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547 U.S. 293, 126 S.Ct. 1735, 164 L.Ed.2d 480, 74 USLW 4224, 46
Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), one of J. Howard's sons, was the
ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard's estate plan, which consisted of a living trust
and a “pourover” will. Under the terms of the will, all of J. Howard's assets not
already included in the trust were to be transferred to the trust upon his death.
Competing claims regarding J. Howard's fortune ignited proceedings in both state
and federal courts. In January 1996, while J. Howard's estate was subject to
ongoing proceedings in Probate Court in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, et seq., in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. See In June
1996, Pierce filed a proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding, see ,
alleging that Vickie had defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard's death,
lawyers representing Vickie told members of the press that Pierce had engaged
in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his father's assets. Pierce
sought a declaration that the debt he asserted in that claim was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie answered, asserting truth as a defense.
She also filed counterclaims, among them a claim that Pierce had tortiously
interfered with a gift she expected. see App. 23-25. Vickie alleged that Pierce
prevented the transfer of his father's intended gift to her by, among other things:
effectively imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes; surrounding him with hired
guards for the purpose of preventing personal contact between him and Vickie;
making misrepresentations to J. Howard; and transferring property against J.
Howard's expressed wishes.
Among debts not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see , are those arising from
“willful and malicious injury by the debtor,” .
Vickie's tortious interference counterclaim turned her objection to Pierce's claim
into an adversary proceeding. see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007. In that
proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of Vickie
on Pierce's claim and, after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on
her tortious interference counterclaim. See . The Bankruptcy Court also held
that both Vickie's objection to Pierce's claim and Vickie's counterclaim qualified
as “core proceedings” under , which meant that the court had authority to enter a
final judgment disposing of those claims. See . The court awarded Vickie
compensatory damages of more than $449 million-less whatever she recovered
in the ongoing probate action in Texas-as well as $25 million in punitive
damages.
Pierce filed a post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
Meanwhile, in the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the
living *1743 trust and his father's will were valid. Vickie, in turn, challenged the
validity of the will and filed a tortious interference claim against Pierce, but
voluntarily dismissed both claims once the Bankruptcy Court entered its
Court “did not assert jurisdiction generally over the probate proceedings ... or
take control over [the] estate's assets,” the District Court observed, “[t]hus, the
probate exception would bar federal jurisdiction over Vickie's counterclaim only if
such jurisdiction would ‘interfere’ with the probate proceedings,” (quoting
proceedin[g] arising under , or arising in a case under .” ; see A bankruptcy
court may exercise plenary power only over “core proceedings.” See . In non-
core matters, a bankruptcy court may not enter final judgment; it has authority to
issue only proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are reviewed
“(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal
“(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
“(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
“(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
“(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate;
“(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
prepare an inter vivos trust for Vickie consisting of half the appreciation of his
assets from the date of their marriage. See It further found that Pierce
conspired to suppress or destroy the trust instrument and to strip J. Howard of
his assets by backdating, altering, and otherwise falsifying documents, arranging
recognized that Vickie's claim “does not involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.” Nevertheless, the
court held that the probate exception bars federal jurisdiction in this case. In the
Ninth Circuit's view, a claim falls within the probate exception if it raises
jurisdiction. In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated: “Where a state has
relegated jurisdiction over probate matters to a special court and [the] state's trial
courts of general jurisdiction do not have jurisdiction to hear probate matters,
then federal courts also lack jurisdiction over probate matters.” Noting that
decisions, we reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
II
In , we addressed both the derivation and the limits of the “domestic relations
exception” to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of
holding that Ankenbrandt's suit fell within “the ‘domestic relations' exception to
diversity jurisdiction.” The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. We
reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Holding that the District Court improperly refrained from exercising jurisdiction
cases, the Court in anchored the exception in Congress' original provision for
diversity jurisdiction, Beginning at the beginning, the Court recalled:
“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that ‘the circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
Court stressed, remained in successive statutory provisions for diversity
jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress adopted the more economical phrase, “all
civil actions.” 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, .
The majority, we acknowledged in did not expressly tie its announcement of a
Such relief, in other words, would not fall within the diversity statute's original
grant of jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.”
