978-1285770178 Case Printout Case CPC-28-08

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subject Authors Roger LeRoy Miller

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Crippen v. Campbell
Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2768076
granted the Donee's motion, noting, with respect to the engagement ring,
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The Donor argues that the transfer of an engagement ring is a conditional
gift-one given in contemplation of marriage. He asserts that, if and when
the condition, i.e., the marriage, does not occur, the gift fails and the donor
is entitled to the return of the ring. The Donee, not surprisingly, agrees with
the trial court that the transfer of the ring to the Donee was complete upon
is contrary to the trial court's ruling in this case.
III.
The only citable authority in Tennessee addressing the legal status of an
engagement ring is a federal bankruptcy case, In re Berry, 1 B.R. 127
(Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1979). That case, however, was not a dispute between
condition that the marriage ensue. The condition having been met, as in
this case, the gifts become absolute.” Id. at 130 (citation omitted). While
the ruling in Berry is helpful in resolving the issue before us, it is not based
upon facts similar to those in the instant case. As previously noted, there
are no citable Tennessee appellate court decisions on point.
engagement rings should be considered, by their very nature, conditional
gifts given in contemplation of marriage. Once it is established the ring is
an engagement ring, it is a conditional gift.
Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 634 (Kan.1997). The Indiana Court of
Appeals explained why this is so:
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Fowler v. Perry, 830 N.E.2d 97, 105 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citation omitted).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed:
We find the conditional gift theory particularly appropriate when the
contested property is an engagement ring. The inherent symbolism of this
gift forecloses the need to establish an express condition that marriage will
Ct.App.1990). “At the moment of a marriage proposal, couples are least
inclined to utter any disparaging comments concerning the longevity of the
relationship.” Id. Rather than imposing such an unrealistic requirement,
courts have almost universally held that “an engagement ring given in
contemplation of marriage is an impliedly conditional gift”; it is a completed
(Bankr.D.Md.2002); Meyer v. Mitnick, 625 N.W.2d 136
(Mich.Ct.App .2001); Busse v. Lambert, 773 So.2d 182 (La.Ct.App.2000);
Lindh v. Surman, 702 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997); Aronow v. Silver, 538
A.2d 851 (N.J.Super.Ct. Ch. Div.1987); Lyle v. Durham, 473 N.E.2d 1216
(Ohio Ct.App.1984); Gill v. Shively, 320 So.2d 415 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975);
as this past February, the Court of Appeals decided a case involving a
factual dispute over “whether [a] gift ... was a complete, unconditional inter
vivos gift or whether it was a gift with a condition attached.” Weston v.
Community Baptist Church of Wilson County, No. M2004-02688-COA-R3-
CV, 2007 WL 394644, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.App. M.S., filed February 5, 2007)
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“Confederate Memorial Hall”); Albright v. Button, 155 S.W.3d 110
(Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (decedent's bequest of real property to his caretaker
conditioned on her continued performance of care-taking duties); Smith v.
Smith, 650 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (father's gift of a car to his
daughter purportedly conditioned on various criteria of good behavior;
latter set of rules flows naturally from the former. As stated in Arnoult,
Tennessee courts have long held that “in order to constitute a completed
and irrevocable gift, inter vivos, there must be: (1) an intention on the part
of the donor to make the gift, and (2) the intention must be accompanied
by delivery.” Id. at 710 (citing Dodson v. Matthews, 117 S.W.2d 969
The trial court in the instant case relied upon a “memorandum opinion”
FN3 of ours that apparently was cited to the trial court by counsel for the
Donee. Such a case should never be cited to a court “in any unrelated
case.” This can be seen from a reading of the very clear language of Rule
10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals:
2481931, at *3 n. 3 (Tenn., filed September 5, 2007). The “memorandum
opinion” case cited to the trial court, and upon which that court relied, has
no precedential value.
IV.
In summary, we hold that an engagement ring is given in contemplation of
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engagement is broken owing to the fault of the donor, he may not recover
the ring”). We decline to follow these cases because we believe the rule
adopted by us is more in keeping with the essence of what occurs, and
what is contemplated, at the time of an engagement. If and when that
