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ORiON, Vol. 17, No. 1/2, pp. 29-54 ISSN 0259-191-X
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND RISK
ROB THOMSON
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
South Africa
ABSTRACT
Financial economists and actuaries do not always talk the same language. One particular
difference of concern to actuaries is the method of treatment (or non-treatment) of the
liabilities of an investor in the portfolio selection problem. Another difference relates to the
way in which liabilities are valued. In this paper, these differences are discussed and possible
ways forward are suggested.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the development of portfolio theory, Markowitz (1952, 1959) made no reference to the
liabilities of the investor. The reasons were presumably twofold: in the first place, it could be
assumed that a liability was merely a short position in one of the assets in the opportunity set,
and secondly it could be assumed that that asset, like all the others in that set, was tradable.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Tobin, 1958; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965;
Mossin, 1966) was also developed without reference to the liabilities of investors, mainly
because its authors were concerned with capital assets (i.e. assets in non-zero supply in the
economy) or at least shares and other financial instruments providing entitlement to the
proceeds of such assets. The use of the CAPM to define a ‘market price of risk’ resulted in a
concept of risk without reference to the investor’s liabilities. Subsequent measures of risk such
as Sharpe’s (1966) measure, Treynor’s (1966) measure, Jensens (1968, 1969) measure and the
appraisal ratio (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1996: 780) follow suit.
Borch (1990) seeks to bridge the gap between financial economists and actuaries with regard
to problems related to insurance. But his interest in the portfolio selection problem relates
more to insurance and reinsurance portfolios than to capital asset portfolios. And his interest
30
in the pricing of liabilities relates more to the development of explanatory models of market
prices than to the determination of market-based values for complex portfolios of liabilities
that are not explicitly priced in the market.
This paper discusses the importance of the liabilities of an investor in the discussion of risk,
as well as the quantification of risk for the purposes of the valuation of the liabilities. Section
2 considers the former matter from the perspective of financial economics and section 3 from
the point of view of fund management. Section 4 discusses the use of benchmark portfolios
based on asset and liability modelling. Section 5 compares this approach with that of the
CAPM. In section 6, consideration is given to the determination of the value of the liabilities.
In order to justify reference to the liabilities of the financial institution, as opposed to the
preferences of prospective beneficiaries, in the asset allocation problem, the principal-agent
problem is discussed in section 7, as well as the trusteeship function. Section 8 concludes.
2. THE PLACE OF LIABILITIES IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
Both portfolio theory and the CAPM are based on the expected utility theory of Von
Neumann & Morgenstern (1947). Expected utility theory, in turn, is based on the distribution
of the outcomes and the utility function of the decision-maker. Now suppose, for simplicity,
that the decision-maker is an investor with assets and liabilities maturing at a specified time
horizon. It must be assumed that the decision-maker will be indifferent between an extra rand
of asset proceeds and one rand less of liability payments at the time horizon. If the future
proceeds of assets available to the decision-maker are correlated with the future payments for
which it will become liable, it is the net future proceeds whose distribution must be
considered. All else being equal, if the investor invests in assets that are positively correlated
with its liabilities, the risks of low net proceeds at the time horizon will be reduced and vice
versa. Conversely, if the investor invests part of its wealth in assets that are positively
correlated with its other assets, the risks of low proceeds at the time horizon are increased and
vice versa. And indeed, these results follow from portfolio theory.
Suppose, for example, that an investor has fixed exposure k (which may be negative) to
security 1, and
α
l and (1
α
)l to securities 2 and 3 respectively, where k and l (> 0) are
specified constants and
α
is the decision variable. Suppose that the values of the securities at
the time horizon are jointly distributed with mean
31
=
3
2
1
µ
µ
µ
µ
and covariance matrix
=Σ
333231
232221
131211
σσσ
σσσ
σσσ
.
Suppose also that the investor has a quadratic utility function.
Then it may be shown that the value of
α
that maximises the investor’s expected utility is
)( 12131
σ
σ
µ
α
+
+
=
ckba
where a, b and c are functions of 33232232 ,,,,
σ
σ
σ
µ
µ
, and c > 0.
