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Comment on the following argument:
“More equity might increase the stability of banks. At the same time, however,
it would restrict their ability to provide loans to the rest of the economy. This
reduces growth and has negative effects for all.”
Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank (November 20, 2009, interview)
Response
In retrospect, the period from 2007 to 2009 has witnessed one of the most tremendous
financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 2007, it began with the rise
of house price in the U.S.A, and developed into a global banking crisis when the
largest investment bank – Lehman Brothers failed to continue operating and collapsed
on September, 2008. The whole crisis can be summarized in the securitization food
chain that many financial institutions were involved in. The first step in the chain
began with the simple process of granting of mortgage loans to consumers at
commercial banks. For the lenders, mortgage notes were considered as assets, but
these assets clearly bore counterparty risk: the borrower could be unable to repay the
loan. The banks, encouraged by new capital ratio requirements from the U.S.
government and the Basel II Accord, sought ways to sell notes for cash. They decided
to repackage those loans into the form of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and
pass on the debt to the investment banks. This was the second link in the securitization
chain. This spread the risk of default around, similar to how standard portfolio
diversification works. Subsequently, the investment banks resold these CDOs to
people or mutual funds who want to invest on it. The investors would receive a
proportionate amount of the mortgage payments as a return on investment, this is the
last part of the chain. The whole system seemed to be operating well, but things started
to go wrong. Due to the steady increase of house price, commercial banks started to
make subprime mortgages, and the probability of failure involved in those lendings
became higher and higher. And to made those CDOs become more attractive to
investors, investment banks pay money to let the rating agencies to put high ratings on
those securities, while they started to buy credit default swaps (CDSs) for the
securities that they sold to investors. When the bursting of housing bubble happened,
the value of these derivatives plummeted, damaging financial institutions globally,
including banks. During this catastrophe, a great number of banks collapsed because