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The Application of the Rules of Warfare and Necessity
The means of warfare have changed significantly from just a decade ago and as the
means of warfare change, so too do the rules of war. The rules of war change not only with new
technology, but also with new enemies. Just as World War II was not subject to the chivalric
code, modern day warfare may be subject to new rules of engagement. The application of the
rules of warfare to previous conflicts is relatively simple, but the War on Terror is new and
uncharted territory creating a far more complex battlefield necessitating the reevaluation of the
application of the rules of warfare and the treatment of non-combatants.
We must first understand the conventions of war and when these conventions can be
voided before discussing their application. The distinction between combatants and
noncombatants plays a large role in the rules of war and the differentiation between legitimate
combat and inadmissible violence. Combatants are those who directly participate in combat or
support the war effort by providing supplies necessary for combat. “The relevant distinction is
not between those who work for the war effort and those who do not, but between those who
make what soldiers need to fight and those who make what they need to live” (Walzer 146). In
this same quote, Walzer distinguishes noncombatants as those that do not directly participate in
combat and only make things necessary for normal life like medical supplies and clothing.
This distinction between combatants and noncombatants has large implications on the
rules of warfare and what makes legitimate combat. “But it is the enterprise of their class, and
this fact radically distinguishes the individual soldier from the civilians he leaves behind” (144).
Becoming a participant in warfare means relinquishing some rights that come with being a
civilian, the greatest being he can now be “personally attacked only because he already is a
fighter” (145). The distinction of noncombatants also plays a large role in legitimate combat.
“The second principle of war convention is that noncombatants cannot be attacked at any time”
(151). Noncombatants cannot be attacked directly, but that is not to say that noncombatants
cannot become casualties indirectly.
The double effect serves to clarify this point. In order to perform an act that may result in
negative consequences, like the death of a noncombatant, it must meet four conditions. The act
must in itself be good, the direct effect of the act must be morally acceptable, the act must be
aimed at achieving the acceptable effect, and the good of the act must outweigh the negative
consequences. While seemingly sufficient, Walzer contends these conditions do not fully attend
to the rights of civilians. To satisfy this need, Walzer proposes the idea of double intention. “The
intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect… he seeks to
minimize it [evil effect], accepting the cost himself” (155). Not only must the act meet all four