We concluded in that “it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional limitation
recognized by the Court rested on th[e] statutory basis” indicated by the
jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.’ ” (quoting 1
Stat. 78). We further determined that Congress did not intend to terminate the
exception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity distinction with the phrase ‘all
civil actions.’ ” Absent contrary indications, we presumed that Congress meant
that some lower federal courts had applied the domestic relations exception “well
beyond the circumscribed situations posed by and its progeny,” we clarified that
only “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees” remain outside federal
jurisdictional bounds, While recognizing the “special proficiency developed by
Decisions of this Court have recognized a “probate exception,” kin to the
domestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. See see
also ; . Like the domestic relations exception, the probate exception has been
linked to language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
probate exception described in We therefore need not consider in this case
whether there exists any uncodified probate exception to federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction under .
We note that the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by is subject to a
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain
from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be
timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”
That provision is, in turn, qualified: “Non-core proceedings under , shall
asserted rights regarding a decedent's estate. Jurisdiction was predicated on
§ 24(1) of the Judicial Code, now , which provides for federal jurisdiction over
suits brought by an officer of the United States. At the time the federal suit
commenced, the estate was undergoing probate administration in a state court.
authorizes the President to appoint an official known as the “alien property
custodian,” who is responsible for “receiv[ing,] ... hold [ing],
administer[ing], and account[ing] for” “all money and property in the United
States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy....” The Act was
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had ordered the case dismissed for want of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court held that federal jurisdiction was
properly invoked. The Court first stated:
“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an
Next, the Court described a probate exception of distinctly limited scope:“[W]hile
a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction to disturb or affect the possession
of property in the custody of a state court, ... it may exercise its jurisdiction to
adjudicate rights in such property where the final judgment does not undertake to
against a decedent's estate, “so long as the federal court does not interfere with
the probate proceedings.” (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have
puzzled over the meaning of the words “interfere with the probate proceedings,”
and some have read those words to block federal jurisdiction over a range of
plaintiff's expected inheritance).
We read enigmatic words, in sync with the second above-quoted passage, to
proscribe “disturb[ing] or affect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a
state court.” True, that reading renders the first-quoted passage in part
decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose
of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise
within federal jurisdiction.
receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that [s]he would otherwise
have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).
Vickie seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the probate or
annulment of a will. Cf. (suit to annul a will found “supplemental to the
B
The Court of Appeals advanced an alternate basis for its conclusion that the
federal courts lack jurisdiction over Vickie's claim. Noting that the Texas Probate
Court “ruled it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie Lynn Marshall's claims
to its probate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate a transitory tort. We have
long recognized that “a State cannot create a transitory cause of action and at
the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any
court having jurisdiction.” . Jurisdiction is determined “by the law of the court's
Texas appellate courts have on occasion held claims of tortious
interference with an expected inheritance “barred” by a prior probate court
judgment, apparently applying ordinary principles of preclusion. See,
e.g., (final probate court judgment bars claim of tortious interference with
probate judgment, and failed to state the elements of the claim). Neither
nor questions the Texas trial courts' subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims in question.
Pierce maintains that and other Texas decisions support his contention
36-38. Vickie argues to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioner 42 n. 30
(urging that preclusion does not apply because (1) Vickie's claim was not
litigated to final judgment in the Texas probate proceedings; (2) having
presented her claim in the Bankruptcy Court years before she joined the
stands only for the proposition that a state court's final judgment determining its
own jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the
jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the
judgment. See At issue here, however, is not the Texas Probate Court's
After determining that Vickie's claim was not a “core proceeding,” the District
Court reviewed the case de novo and entered its final judgment on March 7,
2002. The Texas Probate Court's judgment became final on February 11,
2002, nearly one month earlier. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41. The Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Respondent, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce), one of J. Howard's sons, was the
ultimate beneficiary of J. Howard's estate plan, which consisted of a living trust
and a “pourover” will. Under the terms of the will, all of J. Howard's assets not
already included in the trust were to be transferred to the trust upon his death.
