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445 F.3d 105
Page 1
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Robert Wayne CHALFANT, Appellee,
v.
TITAN DISTRIBUTION, INC.; Titan International, Inc., Appellants.
Filed: Jan. 22, 2007.
Before , Chief Judge, SMITH and , Circuit Judges.
damages. The district court then awarded Chalfant $18,750 in front pay and denied Titan's
portion of Quintak's employees. All Quintak employees who wanted to work at Titan were
Cheryl Luthin oversaw the application process.
Chalfant applied at Titan for the same position he had with Quintak, second shift supervisor in
the tire and wheel mounting division. He believed that this position would have the same
supervisor in the tire and wheel mounting division as an employee of Labor Ready, a
445 F.3d 105
Page 2
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
After Titan refused to hire him, Chalfant took a job with AMPCO Systems, a parking ramp
management company, within two months. At AMPCO, Chalfant performed general service
work, walking up to five miles a day and lifting more than he did as a Quintak employee. His
wages were half of what he earned at Quintak. Once he started working at AMPCO, Chalfant
continued his job search by reviewing newspaper classifieds for other jobs. The day after he
the physical examination that was withdrawn after he failed the physical. During litigation,
however, Titan claimed that Chalfant was not hired as a second shift supervisor because the
entire second shift was going to be eliminated.
Chalfant sued Titan for disability and age discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, et seq., respectively, and
new trial, its motion for remittitur and its motion to alter or amend the front pay *988 award
under . Titan appeals.
Titan challenged the award of back pay in its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
However, we adopt the district court's characterization of Titan's back pay challenge as a
motion for remittitur.
and (iii) the district court abused its discretion in awarding Chalfant front pay. We address
each argument in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Titan argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial
because there was insufficient evidence for the jury's verdict of discrimination and for the jury
445 F.3d 105
Page 3
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
matter of law nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Titan's motion for a new trial.
1. Judgment as a Matter of Law
A plaintiff alleging discrimination based on a disability under the ADA must establish a prima
facie case. The three elements of this prima facie case are (1) that the plaintiff has “a disability
within the meaning of the ADA;” (2) that he is qualified “to perform the essential functions of
the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;” and (3) that he suffered “an adverse
employment action due to a disability.” . Titan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” ; . A person is regarded as disabled if “(1) the
employer mistakenly believes that the employee has an impairment (which would substantially
limit one or more major life activity), or (2) the employer mistakenly believes that an actual*989
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity.” .
(quoting ). If an employer believes that an employee is unable to perform “one specific job,”
then the employee is not regarded as disabled. .
Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled because it mistakenly believed that his physical ailments
substantially limited his ability to work in a broad range of jobs. Chalfant wrote in his
application packet that he considered himself physically handicapped because of his ailments.
Chalfant only applied for that position, and Titan declined to hire Chalfant for that one position.
If Titan did not believe that Chalfant was substantially limited in his ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, Titan argues that Chalfant cannot
show that he was regarded as disabled by Titan.
Giving all reasonable inferences to the jury's verdict in favor of Chalfant, we find sufficient
445 F.3d 105
Page 4
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Titan believed Chalfant's impairments
substantially restricted his ability to work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. While Chalfant only applied for the second shift supervisor position, that position did
not require unique or strenuous lifting. Titan employees testified that there was no lifting
Chalfant would have been prevented from performing 70 percent of the jobs in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could have found that Titan did not believe that a person with Chalfant's medical impairments
could work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Therefore, the jury
could have reasonably found that Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled.
prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent
on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function; and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
(quoting ).
Titan first argues that it cannot identify the fundamental job duties of the position of a second
and heavy lifting at times. Palmer, the second shift supervisor who assumed Chalfant's
duties, testified that he had to walk more in his position after Titan replaced Quintak.
Chalfant's doctor, Dr. Jeffrey Schoon, testified that Chalfant could not lift more than five
pounds or walk more than one-half mile in one day. With this evidence, Titan argues that
Chalfant would not have been able to meet the requirements of the second shift supervisor
employee during the first week of August, before he was told that he would not be hired.