Thus, if k is positive (so that security 1 is an asset), then the optimal exposure to security 2
increases as the covariance of the values of securities 1 and 3 increases relative to that of
securities 1 and 2, and vice versa. If k is negative (so that security 1 is a liability) then the
converse holds.
The assumption of quadratic utility is used to simplify the above analysis. Utility functions of
higher order would introduce higher moments than covariances into the relationships
involved. But the above analysis is sufficient to show that, in general, it is the expected utility
of the entire net wealth of the decision-maker that must be maximised, not the expected utility
of that portion of the decision-maker’s gross wealth which has been allocated to a particular
investment manager.
Investment practitioners frequently abuse the theory by ignoring investors’ liabilities.
Typically, linked internal rates of return on investments are determined for investment
performance measurement and compared either with the return on an appropriate index or
with the returns achieved by other investment managers. (Adams, 1989: 310-6; Bodie, Kane
& Marcus, 1996: 778) These comparisons are invariably made without reference to the
investors’ liabilities. Even where risk-adjusted investment returns are compared, liabilities are
typically ignored. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 1996: 779-88) Academics and other researchers
have followed suit (e.g., in South Africa, Patrick & Ward, 1996 and Swart, 1999).
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Adams (1989: 9) distinguishes between financial economists’ and actuaries’ definitions of
risk. Whereas a financial economist, he suggests, might define risk to be ‘uncertainty of future
returns’ on investments, an actuary would define it with reference to the investor’s ‘ability to
meet liabilities when they fall due’. This distinction may be true in practice, but if so it is not
portfolio theory that is at fault. Thomson (1998) defended the use of expected utility theory
for normative purposes in the context of defined-contribution retirement funds. Although
mean-variance analysis has its faults—and the necessary caveats are clearly stated and
discussed in Markowitz (1959)—it is still useful as a first approximation to the portfolio
selection problem, provided the liabilities of the investor are taken into account. The
necessary caveats were similarly stated by Sharpe (1964) with regard to the CAPM, but they
have been largely ignored by practitioners, despite numerous findings that the underlying
assumptions do not hold in practice. This matter is discussed further in section 5 below.
3. THE PLACE OF LIABILITIES IN FUND MANAGEMENT
In investment management parlance, ‘fund management’ refers only to the assets of a fund. In
practice the liabilities of a fund may be beyond the control even of the trustees, let alone the
investment managers. But this does not mean that the liabilities can be ignored in the
management of the assets.
Leibowitz (1987) introduces the concept of a ‘return on liabilities’, which can be calculated
retrospectively in much the same way as a return on assets. Whilst this concept has some
explanatory value, it does not mean anything on its own. It can be compared with the return
on assets, but without knowledge of the relative values of the assets and liabilities the net
effect is unclear. What is needed, therefore, is to focus on the surplus (i.e. the value of the
assets less the value of the liabilities) in monetary terms—in other words, on the net wealth of
the fund.
If an investor’s net wealth W(t) is positive at time t = 0 then its value at time t > 0 is a positive
linear function of the return I(t) earned up to that time; i.e.
)}(1){0()( tIWtW
+
=
.
Under these circumstances it would therefore be consistent with portfolio theory and the
CAPM to measure investment performance in terms of the returns earned on net wealth.
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However, contrary to the assumptions of portfolio theory and the CAPM, liabilities cannot be
regarded as short positions in tradable assets. Otherwise, investment managers could be given
control over the liabilities of investors as well as their assets, and financial institutions would
be unnecessary. In the first place, if a liability is transferred from the original counterparty to
another, the counterparty risks associated with the liability are changed, and the value of the
liability changes accordingly. For example, if a retirement fund transfers its liability for a
final-salary pension to a third party, the third party may be unable to meet the liability when it
becomes payable.
On the other hand, the moral hazard associated with the liability may increase enormously on
such transfer, thus increasing its value. This is particularly true where the moral hazard
associated with a particular counterparty is controlled by a convergence of interest between
the institution and that counterparty. For example, if a retirement fund transfers its liability for
a final-salary pension to a third party, the employer may substantially increase the employee’s
salary at the end of the employee’s career, thus increasing the value of the liability without
any cost to the employer. In this case the institution is the retirement fund and the
counterparty is the employer. The increase in the value of the liability arises because the
counterparty no longer has an interest in minimising the cost of funding the benefits.
