https://doi.org/10.1177/09539468211009755
Studies in Christian Ethics
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DOI: 10.1177/09539468211009755
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Accountability as a Virtue
Andrew Torrance
University of St Andrews, UK
Abstract
This opening article will offer a brief introduction to what it means to understand accountability
as a virtue. To do so, I first propose a definition of the condition of accountability, which I go
on to distinguish from responsibility. Based on this definition, I then present an account of the
corresponding virtue of accountability.
Keywords
accountability, human flourishing, responsibility, virtue
Introduction
Over the past few years of fraught politics, the word ‘accountability’ has risen to promi-
nence in the vocabulary of politicians. Without naming names, it has become common-
place for politicians on ‘the left’ to say that ‘there needs to be accountability’ when it
comes to the actions of politicians on ‘the right’ (and vice versa). By this, they tend to
mean something like ‘that politician needs to be punished for failing in their particular
role’. Consequently, the negative connotations of this word have come to the fore. More
than ever, accountability is perceived as a threat to the person who fails in their particular
role—‘If you fail, then you will be held accountable!’ Yet, as the articles in this sympo-
sium will seek to show, such a view of accountability neglects the more positive and,
indeed, virtuous ways to think about the nature of accountability.
So, what might a more positive view of accountability look like? Such a view focuses
on the way in which relationships of accountability can serve to upbuild persons rather
than threatening to tear them down. In the case of the aforementioned politicians, for
example, a positive view of accountability would focus on the ways in which the two
politicians could seek to build up one another by holding each other to a high standard
(albeit from their different sides). In such a relationship, accountability would not be
Corresponding author:
Andrew Torrance, University of St Andrews, St Mary’s College, South St, St Andrews, KY16 9JU, UK.
Email: abt3@st-andrews.ac.uk
1009755SCE0010.1177/09539468211009755Studies in Christian EthicsTorrance
research-article2021
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1. In the wider project out of which this symposium emerges, an interdisciplinary team of schol-
ars is investigating the broader significance of a positive view of accountability. In addition to
C. Stephen Evans, Brendan Case, and myself, the core project team includes social scientists
(Byron R. Johnson and Matt Bradshaw), a criminologist (Sung Joon Jang), two psychologists
(Charlotte vanOyen-Witvliet and Joseph Leman), a psychiatrist (John R. Peteet), and two
other philosophers (Robert C. Roberts and Brandon Rickabaugh). More information about
this project can be found at: https://www.livingaccountably.com.
something to avoid but something to embrace, insofar as it helps the politicians to grow
and flourish in their roles. While such a positive view of accountability may currently
be hard to imagine between politicians from opposing parties, it is not hard to find such
a view being represented in relationships between parents and children, teachers and
students, employees and supervisors, coaches and players, or sponsors and addicts. As
a number of scholars are currently arguing, there are many other areas that stand to
benefit enormously from a more positive view of accountability, such as criminal jus–
tice, mental health treatment and, as this symposium considers, Christian ethics and
moral theology.1
With its focus on Christian ethics and moral theology, this symposium will seek to
show that accountability to God and neighbour should be seen as an essential part of
human flourishing—of becoming all that God creates and calls humans to be. Furthermore,
this symposium will build a case for thinking about accountability as a virtue: one that
characterises the person who embraces being accountable to others and, in so doing,
fulfils their role in a relationship of accountability.
To introduce this symposium, I shall not offer a summary of the articles—I shall let
their abstracts do this. Rather, this article will introduce what it means to understand
accountability as a virtue. To do so, I begin by proposing a definition of the condition of
accountability. Based on this definition, I then present an account of the corresponding
virtue of accountability. Given how much the word ‘accountability’ is thrown around,
with little regard for its specific meaning, it is important to take the time to offer a precise
account of what we mean by accountability. Another thing to mention here is that while
the concept of accountability is increasingly common in discussions relating to Christian
ethics and moral theology, the word ‘accountability’ has only emerged in the last two
hundred years and has only risen to prominence in the last fifty years. During its emer-
gence, this word has received very little focused attention in the world of theology, and
so this symposium will hope to offer an initial contribution to addressing this lacuna.
The Condition of Accountability
One of the greatest contributors to human flourishing—to humans achieving their goals
in life—is the relationships we have with other persons who help us to develop and fulfil
a better account of ourselves, relative to our specific life goals and values. For this rea-
son, we often seek relationships with certain experts or authorities (e.g., teachers, psy-
chiatrists, religious leaders, etc.) who can provide insightful judgements into aspects of
who we are and who we should be, relative to certain aspects of our lives in this world.
Such relationships, however, are not necessarily voluntary. Our lives develop in
Torrance 3
relationships with persons who shape who we become in ways that are beyond our
immediate control (e.g., parents, caregivers and, generally, so many of the people who
we happen to encounter in our day-to-day lives). These relationships, we consider, can
be said to be characterised by accountability. What do I mean by this? Let me propose the
following broad definition of the condition of accountability.
Accountability (between persons): the condition of someone standing before another who has
authority to judge aspects of who that person is and should be in their role in a shared project:
a project that characterises the relationship between the two parties and their roles within it, but
which is specifically oriented towards a goal(s) of and/or for the one who is accountable.
To help us gain a better understanding of this concept, let us consider it in the context of
a student-professor relationship. According to this definition, we could say that a student
is accountable to a professor insofar as the professor has legitimate authority to judge
aspects of who a student is and should be relative to the shared project of learning, which
serves the academic goal(s) of the student. Or we could also say that the professor is
accountable to the student insofar as the student has legitimate authority to judge aspects
of who the professor is and should be relative to the shared project of teaching (e.g., by
filling out a module evaluation), thereby serving the vocational goal(s) of the professor.
When the professor and the student are willing to embrace such relationships of
accountability it is because they both have a certain respect for the other’s authority or
standing to make constructive judgements about who they are and should be. What do I
mean by authority or standing here? In a relationship of accountability, a person has