Furthermore, the jury heard evidence concerning Chalfant's new position at AMPCO. In that
position, Chalfant testified that he walked over five miles each day. Chalfant argued that he
445 F.3d 105
Page 5
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Chalfant's vocational expert considered Chalfant's limitations and testified that he would be
able to perform the supervisor position as described by Titan. The jury heard the evidence of
both parties, and that evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that Chalfant
was able to perform the essential functions of the second shift supervisor position.
The third element of the prima facie case requires a showing that the person suffered an
motivating factor in the employer's decision for the adverse action.
Titan argues that Chalfant did not present sufficient evidence to establish a specific link
between Chalfant's alleged disability and the adverse action of refusing to hire him. The
position is no longer in existence, and Campbell testified that he made the decision to
terminate the second shift at the beginning of 2002. Therefore, Chalfant allegedly was not
because he failed the physical exam. Titan even provided this reason for not hiring Chalfant
to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. It was not until the litigation proceedings that Titan
claimed that the reason Chalfant was not hired was that the position had been eliminated. On
these facts, a reasonable jury could decide that there was a specific link between the disability
discrimination and Titan's decision not to hire Chalfant.
also know that it “may be acting in violation of federal law.”
Titan argues that there was insufficient evidence for the district court to submit the issue of
punitive damages to the jury. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Chalfant, we find
sufficient evidence to show that Titan acted with malice or reckless indifference in its decision
not to hire Chalfant. Campbell testified that he and Holley knew that disability discrimination
acting in violation of federal law. In short order, Titan accepted that Chalfant passed his
445 F.3d 105
Page 6
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
445 F.3d 105
Page 7
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
omitted). The purpose of front pay is to address the equitable needs of the employee,
including his ability to find another position with a similar salary.
Titan and Chalfant agreed that reinstatement was not practical. While Chalfant sought an
award of front pay that would compensate him for six years, the district court determined that
front pay should cover only one year. The district court awarded Chalfant $18,750,
representing the difference between Chalfant's wages and health insurance benefits at
AMPCO and what they would have been at Titan for the one-year period. The district court
reasoned that Chalfant should be able to find employment similar to the Titan position within
one year. Titan argues that the district court erred in providing this award because Chalfant
did not attempt to find a comparable job. The district court, however, properly considered
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
445 F.3d 105
Page 2
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
After Titan refused to hire him, Chalfant took a job with AMPCO Systems, a parking ramp
management company, within two months. At AMPCO, Chalfant performed general service
work, walking up to five miles a day and lifting more than he did as a Quintak employee. His
wages were half of what he earned at Quintak. Once he started working at AMPCO, Chalfant
continued his job search by reviewing newspaper classifieds for other jobs. The day after he
the physical examination that was withdrawn after he failed the physical. During litigation,
however, Titan claimed that Chalfant was not hired as a second shift supervisor because the
entire second shift was going to be eliminated.
Chalfant sued Titan for disability and age discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, et seq., respectively, and
new trial, its motion for remittitur and its motion to alter or amend the front pay *988 award
under . Titan appeals.
Titan challenged the award of back pay in its motion for judgment as a matter of law.
However, we adopt the district court's characterization of Titan's back pay challenge as a
motion for remittitur.
and (iii) the district court abused its discretion in awarding Chalfant front pay. We address
each argument in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Titan argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial
because there was insufficient evidence for the jury's verdict of discrimination and for the jury
445 F.3d 105
Page 3
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
matter of law nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Titan's motion for a new trial.
1. Judgment as a Matter of Law
A plaintiff alleging discrimination based on a disability under the ADA must establish a prima
facie case. The three elements of this prima facie case are (1) that the plaintiff has “a disability
within the meaning of the ADA;” (2) that he is qualified “to perform the essential functions of
the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;” and (3) that he suffered “an adverse
employment action due to a disability.” . Titan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” ; . A person is regarded as disabled if “(1) the
employer mistakenly believes that the employee has an impairment (which would substantially
limit one or more major life activity), or (2) the employer mistakenly believes that an actual*989
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity.” .
