758.8 7,000.1 4,046.0 3,198.4 2,013.5
Cost of revenues:
Automotive sales 6,724.5 4,268.1 2,639.9 2,058.3 1,483.3
Automotive leasing 708.2 482.0 183.4 87.4
Total automotive cost of revenues 7,432.7 4,750.1 2,823.3 2,145.7
Energy generation and storage 874.5 178.3 12.3 4.0
Services and other 1,229.0 472.5 286.9 166.9 73.9
Total cost of revenues 9,536.3 5,400.9 3,122.5 2,316.7 1,557.2
Gross profit (loss) 2,222.5 1,599.3 923.5 881.7 456.3
Operating expenses:
Research and development 1,378.1 834.4 717.9 464.7 232.0
Selling, general and administrative 2,476.5 1,432.2 922.2 603.7 285.6
Total operating expenses 3.854.6 2,266.6 1,640.1 1,068.4 517.5
Loss from operations (1,632.1) (667.3) (716.6) (186.7) (61.3)
Interest income 19.7 8.5 1.5 1,126 189
Interest expense (471.3) (198.8) (118.9) (100.9 (32.9
Other income (expense), net (125.4) 111.3 (41.7) 1.8 22.6
Loss before income taxes (2,209.0) (875,624) (875.6) (284.6) (71.4)
Provision for income taxes 31.5 13,039 13.3 9.4 2.6
Net loss $ (2,240.6) $ (773.0) $ (888.7) $ (294.0) $ (74.0)
Net loss attributable to noncontrolling
interests and subsidiaries
(279.1) (98.1) — — —
Net loss attributable to common
shareholders
$ (1,961.4) (674.9) $ (888.7) $ (294.0) $ (74.0)
Net loss per share of common stock,
basic and diluted
$ (11.83) $ (4.68) $ (6.93) $ (2.36) $ (0.62)
Weighted average shares used in
computing net loss per share of
common stock, basic and diluted
165.8 144.2 128.2 124.5 119.4
Balance Sheet Data:
Cash and cash equivalents $ 3,367.9 $ 1,196,908 $ 1,196.9 $ 1,905.7 $ 845.9
Inventory 2,263.5 2,067.5 1,277.8 953.7 340.4
Total current assets 6,570.5 6,259.8 2,791.4 3,198.7 1,265.9
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CAse 18 Tesla Motors in 2018: Will the New Model 3 Save the Company? C-197
S and $100 million for a powertrain manufacturing
plant employing about 650 people that would supply
all-electric powertrain solutions to other automakers
and help accelerate the availability of relatively low-
cost, mass-market electric vehicles.
In June 2010, Tesla Motors became a public com–
Financing Early Operations
Eberhard and Tarpenning financed the company
until Tesla’s first round of investor funding in
February 2004. Elon Musk contributed $6.35 million
of the $6.5 million in initial funding and, as the
Property, plant, and equipment, net 10,027.5 5,983.0 3,403.3 1,829.3 738.5
Total assets 28,655.4 22,644.1 8,092.5 5,849.3 2,416.9
Total current liabilities 7,674.7 5,827.0 2,816.3 2,107.2 675.2
Long-term debt and capital leases, net of
current portion
9,415.7 5,860.0 2,040.4 1,818.8 599.0
Total stockholders’ equity 4,237.2 4,752.9 1,088.9 911.7 667.1
Cash Flow Data:
Cash flows from operating activities $ (2,240.6) $ (773.0) $ (888.7) $ (57.3) $ 263.8
Proceeds from issuance of common
stock in public offerings
400.2 1,701.7 730.0 — 360.0
Purchases of property and equipment
excluding capital leases
(3,414.8) (1,280.8) (1,634.9 (970.0) (264.2)
Net cash used in investing activities (4,419.0) (1,416.4) (1,673.6) (990.4 (249.4)
Net cash provided by financing activities 4,414.9 3,744.0 1,523.5 2,143.1 635.4
Sources: Company 10-K reports for 2014, 2015, and 2017.
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