Competing claims regarding J. Howard's fortune ignited proceedings in both state
and federal courts. In January 1996, while J. Howard's estate was subject to
ongoing proceedings in Probate Court in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, et seq., in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. See In June
1996, Pierce filed a proof of claim in the federal bankruptcy proceeding, see ,
alleging that Vickie had defamed him when, shortly after J. Howard's death,
lawyers representing Vickie told members of the press that Pierce had engaged
in forgery, fraud, and overreaching to gain control of his father's assets. Pierce
sought a declaration that the debt he asserted in that claim was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy. Vickie answered, asserting truth as a defense.
She also filed counterclaims, among them a claim that Pierce had tortiously
interfered with a gift she expected. see App. 23-25. Vickie alleged that Pierce
prevented the transfer of his father's intended gift to her by, among other things:
effectively imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes; surrounding him with hired
guards for the purpose of preventing personal contact between him and Vickie;
making misrepresentations to J. Howard; and transferring property against J.
Howard's expressed wishes.
Among debts not dischargeable in bankruptcy, see , are those arising from
“willful and malicious injury by the debtor,” .
Vickie's tortious interference counterclaim turned her objection to Pierce's claim
into an adversary proceeding. see Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 3007. In that
proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment in favor of Vickie
on Pierce's claim and, after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for Vickie on
her tortious interference counterclaim. See . The Bankruptcy Court also held
that both Vickie's objection to Pierce's claim and Vickie's counterclaim qualified
as “core proceedings” under , which meant that the court had authority to enter a
final judgment disposing of those claims. See . The court awarded Vickie
compensatory damages of more than $449 million-less whatever she recovered
in the ongoing probate action in Texas-as well as $25 million in punitive
damages.
Pierce filed a post-trial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
Meanwhile, in the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the
living *1743 trust and his father's will were valid. Vickie, in turn, challenged the
validity of the will and filed a tortious interference claim against Pierce, but
voluntarily dismissed both claims once the Bankruptcy Court entered its
Court “did not assert jurisdiction generally over the probate proceedings ... or
take control over [the] estate's assets,” the District Court observed, “[t]hus, the
probate exception would bar federal jurisdiction over Vickie's counterclaim only if
such jurisdiction would ‘interfere’ with the probate proceedings,” (quoting
proceedin[g] arising under , or arising in a case under .” ; see A bankruptcy
court may exercise plenary power only over “core proceedings.” See . In non-
core matters, a bankruptcy court may not enter final judgment; it has authority to
issue only proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are reviewed
“(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal
“(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
“(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
“(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
“(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate;
“(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
prepare an inter vivos trust for Vickie consisting of half the appreciation of his
assets from the date of their marriage. See It further found that Pierce
conspired to suppress or destroy the trust instrument and to strip J. Howard of
his assets by backdating, altering, and otherwise falsifying documents, arranging
recognized that Vickie's claim “does not involve the administration of an estate,
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.” Nevertheless, the
court held that the probate exception bars federal jurisdiction in this case. In the
Ninth Circuit's view, a claim falls within the probate exception if it raises
jurisdiction. In this regard, the Court of Appeals stated: “Where a state has
relegated jurisdiction over probate matters to a special court and [the] state's trial
courts of general jurisdiction do not have jurisdiction to hear probate matters,
then federal courts also lack jurisdiction over probate matters.” Noting that
decisions, we reverse the Ninth Circuit's judgment.
II
In , we addressed both the derivation and the limits of the “domestic relations
exception” to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Carol Ankenbrandt, a citizen of
holding that Ankenbrandt's suit fell within “the ‘domestic relations' exception to
diversity jurisdiction.” The Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. We
reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Holding that the District Court improperly refrained from exercising jurisdiction
cases, the Court in anchored the exception in Congress' original provision for
diversity jurisdiction, Beginning at the beginning, the Court recalled:
“The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that ‘the circuit courts shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
Court stressed, remained in successive statutory provisions for diversity
jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress adopted the more economical phrase, “all
civil actions.” 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 62 Stat. 930, .
The majority, we acknowledged in did not expressly tie its announcement of a
Such relief, in other words, would not fall within the diversity statute's original
grant of jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.”