which the parties contemplated-the marriage-does not occur, the
appellee Catharyn Campbell. This case is remanded to the trial court for
enforcement of the summary judgment for Jason M. Crippen and for
collection of the trial court's costs, all as provided for by law.
The Donor argues that the transfer of an engagement ring is a conditional
gift-one given in contemplation of marriage. He asserts that, if and when
the condition, i.e., the marriage, does not occur, the gift fails and the donor
is entitled to the return of the ring. The Donee, not surprisingly, agrees with
the trial court that the transfer of the ring to the Donee was complete upon
is contrary to the trial court's ruling in this case.
III.
The only citable authority in Tennessee addressing the legal status of an
engagement ring is a federal bankruptcy case, In re Berry, 1 B.R. 127
(Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1979). That case, however, was not a dispute between
condition that the marriage ensue. The condition having been met, as in
this case, the gifts become absolute.” Id. at 130 (citation omitted). While
the ruling in Berry is helpful in resolving the issue before us, it is not based
upon facts similar to those in the instant case. As previously noted, there
are no citable Tennessee appellate court decisions on point.
engagement rings should be considered, by their very nature, conditional
gifts given in contemplation of marriage. Once it is established the ring is
an engagement ring, it is a conditional gift.
Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 634 (Kan.1997). The Indiana Court of
Appeals explained why this is so:
Fowler v. Perry, 830 N.E.2d 97, 105 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citation omitted).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed:
We find the conditional gift theory particularly appropriate when the
contested property is an engagement ring. The inherent symbolism of this
gift forecloses the need to establish an express condition that marriage will
Ct.App.1990). “At the moment of a marriage proposal, couples are least
inclined to utter any disparaging comments concerning the longevity of the
relationship.” Id. Rather than imposing such an unrealistic requirement,
courts have almost universally held that “an engagement ring given in
contemplation of marriage is an impliedly conditional gift”; it is a completed
(Bankr.D.Md.2002); Meyer v. Mitnick, 625 N.W.2d 136
(Mich.Ct.App .2001); Busse v. Lambert, 773 So.2d 182 (La.Ct.App.2000);
Lindh v. Surman, 702 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997); Aronow v. Silver, 538
A.2d 851 (N.J.Super.Ct. Ch. Div.1987); Lyle v. Durham, 473 N.E.2d 1216
(Ohio Ct.App.1984); Gill v. Shively, 320 So.2d 415 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975);
as this past February, the Court of Appeals decided a case involving a
factual dispute over “whether [a] gift ... was a complete, unconditional inter
vivos gift or whether it was a gift with a condition attached.” Weston v.
Community Baptist Church of Wilson County, No. M2004-02688-COA-R3-
CV, 2007 WL 394644, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.App. M.S., filed February 5, 2007)
“Confederate Memorial Hall”); Albright v. Button, 155 S.W.3d 110
(Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (decedent's bequest of real property to his caretaker
conditioned on her continued performance of care-taking duties); Smith v.
Smith, 650 S.W.2d 54 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (father's gift of a car to his
daughter purportedly conditioned on various criteria of good behavior;
latter set of rules flows naturally from the former. As stated in Arnoult,
Tennessee courts have long held that “in order to constitute a completed
and irrevocable gift, inter vivos, there must be: (1) an intention on the part
of the donor to make the gift, and (2) the intention must be accompanied
by delivery.” Id. at 710 (citing Dodson v. Matthews, 117 S.W.2d 969
The trial court in the instant case relied upon a “memorandum opinion”
FN3 of ours that apparently was cited to the trial court by counsel for the
Donee. Such a case should never be cited to a court “in any unrelated
case.” This can be seen from a reading of the very clear language of Rule
10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals:
2481931, at *3 n. 3 (Tenn., filed September 5, 2007). The “memorandum
opinion” case cited to the trial court, and upon which that court relied, has
no precedential value.
IV.
In summary, we hold that an engagement ring is given in contemplation of
engagement is broken owing to the fault of the donor, he may not recover
the ring”). We decline to follow these cases because we believe the rule
adopted by us is more in keeping with the essence of what occurs, and
what is contemplated, at the time of an engagement. If and when that
which the parties contemplated-the marriage-does not occur, the
appellee Catharyn Campbell. This case is remanded to the trial court for
enforcement of the summary judgment for Jason M. Crippen and for
collection of the trial court's costs, all as provided for by law.

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