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of an account with that broker. The court further [found] that the defendant breached this contract when it trans-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dalia v. Lawrence, supra, at 71, 627 A.2d 392; see also Bristol v. Tilcon
Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 65, 931 A.2d 237 (2007). Even under this deferential standard, we conclude that the
findings of the trial court must yield.
[4][5][6][7] “A gift is the transfer of property without consideration.... To make a valid gift inter vivos, the donor
must part with control of the property which is the subject of the gift with an intent that title shall pass immediately
and irrevocably to the donee.” (Citation *104 omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kriedel v. Krampitz, supra,
137 Conn. at 534, 79 A.2d 181; Parley v. Parley, 72 Conn.App. 742, 749, 807 A.2d 982 (2002); see also Burbank v.
Stevens, 104 Conn. 17, 22, 131 A. 742 (1926). In other words, a valid inter vivos gift of personal property requires
both delivery of possession of the property to the donee and an intent on the part of the donor that title shall pass
[8][9][10] “Delivery of possession is the foundation of a transfer; without delivery there can be no transfer.” City
National Bank v. Morrissey, 97 Conn. 480, 483, 117 A. 493 (1922). In order to constitute a delivery, not only must
the donor part with possession of the property, but he also must relinquish control of it. See Kriedel v. Krampitz,
supra, 137 Conn. at 534, 79 A.2d 181; Burbank v. Stevens, supra, 104 Conn. at 22, 131 A. 742 (delivery to third per-
or mode. See Hebrew University Assn. v. Nye, 148 Conn. 223, 232, 169 A.2d 641 (1961); Fontaine v. Colt's Mfg.
Co., supra, 74 Conn.App. at 733, 814 A.2d 433.
In the present case, the parties agree that the plaintiff never received actual delivery of the funds in the brokerage
account. Indeed, he was unaware of the existence of those funds until after they had been withdrawn from the ac-
those funds in the possession of the defendant, who thereafter affixed the plaintiff's name and social securi-
ty number to those funds. He further claims that the defendant never has disputed the existence or applica-
bility of that legal proposition and that the defendant cannot defeat his title to the funds by now claiming a
failure of delivery. We disagree. Our review of the record reveals that, from the initiation of this action, the
defendant has taken the position that the placement of the funds in the brokerage account was insufficient
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dalia v. Lawrence, supra, at 71, 627 A.2d 392; see also Bristol v. Tilcon
Minerals, Inc., 284 Conn. 55, 65, 931 A.2d 237 (2007). Even under this deferential standard, we conclude that the
findings of the trial court must yield.
[4][5][6][7] “A gift is the transfer of property without consideration.... To make a valid gift inter vivos, the donor
must part with control of the property which is the subject of the gift with an intent that title shall pass immediately
and irrevocably to the donee.” (Citation *104 omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kriedel v. Krampitz, supra,
137 Conn. at 534, 79 A.2d 181; Parley v. Parley, 72 Conn.App. 742, 749, 807 A.2d 982 (2002); see also Burbank v.
Stevens, 104 Conn. 17, 22, 131 A. 742 (1926). In other words, a valid inter vivos gift of personal property requires
both delivery of possession of the property to the donee and an intent on the part of the donor that title shall pass
[8][9][10] “Delivery of possession is the foundation of a transfer; without delivery there can be no transfer.” City
National Bank v. Morrissey, 97 Conn. 480, 483, 117 A. 493 (1922). In order to constitute a delivery, not only must
the donor part with possession of the property, but he also must relinquish control of it. See Kriedel v. Krampitz,
supra, 137 Conn. at 534, 79 A.2d 181; Burbank v. Stevens, supra, 104 Conn. at 22, 131 A. 742 (delivery to third per-
or mode. See Hebrew University Assn. v. Nye, 148 Conn. 223, 232, 169 A.2d 641 (1961); Fontaine v. Colt's Mfg.
Co., supra, 74 Conn.App. at 733, 814 A.2d 433.
In the present case, the parties agree that the plaintiff never received actual delivery of the funds in the brokerage
account. Indeed, he was unaware of the existence of those funds until after they had been withdrawn from the ac-
those funds in the possession of the defendant, who thereafter affixed the plaintiff's name and social securi-
ty number to those funds. He further claims that the defendant never has disputed the existence or applica-
bility of that legal proposition and that the defendant cannot defeat his title to the funds by now claiming a
failure of delivery. We disagree. Our review of the record reveals that, from the initiation of this action, the
defendant has taken the position that the placement of the funds in the brokerage account was insufficient