We concluded in that “it may be inferred fairly that the jurisdictional limitation
recognized by the Court rested on th[e] statutory basis” indicated by the
jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.’ ” (quoting 1
Stat. 78). We further determined that Congress did not intend to terminate the
exception in 1948 when it “replace[d] the law/equity distinction with the phrase ‘all
civil actions.’ ” Absent contrary indications, we presumed that Congress meant
that some lower federal courts had applied the domestic relations exception “well
beyond the circumscribed situations posed by and its progeny,” we clarified that
only “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees” remain outside federal
jurisdictional bounds, While recognizing the “special proficiency developed by
Decisions of this Court have recognized a “probate exception,” kin to the
domestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal jurisdiction. See see
also ; . Like the domestic relations exception, the probate exception has been
linked to language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
probate exception described in We therefore need not consider in this case
whether there exists any uncodified probate exception to federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction under .
We note that the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by is subject to a
States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain
from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be
timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.”
That provision is, in turn, qualified: “Non-core proceedings under , shall
asserted rights regarding a decedent's estate. Jurisdiction was predicated on
§ 24(1) of the Judicial Code, now , which provides for federal jurisdiction over
suits brought by an officer of the United States. At the time the federal suit
commenced, the estate was undergoing probate administration in a state court.
authorizes the President to appoint an official known as the “alien property
custodian,” who is responsible for “receiv[ing,] ... hold [ing],
administer[ing], and account[ing] for” “all money and property in the United
States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy....” The Act was
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had ordered the case dismissed for want of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court held that federal jurisdiction was
properly invoked. The Court first stated:
“It is true that a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an
Next, the Court described a probate exception of distinctly limited scope:“[W]hile
a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction to disturb or affect the possession
of property in the custody of a state court, ... it may exercise its jurisdiction to
adjudicate rights in such property where the final judgment does not undertake to
against a decedent's estate, “so long as the federal court does not interfere with
the probate proceedings.” (emphasis added). Lower federal courts have
puzzled over the meaning of the words “interfere with the probate proceedings,”
and some have read those words to block federal jurisdiction over a range of
plaintiff's expected inheritance).
We read enigmatic words, in sync with the second above-quoted passage, to
proscribe “disturb[ing] or affect[ing] the possession of property in the custody of a
state court.” True, that reading renders the first-quoted passage in part
decedent's estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose
of property that is in the custody of a state probate court. But it does not bar
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and otherwise
within federal jurisdiction.
receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that [s]he would otherwise
have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”).
Vickie seeks an in personam judgment against Pierce, not the probate or
annulment of a will. Cf. (suit to annul a will found “supplemental to the
B
The Court of Appeals advanced an alternate basis for its conclusion that the
federal courts lack jurisdiction over Vickie's claim. Noting that the Texas Probate
Court “ruled it had exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie Lynn Marshall's claims
to its probate courts the exclusive right to adjudicate a transitory tort. We have
long recognized that “a State cannot create a transitory cause of action and at
the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any
court having jurisdiction.” . Jurisdiction is determined “by the law of the court's
Texas appellate courts have on occasion held claims of tortious
interference with an expected inheritance “barred” by a prior probate court
judgment, apparently applying ordinary principles of preclusion. See,
e.g., (final probate court judgment bars claim of tortious interference with
probate judgment, and failed to state the elements of the claim). Neither
nor questions the Texas trial courts' subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claims in question.
Pierce maintains that and other Texas decisions support his contention
36-38. Vickie argues to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioner 42 n. 30
(urging that preclusion does not apply because (1) Vickie's claim was not
litigated to final judgment in the Texas probate proceedings; (2) having
presented her claim in the Bankruptcy Court years before she joined the
stands only for the proposition that a state court's final judgment determining its
own jurisdiction ordinarily qualifies for full faith and credit, so long as the
jurisdictional issue was fully and fairly litigated in the court that rendered the
judgment. See At issue here, however, is not the Texas Probate Court's
After determining that Vickie's claim was not a “core proceeding,” the District
Court reviewed the case de novo and entered its final judgment on March 7,
2002. The Texas Probate Court's judgment became final on February 11,
2002, nearly one month earlier. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41. The Court of Appeals
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