(quoting ). If an employer believes that an employee is unable to perform “one specific job,”
then the employee is not regarded as disabled. .
Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled because it mistakenly believed that his physical ailments
substantially limited his ability to work in a broad range of jobs. Chalfant wrote in his
application packet that he considered himself physically handicapped because of his ailments.
Chalfant only applied for that position, and Titan declined to hire Chalfant for that one position.
If Titan did not believe that Chalfant was substantially limited in his ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, Titan argues that Chalfant cannot
show that he was regarded as disabled by Titan.
Giving all reasonable inferences to the jury's verdict in favor of Chalfant, we find sufficient
445 F.3d 105
Page 4
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Titan believed Chalfant's impairments
substantially restricted his ability to work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes. While Chalfant only applied for the second shift supervisor position, that position did
not require unique or strenuous lifting. Titan employees testified that there was no lifting
Chalfant would have been prevented from performing 70 percent of the jobs in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could have found that Titan did not believe that a person with Chalfant's medical impairments
could work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Therefore, the jury
could have reasonably found that Titan regarded Chalfant as disabled.
prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (3) the amount of time spent
on the job performing the function; (4) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function; and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
(quoting ).
Titan first argues that it cannot identify the fundamental job duties of the position of a second
and heavy lifting at times. Palmer, the second shift supervisor who assumed Chalfant's
duties, testified that he had to walk more in his position after Titan replaced Quintak.
Chalfant's doctor, Dr. Jeffrey Schoon, testified that Chalfant could not lift more than five
pounds or walk more than one-half mile in one day. With this evidence, Titan argues that
Chalfant would not have been able to meet the requirements of the second shift supervisor
employee during the first week of August, before he was told that he would not be hired.
Furthermore, the jury heard evidence concerning Chalfant's new position at AMPCO. In that
position, Chalfant testified that he walked over five miles each day. Chalfant argued that he
445 F.3d 105
Page 5
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Chalfant's vocational expert considered Chalfant's limitations and testified that he would be
able to perform the supervisor position as described by Titan. The jury heard the evidence of
both parties, and that evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that Chalfant
was able to perform the essential functions of the second shift supervisor position.
The third element of the prima facie case requires a showing that the person suffered an
motivating factor in the employer's decision for the adverse action.
Titan argues that Chalfant did not present sufficient evidence to establish a specific link
between Chalfant's alleged disability and the adverse action of refusing to hire him. The
position is no longer in existence, and Campbell testified that he made the decision to
terminate the second shift at the beginning of 2002. Therefore, Chalfant allegedly was not
because he failed the physical exam. Titan even provided this reason for not hiring Chalfant
to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. It was not until the litigation proceedings that Titan
claimed that the reason Chalfant was not hired was that the position had been eliminated. On
these facts, a reasonable jury could decide that there was a specific link between the disability
discrimination and Titan's decision not to hire Chalfant.
also know that it “may be acting in violation of federal law.”
Titan argues that there was insufficient evidence for the district court to submit the issue of
punitive damages to the jury. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Chalfant, we find
sufficient evidence to show that Titan acted with malice or reckless indifference in its decision
not to hire Chalfant. Campbell testified that he and Holley knew that disability discrimination
acting in violation of federal law. In short order, Titan accepted that Chalfant passed his
445 F.3d 105
Page 6
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
445 F.3d 105
Page 7
445 F.3d 105, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,741
(Cite as: 445 F.3d 105)
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
omitted). The purpose of front pay is to address the equitable needs of the employee,
including his ability to find another position with a similar salary.
Titan and Chalfant agreed that reinstatement was not practical. While Chalfant sought an
award of front pay that would compensate him for six years, the district court determined that
front pay should cover only one year. The district court awarded Chalfant $18,750,
representing the difference between Chalfant's wages and health insurance benefits at
AMPCO and what they would have been at Titan for the one-year period. The district court
reasoned that Chalfant should be able to find employment similar to the Titan position within
one year. Titan argues that the district court erred in providing this award because Chalfant
did not attempt to find a comparable job. The district court, however, properly considered
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