In terms of the Pension Funds Act (Act no. 24 of 1956 as amended), a retirement fund
member may not cede or assign his or her rights to benefits from a fund, and a transfer of
liabilities from a retirement fund is subject to strict regulation.
Retirement funds may be able to insure some of their benefits specifically those for which
there is little or no moral hazard— but this leaves the core liabilities of a final-salary
retirement fund, namely the normal retirement benefits, uninsurable and untradable.
The liabilities of life offices are less circumscribed. Life offices are able to reinsure their
liabilities to a large extent. This means that, within the reinsurance market, they are tradable.
However, the reinsurance market is generally distinct from the securities markets. Although
reinsurers are increasingly providing products that modify the investment risks of insurers,
different managers are involved in the management of the assets of the life office and must be
separately mandated and measured.
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In retirement funds, thanks to the popularity of split funding, not only does an investment
manager not have control over the liabilities, it may not even have control over all the assets.
How, then, do we take cognisance of the entire net wealth of the fund in managing its risks?
4. BENCHMARK PORTFOLIOS BASED ON ASSET AND LIABILITY
MODELLING
In the light of the above considerations, it is therefore becoming increasingly widely
advocated that investment managers should be measured against a benchmark portfolio
constructed to reflect the liabilities of the investor. A revised regulation 28 has been drafted
by the Financial Services Board to allow for this process in terms of the Pension Funds Act.
And the Actuarial Society of South Africa is currently working on a new guidance note on
this subject for actuaries advising the trustees of retirement funds. One of the research
projects of the Actuarial Society relates to the capital adequacy requirements of South African
life offices. This project will necessitate the stochastic modelling of the assets and liabilities
so as to develop measures of capital adequacy.
Booth et al (1999: 98-103) trace the development of asset and liability modelling, which has
now become a standard method of optimising a portfolio in the presence of liabilities. The
optimisation problem was first set out by Wise (1984) and was further developed by Wilkie
(1985) and Sherris (1992).
In broad outline, the actuarial contribution to portfolio optimisation followed the portfolio
theory of Markowitz (op. cit.), but allowed explicitly for the investor’s liabilities. Initially, in
Wise and Wilkie (op. cit.), an efficient frontier was developed in mean-variance space defined
as the mean and variance of the surplus at a suitable time horizon. Panjer (1998: 397-405)
gives a modification of this approach, also in mean-variance space. Sherris (op. cit.)
subsequently generalised the problem beyond the constraints of mean-variance analysis.
This also permitted the use of non-quadratic utility functions and non-elliptical distributions
of returns on investments and growth of liabilities. Because the time horizons of investors
other than banks, general insurers and unit trusts typically extend over many years,
multivariate stochastic models of investment returns, and of variables (such as inflation rates)
driving investors’ liabilities, were developed. These include Wilkie’s (1986, 1995) and Smith’s
(1996) model, the TY model (Yakoubov, Teeger & Duval, 1999) and the Whitten & Thomas
35
(2000) model, all for the United Kingdom. Models developed for other countries include
Carter (1991) for Australia, Sharp (1994a, 1994b) and Deaves (1994) for Canada and
Thomson (1996) for South Africa. There is room for improvement in all the published models
to incorporate recent developments in modelling techniques. Numerous unpublished models
have also been developed in-house by commercial organisations.
Because of the complexity of the liabilities of long-term investors and of the stochastic
models, it is not generally possible to obtain solutions to the optimisation problem in closed
form. However, the models facilitate the generation of pseudo-random samples of the surplus
at an appropriate time horizon, which may be used to select portfolios (and other decision
variables) to maximise the expected utility of that surplus. In practice, the utility functions of
the investors (who may, for example, be a board of trustees1) is indeterminate. Under these
circumstances it may be necessary to produce an efficient frontier of the surplus at the time
horizon in mean-variance space (ignoring the effects of higher moments) and to present
alternative portfolios to the trustees along that frontier.
Since it is the trustees who must decide on the investment allocations, it is the trustees who
must define the objective function for the ALM, i.e. the surplus or funding ratio at a time