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Conn.App.,2012.
Li Li v. Canberra Industries
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination
231Hk42 k. Lifetime or permanent employment. Most Cited Cases
Generally, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.
[3] Labor and Employment 231H 861
231H Labor and Employment
231HVIII Adverse Employment Action
231HVIII(B) Actions
[4] Labor and Employment 231H 861
231H Labor and Employment
231HVIII Adverse Employment Action
231HVIII(B) Actions
to the employer to demonstrate a permissible reason for the termination of employment, and if the employer's bur-
den of going forward is satisfied, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving by the preponderance of the evi-
dence that the employer's reason is pretextual or, even if true, the improper reason likely motivated the employer in
the decision to terminate.
A common-law action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the employment at will doc-
trine includes a causation element, and a failure to prove causation defeats the claim.
[6] Labor and Employment 231H 759
The plaintiff filed an eleven count revised complaint in January, 2009, FN3 which alleged common-law wrongful
discharge (count one), breach of implied contract (count two), breach of express contract (count three), fraudulent
misrepresentation (count four), negligent supervision (count five), statutory wrongful discharge (count six), hostile
issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion as to all counts. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review for summary judgment is well settled. “Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the outcome of the case.... Once the moving party has
presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party mere-
ly to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence
I
[1] The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to her common-law claim of
wrongful discharge. We agree.
She framed her action in the following manner. In count one of her revised complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter
alia, that the defendants discharged her under the pretext of poor performance reviews when, in fact, the discharge
competitor customer support lines.
[2][3] “Generally, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.... In
ment in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yancey v. Con-
necticut Life & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 68 Conn.App. at 559–60, 791 A.2d 719.
[4] Statutory actions for wrongful discharge typically follow the analytic route outlined in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this analysis, the plaintiff has a
minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that he or she engaged in a protected activity or oth-
Conn.App. 501, 507, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003).
[5] A common-law action brought pursuant to Sheets includes a causation element. See Sophia v. Danbury, 116
Conn.App. 68, 74–75, 974 A.2d 804 (2009). A common-law case logically should be analyzed in the same frame-
work as a statutory cause of action. The court in this case explicitly decided only the third step, that is, the actual
reason or reasons for termination. A failure to prove causation defeats the action in any event, so that the court did
materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment were properly authenticated. Because the trial
court appears to have considered all the materials, however, and no challenge appears to have been made,
we likewise will consider the substance of the materials presented.
More specifically, in Schmeizl's March 30, 2000 review, he directed the plaintiff, inter alia, to “[c]all competi-
tors' customer support lines and gather pricing information and literature.” The review noted that the task first had
Schmeizl that unless she pretended to be another person she could not obtain information from competitors. She
stated that, despite this, Schmeizl expected her to continue to telephone competitors pretending to be someone else,
which practice is common within the industry. She further stated that Schmeizl was “punishing” her for not making
the telephone calls in the manner directed. In Schmeizl's ninety day review, in which he recommended termination,
he stated, inter alia, the plaintiff “refused to take an assignment I gave to her. [The plaintiff] leaves me no choice but
© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
231H Labor and Employment
231HI In General
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination
231Hk42 k. Lifetime or permanent employment. Most Cited Cases
Generally, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.
[3] Labor and Employment 231H 861
231H Labor and Employment
231HVIII Adverse Employment Action
231HVIII(B) Actions
[4] Labor and Employment 231H 861
231H Labor and Employment
231HVIII Adverse Employment Action
231HVIII(B) Actions
to the employer to demonstrate a permissible reason for the termination of employment, and if the employer's bur-
den of going forward is satisfied, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving by the preponderance of the evi-
dence that the employer's reason is pretextual or, even if true, the improper reason likely motivated the employer in
the decision to terminate.
A common-law action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the employment at will doc-
trine includes a causation element, and a failure to prove causation defeats the claim.
[6] Labor and Employment 231H 759
The plaintiff filed an eleven count revised complaint in January, 2009, FN3 which alleged common-law wrongful
discharge (count one), breach of implied contract (count two), breach of express contract (count three), fraudulent
misrepresentation (count four), negligent supervision (count five), statutory wrongful discharge (count six), hostile
issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion as to all counts. This appeal followed.
Our standard of review for summary judgment is well settled. “Practice Book § 17–49 provides that summary
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the outcome of the case.... Once the moving party has
presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party mere-
ly to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence
I
[1] The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to her common-law claim of
wrongful discharge. We agree.
She framed her action in the following manner. In count one of her revised complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter
alia, that the defendants discharged her under the pretext of poor performance reviews when, in fact, the discharge
competitor customer support lines.
[2][3] “Generally, contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will.... In
ment in order to raise a genuine issue of fact.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yancey v. Con-
necticut Life & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 68 Conn.App. at 559–60, 791 A.2d 719.
[4] Statutory actions for wrongful discharge typically follow the analytic route outlined in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this analysis, the plaintiff has a
minimal burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that he or she engaged in a protected activity or oth-
Conn.App. 501, 507, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003).
[5] A common-law action brought pursuant to Sheets includes a causation element. See Sophia v. Danbury, 116
Conn.App. 68, 74–75, 974 A.2d 804 (2009). A common-law case logically should be analyzed in the same frame-
work as a statutory cause of action. The court in this case explicitly decided only the third step, that is, the actual
reason or reasons for termination. A failure to prove causation defeats the action in any event, so that the court did
materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment were properly authenticated. Because the trial
court appears to have considered all the materials, however, and no challenge appears to have been made,
we likewise will consider the substance of the materials presented.
More specifically, in Schmeizl's March 30, 2000 review, he directed the plaintiff, inter alia, to “[c]all competi-
tors' customer support lines and gather pricing information and literature.” The review noted that the task first had
Schmeizl that unless she pretended to be another person she could not obtain information from competitors. She
stated that, despite this, Schmeizl expected her to continue to telephone competitors pretending to be someone else,
which practice is common within the industry. She further stated that Schmeizl was “punishing” her for not making
the telephone calls in the manner directed. In Schmeizl's ninety day review, in which he recommended termination,
he stated, inter alia, the plaintiff “refused to take an assignment I gave to her. [The plaintiff] leaves me no choice but
